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ABSTRACT
The Making of Natal: Defensive Institutions and State Formation in Nineteenth Century
Southern Africa
Jacob Mckinnon Ivey
This dissertation establishes an understanding of how the defensive institutions of the colony
of Natal were formed in the context of the emerging British Empire in Southern Africa during
the mid-nineteenth century, the parameters of their organization, and their contributions and
influences to the institutions which characterized Natal as a colonial state. Paying particular
attention to the organization of colonial defence, including the complexities of African
contributions to colonial rule and white solutions to questions of security and defence in the
emerging colonial state of Natal, a clearer picture of the manner in which Natal defined itself
and its place in Southern Africa will be revealed. To accomplish this, particular attention is
paid to the structures created during what I have called the “formative period” of the colony;
from the Cape Colony’s declaring the district of Natal a British territory in May 1844 to the
Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. These defensive and military institutions will be revealed as an
important pillar in Natal’s overall defensive and social structures. These interacting structures
of state formation, or “web of structures”, illustrate the importance of Natal’s creation as a
colonial state. Focus is placed on four areas of colonial defence, which evolved over this
formative period and helped defined Natal’s creation. These include the white volunteer
military organization, known collectively as the Volunteer Corps, the European police
institutions, paying particular attention to the Natal Mounted Police, the African police
constabulary, which worked sometimes in conjunction with and sometimes autonomous from
their European counterparts, and finally the Africans who provided a direct military
contribution to the colony’s defence, or as I have titled them, simply “African military units”.
All of these organizations acted within the colonial government in one form or another and
existed throughout the formative period of the colony. None were part of Her Majesty’s
formal military forces, and all were almost exclusively composed of residents of Natal, both
white and black. The purpose of this limited scope is twofold. It provides an avenue of focus
that moves beyond simple regimental histories and gives greater attention to the lives and
events of those who took part in colonial defence. Also, by excluding the British Imperial
troops, it is easier to strike a balance between both European and African defensive
institutions within the colony of Natal. In doing so, my research reinforces the notion that
colonial defence was truly a universal concern that included both white and black segments
of Natal’s society. By focusing on these institutions, tenets of state formation should be
recognized, at the same time illustrating the fluid or even amorphous nature of Natal’s early
development as a colonial state.
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1
Chapter One: Introduction
In 1892, one year before the establishment of responsible government in the colony of
Natal, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, former Secretary for Native Affairs and pivotal figure in the
history Natal and South Africa, marvelled at what he considered his greatest success:

The history of Natal may be left to speak for itself. Forty-six years of existence, and
forty-six years of peace, as far as its internal management in concerned, is a record
that no other South African state can show.1

One war, and one significant rebellion, though measurable, does little to dissuade this claim.
It is not farfetched to postulate that such an extended period of peace directly contributed to
Natal’s growth as a colonial state throughout the nineteenth century and made it a welcome
addition to the Union of South Africa in 1910. Yet the achievement of peace was not as
simplistic as summarized by Shepstone. The colony of Natal was part of the British Empire,
and its government was the primary implementer of that peace. When considering the
maintenance of that peace, the political society of the state, as described by Antonio Gramsci,
requires the implementation of force.2 Using this logic, the key factor in the organization and
implementation of colonial rule has always been the use of force. In terms of implementation,
rule was maintained by the negotiation of authority and cooperation of local elites or
collaborators, but initially and ultimately, like all states, colonial rule rests on the threat of the
use of force. It was through such force or the professed threat of it the British Empire was
able to maintain its possessions within Africa, on some fundamental level. Generally, as
Robinson and Gallagher illustrated, the “Age of Imperialism” in Africa was not an
overarching event dictated by an organized and established plan by the British, but instead
1

Sir Theophilus Shepstone, “The Native Question: Answer to President Reitz,” Reprinted in The Natal
Mercury, January 29, 1892, 16.
2
See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith
(New York: International Publishers, 1971).
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was part of a constantly evolving approach to imperial rivalry with other European states in
relation to ministerial questions of where to advance and why.3 Therefore, when looking at
the formation of particular colonial states within the Empire, especially in Africa, one general
thesis concerning the causes of imperial expansion, the reasons for its maintenance, or how it
was held together will not suffice. Instead, a more detailed explanation is required to help
understand how certain states defended and defined themselves in the period of British
settlement and conquest during the nineteenth century. As D.A. Low has illustrated in the
case of Uganda, the formation of empire was never set in stone, but instead “fabricated” by
the disputes on the ground, leading to unique colonial ventures with their own distinct
character and contingency.4 Such was the case with the colony of Natal. It would, however,
be beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide a comprehensive examination of the
“making of Natal”, moving through the nineteenth century in the same manner Low moves
through late nineteenth and early twentieth century Uganda. Instead, select elements of
Natal’s formation will be examined. As force and defence were consistent themes in the
formation of the Empire across the globe, it is fitting to see how these elements aided in the
development of Natal as a colonial state during the nineteenth century.

This dissertation aims to understand how the defensive institutions of the colony of
Natal were formed in the context of the emerging British Empire in Southern Africa during
the mid-nineteenth century, as well as the parameters of their organization, and their
contributions and influences to other institutions which characterized Natal as a colonial

3
Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher, and Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of
Imperialism (London: Macmillan, 1961), 13–17.
4
For Low, the case of Uganda shows a level of “forced amalgamation” which led to the formation of states
through a determined process of rule. See D. A Low, Fabrication of Empire: The British and the Uganda
Kingdoms, 1890-1902 (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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state.5 By paying particular attention to the organization of colonial defence, including the
complexities of African contributions to colonial rule and white solutions to questions of
security and defence in the emerging colonial state of Natal, a clearer picture of the manner in
which Natal defined itself and its place in Southern Africa will be revealed. To accomplish
this, close attention is paid to the structures created during what I have called the “formative
period” of the colony; from the declaration of the district of Natal as a British territory in
May 1844 to the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879.6 These defensive and military institutions will be
revealed as an important pillar in Natal’s overall defensive and social structures. These
interacting structures of state formation, or “web of structures”, illustrate the importance of
Natal’s creation as a colonial state.7 By focusing on these institutions, tenets of state
formation should be recognized, at the same time illustrating the fluid and even amorphous
nature of Natal’s development as a colonial state. By using the defensive institutions as a foil,
this fluidity, or constant development and change, will become more apparent in the manner
in which the colonial government, its citizens, and its subjects attempted to come to grips
with the concerns over security and safety within Natal during its formative period.

The very issue of state formation in early colonial or pre-colonial Africa continues to
be a crucial question in understanding the role of African states in early colonial systems,
whether Zulu, Ndebele, or, more widely, Nguni.8 An understanding of the chief system

5

By “defensive institutions”, I hope to encompass the civil, military, police, and security components of
colonial society under a single term. While “security” could be an alternative, this term illustrates the full scope
of these institutions’ place in the development of Natal as a colonial state.
6

The use of the term “formative period” is not only part of the attempt to place a temporal importance to the
period of this research. It is during this period that Natal created the major institutions that would define it as a
colonial state.
7

By “web of structures”, I mean the interconnected elements of Natal’s colonial institutions that would lay the
groundwork in defining Natal as a colonial state during this period, an element the defensive institutions were
only one part of. These “web of structures” included the colony’s military systems, legislature, legal systems,
voting practices, indigenous policy, and socioeconomic order, all coming to fruition in some form during this
“formative period”.

8
Norman Etherington, “Were There Large States in the Coastal Regions of Southeast Africa before the Rise of
the Zulu Kingdom?” History in Africa 31 (January 1, 2004): 157–83.
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within Natal will rely on previous analyses of the Zulu chiefdoms during British settlement
and following the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. Though focused largely on the colonial era, such
analyses attempt to create an understanding of the impact of the British presence on the
institution of chiefship in early colonial Natal. This relates to the standard argument amongst
historians of this period about how the British solidified their power base by reestablishing
many chiefs who lost influence during the age of Shaka. The role of the chief, however, was
significantly altered under the British system. The chief soon became a government official
for the British, which undermined African society within the region and in many ways
resulted in the collapse of powerbases within the Zulu kingdoms.9 All this acted as both a
precursor and facilitator in the formation of Natal and its rise as a colonial state in Southern
Africa.

A secondary, understated goal of this dissertation will be to show that the eventual
incorporation of Natal into South Africa was not inevitable. Whereas previous scholarship
has tended to view the history of Natal as part of the backdrop of the larger story of South
Africa, the colony deserves independent consideration in its own right. At its core, the
response and development of these defensive institutions within the colony shows the fluid
and contentious nature of state formation within colonial Natal, and the British Empire as a
whole. The need to defend itself, a key hallmark of all states, was an obvious drive and
concern for not only the colonial government, but its population. This drive toward selfpreservation in the form of defensive institutions is indicative of a colonial system which
envisioned itself as both semi-autonomous and independent from the other colonial entities
within British Southern Africa and not of an administration that foresaw its eventual
assimilation with the Cape Colony and the rest of what would become South Africa. In

9

For more on the post-Anglo-Zulu War collapse of the Zulu state, see John Lambert, Betrayed Trust: Africans
and the State in Colonial Natal (Scottsville, UZA: University of Natal Press, 1995).
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essence, the fate of the colony of Natal, with its incorporation into the Union of South Africa
in 1910, should not be regarded as inevitable or preordained. Instead, this dissertation will
show that the creation of Natal and its development was part of a process of state formation
that remained largely autonomous, even when it was an actual dependent of the Cape Colony
prior to Natal’s Charter in 1856. This autonomous nature is most revealed in the defensive
structures which were part of Natal and Natal alone during this period, with little or no
overriding influence from the other segments of Southern Africa, especially after the
approval of Natal’s Colonial Charter. Moreover, Natal should be seen not as an extension of
the Cape Colony before union, but instead as a part of the British Empire in its own right.
Only then will the history of Natal help to facilitate a greater understanding of its place in the
Empire and impact on colonial rule in Africa.

This dissertation will focus on four areas of colonial defence, which evolved over this
formative period and helped define Natal’s creation. These include the white volunteer
military organization, known collectively as the Volunteer Corps; the European police
institutions, paying particular attention to the Natal Mounted Police; the African police
constabulary, which worked sometimes in conjunction with and sometimes autonomous from
their European counterparts; and finally the Africans who provided a direct military
contribution to the colony’s defence, or as I have titled them, “African military units” or
“African military units”. All of these organizations acted on behalf of the colonial
government in one form or another and existed throughout the formative period of the
colony. None were part of Her Majesty’s formal military forces, and were almost exclusively
composed of residents of Natal, both white and black.

The purpose of this limited scope is twofold. It provides an avenue of focus that
moves beyond simple regimental histories and gives greater focus on the lives and events of
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those who took part in colonial defence. Also, by excluding the British Imperial troops, it will
be easier to strike a balance between both European and African defensive institutions within
the colony of Natal. In doing so, it will become clear that colonial defence was truly a
universal concern that included both white and black segments of Natal’s society. This will
contribute to an understanding of how the defensive institutions of the colony of Natal were
formed in the context of the emerging British Empire in Southern Africa during the midnineteenth century, the parameters of their organization, and their contributions and
influences to the institutions which characterized Natal as a colonial state.
Historiography
Despite the lack of a centricity to Natal’s important to the history of South Africa
within the historiography, there remains a vast scholarship on this particular region of the
British Southern Africa. Alan Hattersley’s work on the development of colonial Natal during
the mid-nineteenth century is widely considered to be the seminal texts for understanding
early Natal.10 Hattersley’s work, though a necessary foundation for any research on early
Natal, largely lacks an interpretation of the indigenous policy, as well as an understanding of
the manner in which the presence of the indigenous population impacted the Europeans of
Natal and their formation of a colonial state. Moreover, because Hattersley represents one of
the founding historical accounts of Natal, few have called into question some of his basic
research premises. This is beginning to change with the work of scholars like Jeff Guy, who

10
Alan Frederick Hattersley, Portrait of a Colony: The Story of Natal, (Cambridge, UK: University Press,
1940); Alan Frederick Hattersley, The British Settlement of Natal; A Study in Imperial Migration (Cambridge,
UK: University Press, 1950); Alan Frederick Hattersley, The Natalians; Further Annals of Natal
(Pietermaritzburg,: Shuter & Shooter, 1940). Hattersley’s work, though somewhat dated, is a fantastic source of
information for anyone attempting to understand the early history of Natal.
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specifically points to Hattersley’s dismissal of Lieutenant-Governor Scott and his perceived
impact, or lack thereof, on Natal’s history.11

Hattersley focused largely on the development of Natal during the 1840s and provided
an extensive amount of detail in regards to the individuals who initially settled the colony.
Hattersley produced a very concise history of Pietermaritzburg, but it is largely a descriptive
narrative that focuses on a single location that does not fully address its significance to the
wider development of the colony. Other works, including Henderson’s and Ingram’s urban
history of Durban, are local histories commissioned at the end of the nineteenth century to
commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of Natal.12 Whereas these works are
very insightful, they lack a more nuanced historical analysis of the development of Natal as a
colony and more specifically the development of Natal as a colonial state. Hattersley was part
a historical tradition which dated back to the beginning of the twentieth century and focused
on settler history, political, economic, and military history, and a traditional historical
narrative that neglected African involvement in Natal’s formation and evolution. Typical
examples of this tradition are those studies that examine one of the most famous characters to
come out of Natal: Sir Theophilus Shepstone. Both C.J. Uys and J.R. Sullivan were
instrumental in creating the early Shepstone narrative, though such works neglect the impact
of the indigenous population on the European population, as well as on the colony as a
whole.13 Similarly, one of the most famous comprehensive histories of Natal can be found in

11
Specifically, Guy points out that though Scott was unable to set the right tone in settler social life, “he did
please Professor Hattersley by organizing Christmas parties for children.” Jeff Guy, Theophilus Shepstone and
the Forging of Natal: African Autonomy and Settler Colonialism in the Making of Traditional Authority
(Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2013), 247.
12

W. P. M. Henderson, Durban: Fifty Years’ Municipal History (Durban, South Africa: Robinson, 1904);
Joseph Forsyth Ingram, The Colony of Natal: An Official Illustrated Handbook and Railway Guide (London: Sir
Joseph Causton and Sons, 1895).
13

The majority of these works focus on Shepstone’s accomplishments during his career, more specifically his
work on the annexation of the Transvaal in 1877. C.J. Uys, In the Era of Shepstone: Being a Study of British
Expansion in South Africa (1842-1877 (Lovedale, South Africa: Lovedale Press, 1933); J. R Sullivan, The
Native Policy of Sir Theophilus Shepstone (Johannesburg: Walker & Snashall, 1928).
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Brookes’ and Webb’s History of Natal, published the same year as Morris’ more famous (at
least in the United States) The Washing of the Spears.14 Although both were milestones in the
field, Morris’ work was more of a popular history whereas Brookes and Webb attempted a
comprehensive history of what had been an almost completely neglected segment of African
history. Both, however, fell victim to the Eurocentric examination of African history, giving
little credence or agency to the Africans who formed an important component in this history.
Morris’ work especially propagated a general misinterpretation of Shaka’s regime, which
would influence future historiographic debates and interpretations of Shaka’s reign.15 Both
Morris’ and Brookes’ and Webb’s texts were published during the 1960s, a period of
transition in African historiography when Eurocentric accounts of African history were
challenged by those who wished to give greater agency to Africans during the period of
colonization.

Terence Ranger is perhaps the person most responsible for a reexamination of the role
of Africans during the colonial period. By presenting Africans with greater agency in their
various roles during the period of colonial rule, Ranger illustrated the grander complexity that
existed despite the European conquest of Africa.16 He argued that previous historians had
misjudged the relationship between rulers and ruled within Africa by contending that the
colonial governments were not as strong in their rule and the Africans were not as weak in
their subjugation as had been previously presented. Instead, Ranger argued for a greater
complexity in understanding the relationship between the resisters and the collaborators,
especially in the case of who was more enlightened. Though Ranger’s work focused on East
14
Edgar H. Brooks and C. De B. Webb, A History of Natal (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1965);
Donald R. Morris, The Washing of the Spears: A History of the Rise of the Zulu Nation Under Shaka and Its
Fall in the Zulu War of 1879 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1998).
15

For the seminal texts of this debate, see Carolyn Hamilton, Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and
the Limits of Historical Invention (Harvard University Press, 1998); Dan Wylie, Myth of Iron: Shaka in History
(Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2006).

16

See T. O. Ranger, “African Reaction to the Imposition of Colonial Rule in East and Central Africa,” in The
The History and Politics of Colonialism in Africa, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
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and Central Africa, it would have a lasting influence on historians of South African, perhaps
most notably J.D. Omer-Cooper and Shula Marks.

J.D. Omer-Cooper provided the basis for the mfecane thesis, which became a staple of
the historiography of nineteenth century South Africa. The thesis essentially states that during
the precolonial early nineteenth century, the Zulu kingdom initiated a “crushing” or
“scattering” of Nguni people across Southern Africa that resulted in a period of migrancy and
increased state-building throughout the subcontinent, and which included the formation of the
Zulu nation. These migrations and transformations also influenced the trajectory of African
groups like the Sotho, Swazi, and Ndebele.17 Though Omer-Cooper’s work and the mfecane
thesis has been a major point of contention within South African historiography, his work is
widely considered by many in the field to be a celebration of the revolutionary changes which
took place in the Zulu kingdom following the turmoil, and its longstanding influence on
African history. Marks, in her own right, took a more revisionist analysis of the Bambatha
Rebellion of 1906, illustrating the principle causes of the rebellion were aimed more against
the imposition of a “Poll Tax” than a simple rebellion against white authority. It so doing,
Marks provided a deeper understanding of African agency during the colonial period, a first
for a historian of Natal.18

Marks was also a critical figure in challenging the old Eurocentric patterns of Natal’s
history, specifically calling into question the works of Brookes and Webb, by claiming that
their history of Natal was heavily biased “towards the history of white settlement in Natal”
and appeared “cut off from the new thinking in their field”, using Omer-Cooper as a key
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counterpoint.19 Such criticism was the starting point for a new generation of young scholars
who began examining the deeper cultural elements of Natal and African society during the
nineteenth century. Despite the internal debates in South African historiography, particularly
the divide over the “Radical-Liberal Debate” of the 1970s,20 historians of Natal continued to
focus on a more insightful analysis of the evolution of Natal and its people during the late
nineteenth and twentieth century. From this wellspring, new topics of analysis, including
missionaries, urban organization, and African intellectuals, have appeared over the last
quarter of the twentieth century.21 The most prolific and influential product of this new wave
of research was the volume on Natal and Zululand history published 1989, that included a
reinterpretation of the archaeological records, and new analyses of state formation and of the
inherent links between white supremacy and black impoverishment in Natal at the turn of the
twentieth century.22 Other works from this new wave of historians focused almost
exclusively on Africans and Natal and helped to fill the gap in the historiography with quality
scholarship. This dissertation has been inspired by many of these works.23
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Yet perhaps one of the most fascinating elements of the historiography is the analysis
of Theophilus Shepstone who defined nineteenth century colonial Natal, for better or worse.
Although much of the early work by Uys and Sullivan focused on the formation of
Shepstone’s system, there is little emphasis on his adoption of indigenous tactics in managing
the African chiefs of Natal.24 With the publication of David Welsh’s The Roots of
Segregation, the literature began to present Shepstone’s actions in Natal as the roots of
apartheid institutions in South Africa.25 The problem with this, as Jeff Guy explains, is that
Welsh’s work was structured thematically, leading to a misleading continuity and consistency
in Shepstone’s actions in Southern Africa.26 Over the last decade, however, there has been a
shift in focus on tactics for administrative and colonial control, providing deeper insight in
understanding the policy of Shepstone.27 Thomas McClendon has made great strides in
providing a weightier analysis of Shepstone’s activity in what I have termed the formative
period of Natal. His examination provided a collection of thoroughly researched and
presented case studies which illustrate Shepstone’s methods of control and interaction with
the indigenous population. Similarly, Jeff Guy’s most recent work on Shepstone has
produced one of the most detailed accounts of Natal’s formative period in recent history.
Systematically analysing Shepstone’s activities in the colony beyond simple biography, Guy
attempts to fully contextualize Shepstone’s ideas and arguments, creating a deeper
understanding of Shepstone, his policies, and his times.28 It is this type of analysis which
provides the most important inspiration and influence for this work. Though the actions of
Shepstone are not the only reason for Natal’s development as a colonial state, the fluidity of
24
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his indigenous policy compared to colonial states during the later period of imperialism and
its role in Natal’s growth during this formative period were an important component in the
development of Southern Africa, and the British Empire.

Colonial Natal should be situated not only within the history of Southern Africa but
also within the British Empire. For this reason, this dissertation will attempt to come to grips
with the growing field of the “New Imperial History”. Over the past quarter century, in light
of the “cultural turn” in the field of history more generally, the field of imperial history has
witnessed a vast interdisciplinary expansion, which has challenged “Western” modes of
thought, by examining the world from a global perspective. This can clearly be seen in
multiple disciplines, from history, sociology, and literature, including research in the British
Empire. Known as the “Imperial Turn”, there was a pronounced shift away from the study of
domestic and national history toward a study of empire, integrating domestic British history
with the history of Britain overseas. This “turn” complicated the presumed territorial,
cultural, and political boundaries between empire and nations and has resulted in a new wave
of scholarship which is more inclusive of those ruled within the British Empire and also more
focused on the peripheries of empire. As Kathleen Wilson has stated, the New Imperial
history represents works of “historical analysis that are geared to doing precisely what
[historians] themselves acknowledge to simultaneously be impossible…to recognize
alternative modes and sources for understanding the past, to probe the limits of historical
knowledge, and to make the ‘subaltern’—from indigenes to women, and all others rendered
silent or invisible by the historical archive—‘speak.’”29 To accomplish such a goal, many
historians of imperial history have moved beyond the official archives and instead “focused
more on the cultures of empire and on language, and [are] dependent on poststructuralist
29
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ideas in which discourses, narratives, and representations were as important as material
‘realities’.”30 With this turn, imperial studies have moved toward globalization and
postcolonial studies. This new scholarship, though very telling about Britain (especially
England and Scotland), is less informative on Africa, Asia, or Latin America. Though less
influenced by the postcolonial approach of the New Imperial History, especially its emphasis
on culture and language, this dissertation will nevertheless attempt to create a hybrid
methodology of empirical data, cultural analysis, and political and social commentary for
Natal and Africa. Though not defined by these theories, this dissertation shares the desire of
many new historians of empire to move beyond the “official” archives and embrace the
variety of fields and alternative sources available to scholars.

Perhaps just as important, this dissertation will examine the importance of war and
society in colonial Africa. Although only one widespread conflict, the Anglo-Zulu War of
1879, will be covered, the importance of war as an abstract phenomenon plays an important
role in the formation of Natal. Roger Chickering acknowledged over a decade ago that
“military history has largely escaped the methodological assaults that have been launched in
the name of the ‘linguistic turn’”, but the study of war and society has quickly turned to
emphasize the various ways war and militarism influenced society and civilian life, both at
home and abroad.31 This wave of historical military analysis has moved beyond the simple
purviews of “military history” and instead provided a more nuanced examination of the
manner in which militarism influenced and directed social and political movements during
the modern period. As Jeremy Black has written, military history should be understood
30
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through the approach of “military organisation” as an aspect of “wider social patterns and
practices” and the systemisation of knowledge that assists in understanding “the military, its
activities and its interactions with the wider world.”32 Colonial military history, in particular,
has benefited from this transition to perhaps the greatest degree, providing new avenues for
research and analysis from multiple angles of empires across the globe. Colonial wars, states
of emergency, civil disturbances, or rebellions, despite their categorization by some as “small
wars” or pacification, provide an opportunity for research not only in the study of war, but
also in the social consequences of those conflicts on the individuals and communities, both
white and black, involved.33

These “small wars” provide historians the means to address the wider topics of war
and society, particularly the social and cultural impact of conflicts. One example is Jan-Bart
Gewald’s examination of the manner in which the Herero and their military actions moulded
their society in the wake of a genocidal colonial war, fundamentally changing their politics
and social order. Though Gewald’s book is not centrally focused on the Herero-German War
of 1904-1908, he uses the backdrop of the war as a means of understanding how the Herero
“grappled to maintain and attain control over their freedom, and how, when they lost this,
they reorganized to continue their struggle toward redemption.”34 Another example of the use
of war and society comes from Isabel Hull’s work, also an examination of German West
Africa. Hull, however, uses colonial warfare to provide evidence for her conclusion that
32
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imperial Germany’s political and military culture facilitated the reckless approaches that
contributed to genocide, both by the Germans in Namibia and the National Socialists at home
decades later. Using the Herero genocide as the prime case study, Hull connects the
necessities on the ground in Southwest Africa to the German military culture. Hull argues it
was this culture which resulted in military atrocities against the Maji-Maji in modern
Tanzania, the Boxers in China, and finally in Europe, where it was defined by an “immediate
propensity for extreme violence, its deadly instrumentalization of civilians, and its tendency
when thwarted to repeat its scripts of violence to the point of self-destruction”.35 Though
controversial, both of these historians illustrate the ways war and society in a colonial setting
can be incorporated into a richer analysis of both the colonized and the colonizer during the
nineteenth century.
Statement on Research and Outline
The development of Natal as a colonial state is a fundamentally important topic in the
history of the British Empire in South Africa. Not only is Natal the birthplace of many
African National Congress and anti-apartheid leaders of the twentieth century, it also holds a
distinctive place in the emergence of British colonial rule in Africa. Because of this, Natal
deserves to be examined in its own right outside of the development of the Cape Colony, the
Orange Free State, and the Transvaal, and not as a “backwater periphery” to these other
sections of South Africa. The mid-nineteenth century was a period of major change within
Africa and the British Empire. Predating the “Scramble for Africa” and the creation of formal
colonial rule in many parts of the Sub-Saharan Africa, the actions taken by the British and
their interaction with the indigenous populations of Southern Africa in the mid-nineteenth
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century acted as a forerunner to subsequent colonial conquests in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. This project will attempt to place Natal within that period of change.

To accomplish this, questions will be asked concerning the manner in which Natal
was formed as a colonial state, specifically in regards to the institutions of defence and
military organization. How does Natal’s military develop during this period? What role did
Africans play in the formation of the military and police forces within the colony? How
important was land and the defence of land to the colonists and Africans within Natal? What
were the central debates between the European colonists, Africans, and the colonial
government? How were these debates articulated and what impact did they have on policy?
What role did the policy toward indigenous Africans play in this overall state formation?

Extensive focus has been placed on the relationships between defensive institutions,
the people who took part in them, and the emergence of the colonial government which
formed and solidified during this period. Generally speaking, the means through which one
establishes such connections rests largely on the reports generated from both the press and
colonial governments. In a few cases, court and legal records have provided a view into the
mind-set of the police, volunteers, and troops who helped forge Natal into a colonial state.
This dissertation has made extensive use of colonial documents from both Britain and the
colony, as well as the vast array of press opinions available. With that in mind, this project
has taken a page out of Dane Kennedy’s book and created a sort of overlap between
postcolonial studies and imperial history, in which cultural history and discourse analysis are
used in conjunction with empirical research on empires.36 Combining the information found
in the colonial archives in both South Africa and London, the empirical data backs the
36
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conclusions asserted about Natal’s formation as a colonial state. Government documents,
agent correspondence, court statements, and newspapers provide the basis for much of this
research. While reading “against the grain” in most of these archives, problems of bias still
exist in the majority of these political accounts. But the rich case studies that can be found in
such accounts still reveal the exceptional place of Natal in the formation of Southern Africa
and the British Empire. Unfortunately, such resources also limit the subaltern voice, and
result in partial interpretations or limited analysis.

The challenge of the “indigenous voice” remains one of the key obstacles for
historians of the early colonial era in Africa. Written records by Africans are difficult, if not
impossible, to come by, and those that are available present an even greater complexity to
historians. Though some Africans were tutored by Bishop John Colenso and other
missionaries in Natal during this formative period, few of them have left any extensive
written records.37 The silences that occur in many colonial records and the limited recordings
of the African voice have influenced the presentation of the indigenous population within the
dissertation. Some elements of oral history do exist, either in depositions or interviews,
particular the James Stuart Archives.38 These were used when available and relevant. By
using this combination of methodologies, this dissertation makes a relevant contribution to
the role of African and European agency and resistance and collaboration within Natal during
its formative period. It will also illuminate the relationships which developed between
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European, Afrikaner, and African military and police institutions and how they were
indicative of a developing state attempting to come to grips with problems of security,
stability, and safety within a colonial setting.

This dissertation will begin with a brief summary of the history of Southern Africa
that helps contextualize the place of Natal within the emerging British Empire of the
nineteenth century. But beginning with the Volunteer Corps (Chapter Three), this dissertation
will chronologically move through the history of Natal during its formative period.
Government regulations between the enactment of the Volunteer Law of 1854 and the
Volunteer Regulation Act of 1877 will illustrate the evolving nature of defence within the
colonial state, as well as legitimate concerns for the issue of security, especially in response
to the continuing influx of an indigenous population that estimates placed between 80,000
and 120,000 by 1845.39 Though the European population would make use of the volunteer
system not only as a means of collective security, but as an instrument of power within the
colonial state, the formation, preservation, and continuation of these volunteer systems would
be consistently challenged, dismissed, and even abolished by members of the colonial
government, the press, and citizens of the colony who had their own plans and suggestions of
how the colony should defend itself. Ironically, despite the shortcomings of many
components of this system, the volunteer corps would remain one of the most enduring and
praised aspects of Natal’s security institutions for much of its formative period.

Within fifty years of its founding, Natal had also established a police force that
became a critical element in its internal security and fully established itself as a “pillar” of
colonial authority. The origins of this system can be found in the formative period. The
analysis of the European police institutions (Chapter Four) will attempt to address how the
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police and law enforcement systems within Natal acted as a key example of a society
attempting to come to grips with the questions of security and safety which continued
throughout the formative period of the colony. Though the Natal Mounted Police, and later
the Natal Police, would normalize the level of discipline, consistency, and legal fairness in
the police system of the colony following the Anglo-Zulu War, concerns of expense, security,
racial divisions, and the extent of violence and criminality within the colony were all
facilitated during this formative period.

Although the perceptions of control and security within Natal would be dominated by
the white European pillars of defence, it was the Africans who provided perhaps the most
striking and vital element of colonial security during the formative period of the colony.
These African institutions would take the form of the police and the military establishments
that were directed by colonial administrators, including the local magistracy and white
officers. The last two chapters will in turn focus on the African police and military
institutions during this formative period (Chapter Five and Six). Much like the white police
and volunteer institutions of the colony, the African population was a component of colonial
defence that elicited debate, apprehension, and a sense of fear which permeated Natal’s
public consciousness. Yet, by delving into the formation, organization, and responses to
colonial violence the Africans experienced in the colonial constabulary, a deeper
understanding of African agency in the formation of Natal as a colonial state will be revealed,
indicative of a fluid state system of control that was characteristic of Natal. This will remain
essential to understanding the imperial structures of defence that were common in the
nineteenth century. Much like the chapter on African police, the next chapter on African
troops (Chapter Six) will attempt to address the impact of indigenous military units on the
security and organization of the British colony of Natal. The importance of these indigenous
military units on the safety and security of the colony is undeniable in the broader
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examination of the colony’s history, yet questions remain on how these units were organized
within the colonial system, what their origins were in the formation of the colony, how they
were perceived by European colonists, and in what manner the military institutions change
during this period. Whereas it is clear that there was indigenous involvement in the security
apparatuses of the colony, such participation not only advances the theory of a type of
militarization of society that took place in Natal during this period (a type of militarization in
which colonial apprehension was one aspect of the overarching idea of colonial security) but
also provides a viable platform for incorporating African agency into the administration and
creation of Natal as a colonial state.

By looking at these elements or pillars of colonial security, a more nuanced analysis
of the history of Natal’s defensive institutions will be revealed. This study meets the criteria
of what Antoinette Burton defines as critically engaged historical scholarship, which “aims to
trouble conventional narratives and exhilarates in the shifting ground of historical production
itself”.40 The narrative to this point of the military development of Natal has been little more
than regimental histories. The grounds of historical production have also examined either
Africans or Europeans as exclusively independent from one another, instead of a form of
collaboration during the formation of a colonial state. To fully understand how Natal was
formed as a colonial state, an inclusive examination of the major institutions of colonial
defence, both white and black, is critical in presenting a more compelling account of the
making of Natal.
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Chapter Two: British Southern Africa and Natal in the Nineteenth Century
For historians of Africa, context, and the ability to properly situate such context, is a
critical component in the formation of historical ideas. Without such context, it would be
difficult to gauge the parameters and importance of Natal’s place in the British Empire, and
the influences of its defensive institutions on the emerging South African state in the
nineteenth century. With this in mind, the following chapter will attempt to address the
emergence of British and Afrikaner power in the region during the nineteenth century, the
formation of imperial policy in Southern Africa, and the state of imperial rule during Natal’s
formative period. The chapter will conclude with a brief history of the colony of Natal and an
analysis of the key debates during this period with the aim of situating Natal’s defensive
institutions within the wider history of nineteenth century Southern Africa.

For historians of South Africa, the emergence of colonial rule is one of the most basic
tenants in understanding South Africa’s unique place within the British Empire and its
political and social origins. To better understand the emergence of Natal and its creation as a
colonial state, the context of its surroundings and the influences of policies from other parts
of South Africa must be established. As Crawford Young argues, the colonial state achieved a
“distinctive personality of its own” after the colonial polity began expressing itself in the
same process as its modern British counterpart.1 To understand the “distinctive personality”
of Natal, it is necessary to contextualize influences from the rest of South Africa for a further
analysis of Natal’s emerging colonial identity. Such identities would also express themselves
in the form of African agency and conflict, beyond the influences of European expansion
during the nineteenth century.
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The Cape Colony
The first settlers to arrive in what is today South Africa were not of British origin, but
instead the predecessors of the Afrikaner minority which would become the architects of
apartheid. Dutch settlers led by Jan van Riebeeck arrived in Southern Africa in 1652 and
established a permanent settlement at Cape Town. The Dutch migrants, who initially worked
as part of the Dutch United East India Company, turned their attention increasingly to the
establishment of pastoral settlements in the Cape hinterland. This was done despite the
presence of the Khoikhoi (“Bushman” or “Hottentot” in the colonial literature), who had no
tradition of permanent city buildings and whose pastoral lifestyle allowed the Dutch migrants
to push further inland. Though slavery was a key component of early settler life and the
Dutch settlers built slave lodges in the Cape Town, most laws in this early settler society
rested on segregational restriction on slaves owned by the Company being limited to their
owner’s home.2

By 1800, the Dutch settlers represented the development of a distinct communal
identity, what are now known as the Afrikaners or Boer (“farmer” in Dutch), with a
distinctive language of Afrikaans, a creole language which incorporated Dutch and other
African dialects. These Afrikaners also developed a common cultural identity, centred on
their possession of land, a belief in racial superiority, and Calvinist religious tradition. This
identity also encouraged a farming and moral system which implied that all Africans were the
“children of Ham” and “designed by God to labour as the white man’s slaves.”3 As a result of
this new cultural identity and the dissolving of the Dutch East India Company by the end of
the eighteenth century, the Boer population declared two Afrikaner Republics, Graaff Reinet
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and Swellendam, in the land beyond the Great Fish River which had been gradually taken
from the Khoikhoi and San groups in the Cape Colony region.

If the European military presence in South Africa began with the establishment of the
Dutch East India Company post at Cape Town, it was the Afrikaner or voortrekker
(Afrikaans for pioneers, literally “fore-movers”) commando system which would dominate
military conflicts against the Khoisan, the primary indigenous group of the Cape region. This
volunteer settler system of mounted militias counterbalanced the guerrilla warfare favoured
by the Khoisan, and would remain a component of Afrikaner military identity into the
twentieth century. Beginning in the eighteenth century as a group of employers and
volunteers from the Dutch East India Company, by mid-century the commando had become
key feature of frontier society. Though Khoisan slaves would initially fight in these units,
during the Great Trek the commando system would become a hallmark of the frontier
mentality, with no required training or parade drills. By the mid-nineteenth century, the
system became more institutionalized, but it still propagated the myth of white self-reliance
on the South African frontier. The commando system would also influence to some degree
the defensive institutions that were established within the colony of Natal. Yet, the ensuing
conflicts in Europe eventually resulted in British maritime power extending its authority over
the important global port at Cape Town.

With the loss of the Cape from the Dutch East India Company to the British in 1795, a
transition took place within the Cape Colony which would fundamentally alter the Cape for
the next century. The authoritarian trade company shifted toward a more franchise-based
government of consent which allowed for the increased British population to make
considerable headway in reform. This combined with a diversification of culture, population
increase, educational improvements, and religious toleration challenged the authority
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established by the Afrikaner population within the Cape Colony.4 As the number of British
settlers increased, the European population pushed further and further into the hinterland,
coming in contact with a greater degree of the African population, and leading to a series of
wars with the Khoikhoi and San population. The Cape Mounted Rifles, discussed below,
would gain their initial prominence in these conflicts.

An important component of this new frontier society was the emergence of a large
“Coloured” population within British rule. The most famous of these groups was the Griqua,
who represented a combined population of “Bastaards” (people of European and Khoikhoi
slave mixed decent), San, and Sotho and Tswana people. This Coloured population, though
more common in the Cape Colony than other parts of South Africa, remained a key racial
marker in the evolving makeup and demographics of the region. The fact that the Griqua
retained some measure of independence and polity in the frontier region is telling of the
social clusters which formed during this period.5 It must be noted, however, that the term
“Coloured” remained a contentious idea well into the twentieth century. Emancipation in the
early nineteenth century gave the Khoikhoi and former slaves the same legal status, so much
so they became collectively known as the “Cape Coloured People”. Yet so enduring was this
terminology that it would remain in use during the apartheid regime, as one of the four main
racial categories outlined by the government.6

The Great Trek and the British Establishment of Colonial Rule
Though the Afrikaner population remained an important component of British rule for
the first two decades of the nineteenth century, social changes had a dramatic effect on the
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makeup of the Cape Colony. With the campaign for the abolition of the slave trade and
eventually slavery within the Empire and the increase of free labour available, the sources of
slave labour were eventually called into question in the Cape, particularly after Parliament’s
banning of British participation in the slave trade in 1807. Because the Cape Colony never
developed a large-scale plantation slave system, free labour became an ever increasing
component of the Cape economy. With the removal of formal discrimination against the
Khoikhoi and “other free peoples of colour” under Ordinance 50 of 1828 and abolition of
slavery within the Empire in 1834, voortrekker animosity toward British rule hardened.7

Though the British continued to support the Dutch Reform Church within the Cape
region, a policy continued in Natal, Britain began the introduction of its own governmental
and legal systems by the early 1830s. In response, between 1834 and 1840 some 15,000
voortrekkers moved from the frontier region of the Eastern Cape to the inland regions
removed from British rule. The by-product of this “Great Trek” was the creation of new
Afrikaner republics, including the Orange Free State, the South African Republic (or the
Transvaal), and the Republic of Natalia, which would later become the British colony of
Natal. British interests would follow the Great Trek, however. Within the coming decades,
the British would annex the Republic of Natalia in 1844, the Transvaal in 1877, and the
entirety of the Afrikaner republics by the conclusion of the Second South African War or
Boer War in 1902.8

If the Afrikaners threat was somewhat alleviated within the Cape Colony following
the Great Trek, the British continued to have difficulties during the early nineteenth century
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as settlers continued to expand deeper into the African interior. Even with the establishment
of British rule in Natal in 1844 (see below), there remained a prominent frontier region
adjacent to the Cape Colony and part of the Eastern Frontier region, known as Kaffraria.9
This area was dominated by the Xhosa. Ironically, despite the presence of the Zulu in the
collective imagination of the British as being the most aggressive and warlike Africans of
South Africa, it was the Xhosa who would continue to act as a source of contention and
conflict. Nine wars were fought in the Kaffraria between 1779 and 1879 before colonial
white dominance was assured in the region. Though the response in Natal to the eighth
“Frontier” or “Xhosa War” will be discussed below, the Xhosa people in Kaffraria were
representative of the longest spell of resistance in modern South Africa.10 It was for the
Xhosa that the British had to make a policy of rule, and it was the actions of the likes of Sir
Harry Smith that solidified the British blueprint for action against the indigenous African
population of South Africa. It was even the Xhosa who were the first Africans a young
Theophilus Shepstone, architect of the indigenous policy of Natal, interacted with during his
time as an interpreter for the Cape government before his arrival as diplomatic agent in the
colony of Natal.

The British conquest and administration of Kaffraria, though tangential to the topic of
this dissertation, is telling of the methodologies of British rule during this period, and the
eventual factors which inspired colonial rule and state formation in the region. Kaffraria, part
of what is today the Eastern Cape Province (known as the Transkei and Ciskei during
apartheid), was the provincial frontier of the Cape Colony for the vast portion of the early
nineteenth century. The region, though largely occupied by the Xhosa people, was not under
9
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any central rule, unlike the Zululand to the north. Instead, like many Nguni societies, the
Xhosa were composed of a collection of chiefs who controlled a defined area under a
particular chiefdom. In some cases, these chiefdoms were subdivided into smaller chiefdoms,
and some grew into sizable communities, such as Chief Hintsa who in 1809 had some 10,000
followers with eleven chiefs under him.11 By 1800, the Xhosa were composed of at least two
and possibly nine chiefdoms, allowing for the British to take gradual control of the territory
piece by piece, creating alliances and conquering those chiefs who did not fall under imperial
rule. Systematically, the Xhosa would fall under British rule, either through alliances or direct
action.

The infamous Hintsa incident was such an episode of “direct action”. It was important
not only in the rise to prominence of Sir Harry Smith, the future Governor of the Cape
Colony during the early period of Natal, but also in the manner in which British
administration of indigenous leaders was managed in South Africa. During the war of 183435, then Cape Governor Benjamin D’Urban (namesake to the city of Durban in Natal) and
Colonel Harry Smith demanded that Hintsa, a powerful Xhosa chief who was baselessly
suspected of organizing the rebellion against the British, deliver 40,000 head of cattle as
coverage to end the war, as it was suspected, again unfounded, that his territory was being
used as refuge for the cattle of the chiefs fighting the British. Under the false pretext of
negotiation, Hintsa was lured to a camp, captured, and summarily interrogated on the verge
of torture. Though eventually agreeing to the British demands, Hintsa was not released and
was later killed and his body mutilated in an escape attempt.12 As will become clear, such
tactics were not unheard of, at least to some degree within the administration of other areas of
South Africa, including Natal. What the Hintsa incident anticipates, however, is the manner
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in which British agents attempted to use their authority and sometimes unfounded trust with
the indigenous population to manipulate events and allow for greater expansion of colonial
rule.

Such tactics were not supported by the Colonial Office, but instead representative of
the level of independence which was exhibited by the men on the ground in South Africa. For
much of South Africa, including Natal, direct or indirect British guidance superseded any
formal British rule where it existed. Instead, administrative responsibility fell onto the local
European settlers who acted as local agents who made the vast majority of decisions on the
ground. In essence, the British government exercised limited formal responsibilities and
allowed the colonies to manage themselves, except in cases of extreme need, with the AngloZulu War being one of the most famous examples. Although this remained part of the major
tactics within the Empire, the irony rested on the fact that attempts to bring about greater
unity led to increased involvement by the British government into the interior of South Africa
by the conclusion of the nineteenth century, the key example being the two Boer Wars.13
Such actions within the Empire, however, move beyond the purview of this dissertation.
Instead, it is important to contextualize the manner in which the African population in South
Africa established itself during the precolonial period, especially at the dawn of the founding
of Natal.

Mfecane and Difaqane
Historically, the Great Trek is illustrative of the founding of Afrikaner nationalist
identity. Historiographically, it has become representative of the apartheid historical legacy
which dominated early writings of the period. For the purposes of this dissertation, the
importance of the Great Trek rests in the resulting interaction between African and Afrikaner
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communities as the migrants moved across the eastern part of the continent. Though the
motivations for this migration were driven by the interests of land and labour, racial
perceptions would pervade the mind-set of the voortrekker. For the Afrikaner, the land they
settled, which included Natal, was a land largely devoid of any substantial African
population. Though such perceptions were unfounded, Southern Africa had experienced a
series of conflicts which scattered or divided many segments of the African population.
Punctuating this series of conflicts are two events that have been called the mfecane and the
difaqane. Both terms remain contentious historiographic concepts which must be addressed
before examining the founding of Natal.

Those who support the mfecane argument believe it was an autonomous event that
occurred outside of European influence. J.D. Omer-Cooper’s work provided the basis for the
mfecane thesis, which became a staple of the historiography of nineteenth century South
Africa.14 The thesis essentially states the during the early nineteenth century, the Zulu
kingdom propagated a “crushing” or “scattering” of Nguni people across Southern Africa
which resulted in a period of migrancy and increased state-building throughout the
subcontinent. Julian Cobbing and his student John Wright opposed this view, contending that
there was an active European force involved in the affairs of South Africans particularly
interactions with the Zulu and Sotho. Cobbing rightly placed the history of early nineteenth
century Natal outside the scope of pre-colonial history, arguing that pressures from the
Portuguese, Afrikaner, and British influenced events within the interior. There remains,
however, considerable contention over the role of slavery and labour demands at the centre of
Cobbing’s research, in which he claims that the missionaries at Dithakong in the North Cape
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region were “fully and consciously engrossed in what they were doing, i.e. collecting slaves”
and that “slaving was having a dramatic impact” on the region.15

Such actions also called into the question the connecting thesis of the mfecane, known
as the difaqane, meaning “forced migration”, which acted as a reference point to wars in the
interior of South Africa before the Afrikaner arrivals in the 1830s.16 In principle, the mfecane
took place in the south-eastern section of South Africa impacting Nguni-speaking peoples
while the difaqane took place in the region west of the Drakensberg, impacting the Sotho,
Tswana, and Pedi areas. The term difaqane gained considerable ground in Wilson and
Thompson’s Oxford History of South Africa, where it was popularized and became part of the
common usage in academia, particularly in South Africa.17 It was the prominence of both
these ideas within the South African academia which eventually led to the heart of Cobbing’s
critique of the thesis, and his challenge to historical representation of early nineteenth century
South Africa.

Though not completely dismissing Omer-Cooper’s work on pre-colonial Africa,
Cobbing’s main claim rested on the belief that the mfecane thesis was an apartheid myth
created by liberal historians to legitimize racial inequality in South Africa. Cobbing and
Wright criticized the journals and diaries of Nathanial Isaacs and Henry Francis Fynn, but
were not able to provide alternatives in relation to the historical understanding of the
emergence of Shaka and the early Zulu kingdom. For Cobbing, the concept of the mfecane as
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a great upheaval caused by the Zulu was “integral to a white settler, ‘Liberal’ history.”18 In
this sense, Cobbing was referring to settler historians, liberal historians, and apartheid
apologists as essentially presenting the same belief that the political revolution in the
Zululand was entirely self-contained. In doing so, Cobbing argued that this created a
narrative which justified the racially unequal division of the land.19 It remains difficult,
however, to completely prove the source of these migrations or depopulation patterns in
South Africa. Cobbing’s work, though fundamentally important to the debate, also retained
faults in his own analysis of the historiography.20 The current state of this debate is still
contentious, with some historians accepting the validity of Omer-Cooper’s claim while
acknowledging the need for a multifaceted examination of the causes of this massive
migration, and others outright dismissing the use of the term as evident by the disruptions
caused by Europeans beginning in the nineteenth century.21 What remains important is that
during the period of initial settlement of Natal, South Africa as a whole had experienced a
dramatic movement of people and social groups, leading to a fragmented, and sometimes
amorphous indigenous presence which the European settlers, particularly the Afrikaners, used
to their advantage.22 Whether internal or external, the mfecane and the difaqane
fundamentally set the stage of further European expansion and settlement in South Africa.
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Though this dissertation has used the term mfecane, it has done so sparingly and only
in the historiographic context. This is not to dismiss the importance of the mfecane thesis, but
instead to lessen its overall impact on this dissertation. The mfecane was an important event
in the history of Southern Africa and was likely caused by a combination of both European
and African involvement. By illustrating how Natal responded to the aftermath of the
mfecane, caused either by European or African actions, this dissertation better contextualizes
the mfecane debate, and illustrates the manner in which African and European agency acted
in conjunction to create the layout of South Africa during the nineteenth century.

A Short History of Natal
Having contextualized the wider scope of South African history in which this
dissertation is situated, we can now move to the primary locale of this topic: Natal. Located
along the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony and below the established Afrikaner Republics
of the nineteenth century was the British colony of Natal. It was first named by Portuguese
explorers, who gave it the name on Christmas day, 1497 (Natal is the Portuguese word for
Christmas). The territory, stretching roughly 150 miles along the Indian Ocean between the
Tugela and Umzinyati Rivers in the North, and the Umzimkulu to the South with its western
boundary largely defined by the Drakensberg Mountain range, has had both a diverse and
complicated history from the first permanent European settlements in the nineteenth
century.23 Below is a brief and incomplete account of the history of Natal during the
nineteenth century. The intention of such a summary is not to dismiss the major nuances of
Natal’s early history, which will become more apparent in the body of the dissertation, but
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instead of provide some historical context for the larger events taking place over the scope of
this dissertation.24

Originally a stopover for Portuguese traders, the region of Natal was generally
ignored by European settlers until the nineteenth century. Then, after initial contact with the
Zulu King Shaka by British settlers in the 1820s, the area gained its first semi-permanent
European settlers. In 1839, as a by-product of the Great Trek, Afrikaner settlers would
establish the Republic of Natalia. The voortrekkers had crossed the Drakensberg Mountains
in 1837, and had defeated the Zulu kingdom under Dingane (brother and successor to Shaka),
on December 15, 1838 at the notorious Battle of “Blood River” on the River Ncome.
Whereas the battle was decisive in preventing the Zulu from overtaking this European
settlement, it left a number of questions related to the policy of African administration
unanswered. Such questions remained in 1841, when the British announced their intentions of
annexing Natal. Though Britain had staked an initial claim to the area around Port Natal
during the 1820s with the expedition to contact the Zulu King Shaka led by Captain James
King and Henry Fynn (who, incidentally, also provided the main travel narratives on which
the contentious source for much of the mfecane thesis is derived), the Afrikaner migration to
the region in the 1830s limited British interaction in the region to little more than simple trade
relations in the territory. However, the presence of the Afrikaner republic along Britain’s sea
route to India was perceived by the British in the Cape as a threat, especially once the
republic began encroaching on the eastern frontier of the Cape. By 1842, Port Natal, later
renamed Durban, had been seized as a British interest and the Cape government had begun to
make designs on the territory, recognizing the opportunity for greater trade security by
possessing the strategically important Port of Natal. After brief confrontations between the
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British colonial military and Afrikaner commandos, the administration of the Cape Colony
declared the district of Natal British territory in May of 1844.

Under the direction of the Cape Colony governor, Natal was instructed to form its
own colonial government and executive council, with the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal
Martin West reporting to the Governor of the Cape Colony. The colony of Natal, despite its
political connections to the Cape, retained a sizable level of autonomy in light of Natal’s
somewhat remove location beyond both the Cape Colony and British Kaffraria. Through this
relatively autonomous administrative arrangement, Natal would continue to experience
steady growth throughout the formative period of the colony, though the settler population
would always remain modest in size. In 1852, the European population was only 7,629 while
the African population exceeded 100,000. By 1880, European or “whites” had increased to
25,271 as the African population continued to grow at over 362,000.25 Pietermaritzburg, the
colonial capital, was one of two prominent urban areas during this period. Pietermaritzburg
increased from a population of 300 houses and two thousand people in 1854, to 701 houses
and 4,491 people by 1863, to well over 10,000 people in 1881.26 Durban, the major port of
the colony, also saw significant expansion, with a population of 1,204 Europeans in 1854,
8,241 by 1874, and 67,847 by 1904.27

Like much of the rest South Africa, the indigenous African population remained one
of the key components of concern for much of this early formative period. The primary
solution to the “native question”, as it was referred to, came in the form of the locations
system. The locations system, adopted by Theophilus Shepstone, Diplomatic Agent to the
25
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Native Population, and the Commission for Locating the Natives in 1847, was created with
the intention of directing and controlling the massive indigenous population that had become
a growing concern in the colony, especially in regards to the disparity in numbers between
the European and African population. The system envisioned the creation of a number of
individual African communities within the colony of Natal, largely within massive “native
reserves” which was administered and overseen by a government magistrate, who acted
partially as administrator of justice and partially as tax collector. Within this system,
indigenous authorities, namely the African chiefs, were permitted considerable autonomy and
authority within their own group. Final authority rested with the lieutenant-governor, who
was given the title of “Supreme Chief”. The intent of Shepstone’s ideal policy, which he
advocated from 1846 to 1852, was the gradual process of “civilizing” the indigenous
population though preserving indigenous traditions while allowing for “tenets of civilization”
to be incorporated into African society.

Shepstone’s system was specifically characterized by his personal relationship with
the indigenous population. Shepstone’s ability to interact with and direct the indigenous
population would be one of the key factors in the long term survival of the locations system.
For much of the early period of Shepstone’s administration, he remained one of the few
government officials to physically interact with the Africans. It should be noted, however,
that Shepstone’s system of colonial administration has been attributed to the beginnings of
“indirect rule” by the likes of Mahmood Mamdani and his work Citizen and Subject. Though
Mamdani places Shepstone and Natal at the forefront of the emergence of indirect rule, he
admits that the system emerged through “trial and error” and it “was a good half-century
before it could be codified as law in Natal”.28 It is this trial and error period which made

28

Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1996), 62.

36
Shepstone the ideal candidate for the development of Natal’s indigenous policy. It should be
noted, however, that although Mamdani’s work as become the baseline for many Africanists’
understanding of the placement of Shepstone and Natal in the development of indirect rule in
Africa, it has been challenged by scholars such as Jeff Guy, who argue that this approach
could be the result of a misreading of the sources as “the admirable sweep of Mamdani’s
approach has exposed gaps and omissions in his argument, and certainly his treatment of the
policies attributed to Shepstone in Natal is misleading”.29

Despite this debate, there was no question that Shepstone was well suited to the task
of diplomatic agent, largely due to not only his experience in the Cape frontier, but also his
mastery of multiple African languages (though admittedly there are striking similarities
between Xhosa and Zulu). As diplomatic agent and later secretary for native affairs in Natal,
it would become Shepstone’s job to not only deal with indigenous concerns, but, on several
occasions, to act as the representative to the British crown. This type of interaction would
eventually result in the association of Shepstone as the true symbol of power to the
indigenous populations in Natal. It should be noted, however, that Shepstone was typically
the sole translator of British policy, allowing him to keep both British and indigenous
interpretation of his policies separate and controlled.30 Such power and control will be
evident in his management of the indigenous population illustrated below. By 1851, there
were seven locations, each with an average size of 180,000 acres and largely under the
jurisdiction of Shepstone. The locations system would be a major source of debate within the
colony, especially after the death of the first Lieutenant-Governor Martin West and the arrival
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of Benjamin Pine. Pine believed the best means for civilization rested on the complete
removal of the African from his indigenous traditions, which represented a complete break
with the past British policies. Such beliefs, however, did not limit Pine’s attempts to use such
indigenous traditions for military purposes, as will be discussed below.

Pine’s intentions for the Africans were more in line with the opinions put forward by
Earl Grey, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. He believed that because the Africans
were so spread out and “half of this population was made up of remnants of clans without
chiefs”, that Natal would be the perfect environment to organize these groups into more
concentrated, smaller communities that could be more easily governed. Pine almost laments
at the lost opportunities within the district to “mould [Africans] more easily to our views” and
the removal of some indigenous practices, such as witchcraft, that “stood most in the way of
their civilization, [which] might have been imposed as the indispensable terms upon which
permission to inhabit the district should be granted to them.”31 Pine perceived the indigenous
situation in Natal to have been no better than any other indigenous tribe outside of British
influence. Pine was not only fearful of the indigenous culture and tribal customs, including
the concept of multiple wives for each African male, but was also concerned as to what effect
this situation would have on the British settler. Pine wrote, “How can an Englishman with
one pair of hands compete with a native man with five to twenty slave wives?”32
Interestingly, such a viewpoint links directly to the idea of controlling women’s reproductive
power, which can be seen as a key to controlling labour resources. The lieutenant-governor’s
concern not only rested with the placement of the Africans, but on how they would affect the
economy of Natal a whole.
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Pine was not the only English official concerned with the principles of labour within
the colony. Reverend William C. Holden, a long-time resident of the colony and part of one
of the first Wesleyan missions in Natal, published a pamphlet in 1850 entitled “The Kafir
Labour Question.”33 Holden points out in his pamphlet that considerable strain was felt by the
European farmers of Natal largely because of a lack of accessible indigenous labour within
the colony. The pamphlet not only includes several possible solutions to the problem which
were echoed within the European community, but also gives a solid understanding of the
colonists’ view of the Africans and their place within colonial society.

Holden’s stance on the indigenous problem within Natal was very similar to that of
Pine. Holden believed that the locations system itself was flawed and that the plan was “false
in its principles, and injurious in its consequences.” The idea of keeping the Africans as a
“separate, distinct people, enjoying their own heathen rights and immunities” was seen as a
great injustice by Holden. Like Pine, Holden believed that on the arrival of the British, the
Natal Africans were in an ideal position to be influenced as they were “scattered, broken,
powerless, and honest, and this disposed [the Africans] to submit to any form of government
under which the English might be pleased to place them”.34 But instead, the Africans were
allowed to remain within their tribal societies, which Holden points out were “grossly
impure” and “contrary to the dictates of humanity.”35 Within such a view, Shepstone’s
locations were presented as an invented chiefdom system, and, though largely untrue,
individuals such as Pine and Holden saw a lost opportunity to “civilize” a malleable African
population that had been placed in a system that had yet to be entrenched. The opportunities
to create a truly “civilizing mission” for the African population would not be achieved.
33
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Despite these criticisms, Shepstone outlasted his critics and was able to place the
locations under secure legal standing with the Natal Native Trust in 1864, thus preserving the
system for the remainder of the formative period. The colony was never, however, able to
fully fund the system, as administrators, magistrates, and proper oversight was never readily
available. Natal experienced what many British colonies suffered during the early expansion
of the Empire: what John Galbraith described as “humanitarianism on the cheap.”36 Despite
the locations system becoming the established norm within the colony, it remained
representative of a limited commitment to the major problem of the ever increasing African
population within the colonial structure, a problem which would permeate itself in the
colony’s defensive structures as well.

By 1856, Natal was granted a Colonial Charter and became an independent colony,
with its own representative institutions and fully independent administrative structures, in the
form of legislative and executive councils. It was at this time that both the boroughs of
Pietermaritzburg and Durban attained their own status as corporations and began the process
of creating their own town councils and administrative systems. Though there were a number
of economic and internal struggles which permeated this formative period, the colony was
able to maintain relative peace and security. The threat of a Zulu invasion was a consistent
refrain, as will be shown, but there was little open conflict between Natal and its neighbours
to the north. That did not mean that Natal did not influence or interact with the Zulu nation,
but it did avoid direct conflict. This was evident in Shepstone’s trip to the coronation of King
Cetshwayo in 1873, which involved a physical crowning process and a proclamation by
Shepstone of “coronation laws” which, if at the time had no particular sway over the Zulu,
was later used as a pretext for the invasion of the Zululand in 1879. Though maintaining
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some semblance of peace and security (as will be somewhat called into question in the
greater part of this dissertation), there remained multiple avenues and opportunities for
debate, conflict, and even violence within Natal during this formative period.

Though this dissertation ends with the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, the repercussions of
the conflict on the history of Natal do not end there. Debates would continue to rage over the
matters of land, labour, and most importantly, security. The threat of Zulu power in South
Africa would be diminished by the defeat of the Zulu Kingdom in the Anglo-Zulu War of
1879, though the threat of a Zulu uprising was present until the Bambatha Rebellion of
1906.37 The principle causes of the rebellion, however, stemmed more from the imposition of
a “Poll Tax” rather than an overriding revolt against British authority. With the defeat of the
Zulu in 1879, British attention in Natal would shift for the remainder of the nineteenth
century to the Afrikaner population in the Transvaal and Orange Free State. Such tension
would eventually result in the two Boer Wars and would help solidify the formation of an
Afrikaner nationalist identity which would define the social and military tradition of the
white community of South Africa in the coming century.

However, the story does not end so quickly. After the complete dissolving of the Zulu
kingdom in the 1880s, Natal began to focus more intently on attaining greater prosperity.38
Though an attempt at confederation with the Transvaal and Cape Colony was made in 1875
by Lord Carnarvon, it was deemed a failure after the inability of the British to hold onto the
Transvaal following its annexation in 1877. Natal, however, would eventually achieve
responsible government, along the lines of other segments of the dominion, in 1893. Two
decades later, Natal voted 11,121 to 3,701 to be incorporated into the Union of South Africa
37

For a detailed account of the rebellion, See Marks, Reluctant Rebellion; Jeff Guy, Remembering the
Rebellion: The Zulu Uprising of 1906 (Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2006).
38

For more on the civil war that eventually finished any hope of a renewed Zululand, see Guy, The Destruction
of the Zulu Kingdom.

41
in May 1910.With the exception of the Anglo-Zulu War and the Boer Wars, Natal had
retained, for most of its history, a level of security which was nearly unprecedented in the
region during this period. How and in what ways was this security achieved are questions that
lie at the heart of this dissertation.

This chapter has attempted to contextualize the formation of Natal within the borader
landscape of an emerging South Africa in the nineteenth century. Its intent is to provide the
important background necessary for developing a deeper understanding of the importance of
Natal’s place in South African history. Concerns related to the African population and
conflict with the Afrikaners will remain strong subtexts for the remainder of this dissertation,
and should illustrate that the formation of Natal as a colonial state was wrought with
problems, debates, and overwhelming concerns, not only for security, but for racial and
economic issues. These defensive institutions, the examination of which make up the heart of
this dissertation, were only one such entity in the “web of structures” which were established
during this formative period. Through the case studies examined below, their importance will
become even more apparent in understanding the making of Natal.
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Chapter Three: Volunteers
Introduction
During the Cape Frontier War of 1851, there was a general fear amongst the colonists
of Natal of an indigenous uprising that would threaten the lives of European colonists.1 In
response, solutions for the defence of the colony were formulated, including the raising of
indigenous levies from the African population. Thomas Phipson, future sheriff of the colony,
was one of the more outspoken critics of the rumoured policy of raising indigenous levies. At
this time, most African military units within Natal were used to a limited extent in internal
matters. Phipson argued that the creation of formal indigenous units was not only immoral,
but illegal because such actions lacked approval by the colonial population and were
implemented solely on the authority of Lieutenant-Governor Benjamin Pine. Phipson’s
suggestion was to rely on white volunteers from within the colony for defence, stating that “a
volunteer is worth two pressed men.”2

If the formation of Natal as a colonial state was invariably linked to the establishment
of the colony’s defensive institutions, then it is important to begin the analysis with the
institution composed primarily of those who formed the colonial government: the European
volunteer corps. One of the most visible pillars of the Natal’s colonial defence, the volunteer
corps represented an attempt by the European members of the colonial community to address
the problems of colonial rule and security. Acting as a continuation of the military traditions
and systems that were gaining popularity in Europe, volunteering became a means through
which the citizens of Natal were able to take part in the protection of the colony while
1
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2
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remaining viable members of the colonial community outside of military responsibilities.
Because of their consistent and sizable place within the white colonial community, the
volunteers became the idealized form of everyman’s contribution to the protection of the
colonial state.

The volunteers, more importantly, were not simply the members of Natal’s defensive
forces, but were also important figures in the development of Natal as a colonial state.
Lieutenant-governors, police commanders, magistrates, clerks, businessmen, and
administrators all made up the ranks of the volunteer corps. Therefore, by examining the
development and evolution of the volunteers, it becomes easier to trace the development of
the colony of Natal as a whole. This also reveals their major importance to the emergence of
Natal’s security cognizance. The defence and security of the colonial state, in the eyes of
many within Natal, rested on the “brave men” of the volunteer corps. The practicality of this
assumption, though largely unfounded, still resulted in the volunteer corps holding an
important place within the colonial consciousness and the emerging notions of what defined
Natal during its formative period.

This chapter will move through the formative period of the colony of Natal,
examining the formation and organization of the volunteer corps within the colony and
provide key examples of their role in Natal’s colonial defence. By more intensely considering
the problems, limitations, and perceptions of the volunteers, the important place of the
volunteer within Natal’s defensive structures will be realized. Matters of equipment,
readiness, and discipline will all be addressed, with particular emphasis on the lack of
preparation which characterized the volunteer system for most of Natal’s formative period.
Though the most visible element of Natal’s defence, at least amongst the European
community, the lack of success from the volunteers will illuminate their overinflated place
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within Natal’s history, and challenge the established settler narratives which permeated the
early historiography of the colony. The complexities of the volunteer system’s place within
Natal will instead illustrate the fluid nature of defence within the colony and the solutions to
colonial safety during the colony’s formative period.

In 1854, the lieutenant-governor of Natal approved the volunteer law which
formalized the organizational structures of the volunteer units of the colony. It was the first
such law in South Africa. At the time there were five units ranging between 30 and 100
troops within the colony of Natal. By the end of 1878 with the build-up to the Anglo-Zulu
War, the colony possessed 15 units numbering 760 men. Nevertheless, the impact of these
volunteer military organizations on the security and organization of the British colony of
Natal during the mid-nineteenth century went beyond a mere military build-up. The military
systems within Natal, particularly the volunteer corps, were part of a more general
militarization of Natal society which continued throughout the formative period of the
colony, from the founding of the colony in 1845 to the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. Government
regulations between the enactment of the Volunteer Law of 1854 and the Volunteer
Regulation Act of 1877 illustrate the evolving nature of defence within the colonial state, as
well as legitimate concerns for the issue of security, especially in response to the continuing
influx of an indigenous population that estimates placed around 100,000 by 1845.3 The
European population would make use of the volunteer system as not only a means of
collective security, but as an instrument of power within the colonial state. Yet the formation,
preservation, and continuation of these volunteer systems would be consistently challenged,
dismissed, and even abolished by members of the colonial government, the press, and citizens

3
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of the colony who had alternative plans and suggestions of how the colony should defend
itself. Despite the presence of a strong military detachment of the 45th Infantry Regiment at
Fort Napier, the European colonists still believed in the necessity of maintaining their own
elements of security within the colony, even when those systems were impractical,
ineffective, or even criminal. Ironically, despite the shortcomings of many components of
this system, the volunteer corps would remain one of the most enduring and praised aspects
of Natal’s security institutions for much of the formative period of Natal.

It should be emphasized that this chapter is not meant to be a “white man’s history of
Africa” but instead attempts to demonstrate the place of white European settlers within the
defensive structures of the colony of Natal. By illustrating the clear agency exhibited by
white settlers outside of the official British military, the apprehensions and source of tension
with the indigenous African population will become clearer. By understanding how the
colonists defined themselves, greater links between English and European identity and
overall perceptions of defence materialize. What the volunteer systems illuminated was the
means through which the European population of the colony of Natal coped with the
concerns for security, but also their attempts to address their own place in the emerging state.
The fear of invasion, the formalization of the volunteer system, the solutions to discipline,
and the response of the volunteers during crises like the Langalibalele Incident and the
Anglo-Zulu War all address the critical question of the place of the European within Natal’s
defensive institutions. By providing such an encompassing view of the volunteers during the
formative period of Natal, their relationship with the other pillars of defence within Natal will
reveal the interconnecting concerns from all individuals living within the colony. Despite
these overwhelming concerns for security, the expansion of these volunteer military
institutions was indicative of a developing state attempting to come to grips with problems of
security, stability, and safety during the mid-nineteenth century.
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Volunteering and Natal
The catalyst for the European styled volunteer system formed in Natal in the midnineteenth century can be traced back to the establishment of British identity during the
eighteenth and early nineteenth century, especially during the Napoleonic Wars.4 The
motivations to volunteer on the British home front during the early nineteenth century were
similar to those same motivations decades later in Natal; a mix of patriotism, economic
factors, and self-interest. Many settlers were mostly recent arrivals from Britain so they
brought these institutional ideas with them from Europe. Though lacking a unified ruling
class in Natal, the similarities between Britain of the Napoleonic period and Natal of the midnineteenth cannot be ignored. Britain and Natal both had a proximity to a hostile force,
though both threats could be defined in different ways between that of the Zulu Kingdom and
the French across the English Channel. Each established new laws to regulate and arm groups
of men. Both created in these forces a direct correlation between loyalty to the state and
loyalty to the locality of their homes, and along those lines, volunteer corps were local and
not national organizations “recruited from a very small area and officered by amateurs from
the same neighborhood.”5 Ironically, in both cases the usefulness of these volunteer forces
were inflated by a self-engrossing narrative, though it remains possible that the volunteers, as
argued by Austin Gee in his analysis of the volunteer movement of the Napoleonic period,
played a role in maintaining the state through “gaining the active involvement of civilians and
strengthening ties of social allegiance.”6 The trend that began at the turn of the nineteenth
century would continue well through the next five decades till the founding of Natal as a
British colony.
4
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Though a volunteer tradition can be traced back to the Napoleonic period,
fundamental question remains of who were these volunteers and what defined them as
volunteers. Though there is not a strong delineation between the “volunteer” and the
“militia”, some distinctions must be made. Though the militia system had consistently existed
within the British Empire, the very notion of a “volunteer” was a relatively new concept in
the nineteenth century, though it quickly became a powerful symbol of the complete
identification of the individual with the nation.7 A volunteer was one who willingly served as
a defender of one’s state or nation, though retained a strong connection to his civilian life.
What made the volunteers a distinct entity from a militia was the formal organization that
existed within the volunteer system. Officers and men within the volunteers saw themselves
as part of a refined military force that moved beyond a simple mustering of armed men, and
instead acted within the structures of British military decorum. Though such systems saw an
increase in membership in the British home front during the second half of the nineteenth
century, it remained an understated component of the British military order. This is even
more surprising considering Hugh Cunningham’s assertion that as many as one in twelve
British men served in a volunteer corps during their lifetime during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century.8

The history of the volunteer and understanding their place within the European
modelled military systems has only recently come into focus. As with much of military
history, the First World War has become the staging point for new research over the last three
decades on volunteer service, and understanding the motivations of those involved.9 There

7
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remains, however, little research examining the volunteer elements within colonial
organizations outside of Europe, especially in the nineteenth century. The role of the
volunteer within the British Empire has not been completely neglected, yet research has
focused largely on the regimental history or volunteer activity during times of war, with the
South African War gaining considerable attention in the period of imperial expansion.10
Nevertheless, little focus has been played to volunteer organizations during peace time,
especially in the colony of Natal.11 Natal, with its location on the periphery of the British
Empire, acts as a clear starting point in developing a better understanding of how volunteer
organizations were formed and operated during the rise of the British Empire.

Volunteer corps within the British world was nothing new in 1854. Local militias had
been one of the key components of defence within the Empire for much of the nineteenth
century. Though the conscript military system had its origins in the French Revolution’s
Levee En Mass, Britain, "engaged in the imperial hinter-land”, possessed an army which
“remained quite literally a frontier variant of both the popular-conscript and the mass-reserve
styles until the First World War”.12 It was the home front which acted as the main inspiration
for the volunteer movement. The British Volunteer Force, founded in 1859 as a response to
the Crimean War, likely acted as the main inspiration for similar volunteer forces within the
Empire, including Natal. Originally founded as an invasion defence force of middle class
Press, 2000); Gail Braybon, ed., Evidence, History, and the Great War: Historians and the Impact of 1914-18
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), 67–85.
10
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riflemen, the force eventually degraded into a working class military club, though the middle
class members would remain officers after initial interest declined. Only being called upon to
fall under military law during the time of an invasion, unit cohesion rested almost exclusively
on the social interaction between officers and troops, similar to their counterparts in Natal, as
will be shown later. Again, more than simply a militia, the volunteers of this era represented a
bridge between the Victorian military and Victorian society during the latter half of the
nineteenth century.13

Segments of the Empire, especially Canada, relied heavily on volunteer systems to
maintain local defensive structures. The volunteer movements of North America act as a solid
comparative analysis for the volunteer movements of the mid-19th century, especially in the
settler colonies of the Empire, such as Australia, Southern Africa, and Canada. For much of
the nineteenth century, the Canadian volunteer corps “represented the province's principal
contribution to its own defence, providing the mechanism by which a pool of trained
manpower would be available in an emergency. For much of this period, British troops
guarded the territory against attack and bore the main burden of defence responsibility.
Nevertheless, during the numerous emergencies faced by the province in the colonial period
the militia played a key role.”14 Like much of the rest of the Empire, however, Canada would
define its ideas of citizen soldiers much later during the build-up to the Great War.15 Canada,
with its proximity to a possible enemy in the United States, acts as a strong parallel with
Natal and the neighbouring Zulu kingdom (though the threat level for both colonies was
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relatively minimal for much of their existence and fear of invasion was driven almost
exclusively by sensationalism).16

The concept of volunteer service becomes even more complicated when dealing with
a colonial state, as those who served within the colonial system were attempting to strike a
balance between systems at home and those within the colony, with all of the local conditions
therein. Nonetheless, the manner in which volunteers became a modern phenomenon in the
nineteenth century has clear relevance to the formation of colonial defensive structures in
Natal. What made the volunteers distinct was their separation from mercenaries, conscripts,
or professional soldiers, developing what Krüger and Levsen have called unique “normative
judgments.”17 As volunteering became more common within the military elements of British
society in the nineteenth century, it gained greater positive definitions. Though Krüger and
Levsen analysis of volunteering falls under the scope of a traditional European style military,
and not in the context of colonial periphery, it still reveals considerable discernments in the
relationship between military traditions, the concept of home, and the impact on society in
colonial history. These individuals who were part of the volunteer forces illustrate a unique
perspective on the use of force, the role of the government in colonial society, and the
perception of groups and peoples outside the volunteer system (whether defined by race,
gender, or economic status). Through these volunteers, the social, political, racial, and
economic structures of colonial Natal this formative period of the colony’s history are
revealed. 18
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Despite the importance of these systems, previous work on military organizations and
their impact on the colony of Natal has largely neglected the topics of collective security and
these defensive structures’ overall influence on colonial policy and the administration of the
colony. One of the few exceptions is Graham Andrew Dominy’s PhD dissertation on the
garrison at Fort Napier, covering over fifty years of Natal’s history and providing a near
complete analysis of one of this dissertations neglected defensive structures: the British
Army. 19Focusing on the British imperial forces of the colony exclusively, Dominy’s analysis
of the impact of pageantry and its relationship to colonial security as well as the role of
“panics” within the colony provides a key component to understanding the importance of the
military presence in Natal.20 The contributions made by the British Army, however, remains
limited regarding their overall impression on Natal as an emerging colonial state, as those
within the military hardly made long term contributions to the changing landscape of the
colony. The volunteer military corps are also largely ignored in Dominy’s work, possibly due
to their size or simply because, as we will see below, they were not seen by the military as an
intricate component of colonial defence.

Other works on the defensive structures of the colony of Natal largely present the
colony as a staging area for other conflicts, including the Frontier Wars of the 1850s and the
Anglo-Zulu War of 1879.21 Any work done specifically on Natal has been largely relegated
to either the Anglo-Zulu War, or later involvement of South African forces in the Boer Wars
19
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or World War I and II.22 Those authors that do examine Natal in the nineteenth century do
little beyond writing regimental histories or in some cases chronicles of European/white
heroism and exploits in Africa.23 Two exceptions are Timothy Stapleton’s work on colonial
South Africa, which provides one of the few starting points in understanding the volunteer
system of colonial Natal.24 Volunteering is also a component of Robert Morrell’s work on
colonial settler masculinity, but again the focus on this work centres on the post Anglo-Zulu
War era.25 In light of this gap in the literature, this chapter will incorporate the more nuanced
elements of recent military history to better evaluate the importance of the volunteer corps in
the establishment of Natal and the development of an identity amongst the European settlers.
In the words of Richard Price, the volunteer systems were an important element in the
creation of a “culture of imperial rule in Southern Africa” and more importantly, “what
happened to British culture in the empire” during the nineteenth century.26
Early Volunteer Corps
The volunteer corps at the dawn of the colony of Natal was nearly non-existent.
Though there were informal volunteer organizations that had existed in Port Natal before the
British annexation of Natal in 1843, including the Port Natal Volunteers, this early corps
consisted of little more than 20 Europeans (with 16 of the total corps being officers)
commanding groups of local Africans. The Port Natal Volunteers were little more than a
local militia, and did not have the formal military organization of later volunteer corps. It was
22
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instead established in an environment where Britons were surrounded by what was deemed a
hostile state in the Republic of Natalia and some type of military group was necessary for
communal security.27 Though, in retrospect, the comparisons in establishing this corps were
strikingly comparable to their decedents a decade later.

This initial volunteer system was, nonetheless, representative of a more general
system of military control outlined within the frontier society of nineteenth century South
Africa. The Afrikaner concept of the “Commando”, or a mounted militia or “burger force”,
was a staple of white society within Natal. Such early groups could hardly be categorized as a
formalized military force, but instead a militia formed in times of crisis. Unlike the
“commando”, the composition and organization of the volunteer military corps were outlined
under a system similar to the volunteer social clubs in Britain at the time. Trends from
London would have made their way to the colonists through the press and letters home. One
example of this trend was the creation of the “Queen’s Own Volunteer Rifle Corps” in
London in September 1848. Though the exact cause for the creation of the corps is unclear,
the corps was formed in the environment of the 1848 Revolutions, and possibly as a
preventative measure against hostile forces from both outside and within Britain’s borders.
Such inference is clear in the corps motto, attributed to Virgil: In Utrumque Paratus
(“Prepared for either event”).28

Though anticipating the formation of the British Volunteer Corps in 1859, such corps
were a continuation of the volunteer mentality which had existed since the Napoleonic
period. The corps was reported in the London Monthly Times having received full support
from the government and supplied arms and ammunition. So popular was the measure that
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the Naval and Military Gazette announced a second corps was in the course of formation. At
the same time as this British corps creation, the Natal Witness produced an editorial that
inferred that if the colony was to protect itself; it must establish some type of standing force
with similar organizations requiring “tact, time and patience.”29 The opinion of the editor
remained that it would be better to rely upon “voluntary bands of the colonists, uniting, not
from any desire for war, but from the calm conviction that disturbances may arise” over “the
dependence to be placed on the native agency”.30

Almost as a response to this call to arms, the following week the lieutenant-governor
approved of the formation of a volunteers corps at Pietermaritzburg, appointing Walter
Harding, crown prosecutor and future attorney general of the colony, to be lieutenant
colonel.31 On September 8th, the first meeting held by Mr. Harding of this “yeomanry corps”
set out regulation, future meetings, votes for officers, and even styles of uniforms with “Forty
being the complement for a troop, and that number having been already enrolled, it is
calculated that it will not take long to raise a second troop.”32 The troops did drill, yet there
was an overall lack of permanence to this “yeomanry corps” as it was named. Though the
volunteers did follow many of the same methods used later by the formal volunteer corps of
the colony, the unit never took part in any formal action, with the exceptions of acting as part
of the proceeding for the funeral of Lieutenant-Governor Martin West in 1849 and a muster
of troops for the Queen’s birthday in May 1850. Slowly, more units were formed within the
colony including the German settlers at Claremont, where they established fortifications,
consisting of a ditch, wall and palisade of sufficient extent to admit all persons on the station,
as well as the neighbours living in the area. The lieutenant-governor appointed a Mr.
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Bergtheil to be captain, and the volunteer corps was raised under the designation of
“Berhtheil’s Volunteers”.33 The emphasis on fortifications was illustrative of the growing
tension across the border in the Zululand, which was exacerbated by the fear of an impending
invasion from Mpande.

Despite this fear, there were those within the colony who had reservations about these
new corps. Several of the wives of colonists were not as enthusiastic as their husbands to
become “valiant sons of Mars” who “‘had heard of battles! And long’d to follow to the field,
Some warlike lord”.34 By December 1848, several women, described as “primitive colonial
ladies”, or original settlers to the colony, reported to have formed an anti-yeomanry-corpsnon-marrying-association, with the intention of preventing the young men of the colony from
joining the military organizations by promising to “neither [give] themselves, nor their
daughters, nor their daughter’s fortunes to any imitation soldier.”35 The reaction from the
press was unforgiving, claiming these women were a dangerous symptom of “bleeding
hearts” who were not taking into account the dangers of lacking an effective military
presence within the colony, with such action leading many men “to inglorious resignation”.36
The measures, predictably, were unsuccessful, and the praise within the press continued to
espouse the benefits of the corps, and their overall role in the protection of the colony, even
when no military actions were taken.

It was this perceived field of protection that the volunteers provided which would
remain a constant theme for the remainder of Natal’s formative period. Despite having taken
part in no real military engagements, the colonist who drilled as volunteers continued to
33
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assure themselves that they were doing their part to keep the “Zulu Threat” out of the colony.
This was only exacerbated by such unfounded reports that the Zulu knew of the volunteers’
effectiveness, and were in fear of the volunteer’s wrath. One account even claimed Mpande
was holding off an invasion because of the yeomanry corps:

Since Panda [Mpande] has heard of the enrolment of this band, he show no
disposition to come up to the mark,--and woe betide him if he did! He says infantry
waddle like ducks, and he doesn’t care for ducks! But as for the yeomen he won’t
come and feel the edge of their carving knives on any account. No wonder therefore
that his impudence is brought down an inch or two.37

Such exaggerated confidence not only ensured continuing confidence in the volunteers, but
also permeated the next decade of volunteer formation. Even following the outbreak of the
Crimean War, there was a sense of “patriotic enthusiasm” from the British members of
Natal’s community directly associated with the war against Russia. This enthusiasm was
fuelled by rumours of an advance on Durban by Russian privateers following the outbreak of
war. From these patriotic elements and the confidence of the volunteers to prevent any attack,
volunteer military organizations were formed between the later part of 1854 and throughout
1855.38 Despite official legal consent for the forming of the volunteer corps not being fully
approved until the Volunteer Law of 1854, by the ratification of the law elements of these
organizations had been formed and officers selected.

Formalization of the Volunteers
The formalization of the volunteer system came under Legislative Ordinance No. 8,
1854, approved by Lieutenant-Governor Benjamin Pine November 15, 1854, “to promote the
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establishment of Volunteer Corps for the defence of the District.”39 Under this Volunteer Law
of 1854, anyone residing in the colony would be permitted to form a volunteer corps, with the
specific need to develop rules, regulation, and bylaws that focused on duties, discipline, arms
and equipment, and the number and ranks of officers and members. Units were permitted to
elect their own officers, and would receive a maximum of six shillings for each day called out
to actual service. With this legal formalization of the role of the volunteer corps within the
colony, the colonial government, specifically in the form of the lieutenant-governor, was
granted considerable power and authority over the volunteer corps. Troops that failed in their
duties would be liable to a fine of up to £10, and returns for the number of men and horses in
each corps would be forwarded to the lieutenant-governor twice a year. Such returns were
necessary because the volunteer law also stipulated that when “any volunteer corps shall be
reduced below twenty men, rank and file, for a continuous period of six months, it shall
become, ipso facto, disbanded.”40

Such formalization of the volunteer system was critical in the creation of colonial
records and paperwork, especially given the fluid nature of the volunteer system. By the end
of 1855, there were five volunteer corps established, the Natal Carbineers and the Natal
Rifles (spilt into two unites) out of Pietermaritzburg, and the Durban Volunteer Guard and
Royal Durban Rangers out of Durban. Both the Carbineers, Rangers, and half the Rifles were
cavalry units (though both sections of the Natal Rifles were commanded by Walter
Harding).41 All in all, the total number of men in these corps by the end of 1855 was 339. Of
these, the majority were part of the Durban Volunteer Guard numbering 150. Considering
Natal’s population in 1855 numbered around 1,200 Europeans, the percentages of men
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involved in these volunteer corps constituted a measurable proportion of the able bodied
white men in the colony. Despite this strong showing initially, a year later the Durban
Volunteer Guard had been disbanded and the total number of volunteers hovered around
200.42

Every volunteer corps typically began with the founding by a single individual who
would become the commanding officer. The Durban Rangers were a unique case, with the
founding officer being Benjamin Pine, Lieutenant-Governor of the Colony.43 Though not
universal, volunteer corps would be formed and then submit their bylaws for the approval of
the lieutenant-governor. Bylaws sometimes lagged behind the formation of units because of
this need for approval and because of the necessity for the members of the corps to agree on
elements of the bylaws. An early example of these bylaws can be found for the Natal
Carbineers, formed in January 1855 and published their bylaws in March 1855. These rules
outlined the makeup of the corps, the rules and regulations related to troop behaviour, and the
parameters under which the corps could change rules and bylaws. Though strictly militaristic
in tone, the language of these bylaws is telling of important elements to the volunteer corps.

Officers, including the lieutenant-colonel, major, adjutant, surgeon, and quartermaster
would all be elected by the corps as a whole. Non-commissioned officers would be elected by
their particular troop, consisting of no more than 50 men. Elections would take place
typically at corps meetings, even with the greater formalization of the volunteers following
the 1872 law. Promotions amongst officers would typically come from within the ranks, as
was the case of promotion of Second Lieutenant T. Menne to first lieutenant and adjutant of
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the Natal Hussars in 1877.44 Some officers, however, were elected from outside the corps
directly to the position of unit commander, as was the case in the election of Mr. Clius Saner
to the position of captain of the Victoria Mounted Rifles also in 1877.45 Once officers were
selected, the notice of the election for officers would be forwarded first to the commandant of
the volunteers and then on to the lieutenant-governor for final approval. In the case of a death
of an officer “his successor shall be elected by nomination and ballot” and at least 14 days’
notice would need to be given before a replacement was elected, providing enough time for
candidates to be found and possibly make their case while vacancies of critical positions
would be filled by temporary appointment of the commanding officer.46

This democratization of the volunteer organization was not exclusively limited to the
election of officers. In the case of court martial, a president and six members would act as the
jury. The president would be one of the officers, chosen on rotation, and the other six
members would be selected by ballot from the corps as a whole. The quartermaster would act
as judge advocate, and the final verdict would be forwarded to the commanding officer,
which he would either approve and order sentence, or recommend the court reassemble and
reconsider its findings. Far removed from the military tribunals of the British Army, such a
system was implemented with the express purpose of allowing the members of these
volunteer corps to have a say in the discipline of their unit and in doing so provide their own
source of agency in the manner in which such discipline was implemented.47 Punishment was
far removed from the “lash” and would typically take the form of a fine measurable by the
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offence, usually to the maximum of £10. Such methods of military discipline did not mean,
however, that the corps bylaws encouraged a negligible attitude toward military precision.
These elements of the volunteers which would come under greater scrutiny during the AngloZulu War.

Some elements of precision can be found in the early bylaws of units like the Natal
Carbineers. Twenty days were expected for drill and other operations yearly, taking place on
a quarterly basis (in the case of the Carbineers, it would take place during the first five days
of the week in march, June, September, and December for three hours in the morning and two
hours in the afternoon).48 This was perhaps one of the most obvious elements of military
precision. The trumpet would call at 6:30 in the morning, and troops were normally in roll
call by five minutes till. Although the corps members were expected to wear a simple and
inexpensive uniform, unit colours were implemented under the rules and bylaws. For the
Carbineers, uniforms were “blue, with white facings, consisting of a shell jacket, overalls
(strapped), helmet of leather, with white cover, and forage cap.”49 To illustrate the demand
for discipline and order, unit bylaws forbade members from appearing at muster in a
“slovenly state”. First offences were subjected to a fine of less than five shillings, while
continuing transgressions would result in a court martial. This fine system is indicative of the
major means to inflict discipline on a volunteer unit: through the money they had gained
working in the colony.

The pay of the volunteers was measurable, but would quickly disappear over
continuing offences. Absence from drill or service (unless provided a leave of absence ahead
of time) would be fined up to £10. Insubordination, disobedience of orders, or even
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drunkenness on duty would result in a fine of up to two pounds. And if a trooper wished to
leave the unit, six months’ notice had to be given to the commanding officer. The only
alternative would be to find a viable substitute, or (the quickest and most likely option for
those able) pay a fine of five pounds. Ironically, the success of the unit rested largely in its
ability to remain financially stable, and this fine system of punishment was the surest manner
in which to keep the unit financially viable as a form of defence in the colony. This is
conceivably why many corps were unable to last an extended period of time due to financial
constraints and members unable to deal with the financial and temporal obligations.

Such structures to the volunteer bylaws remained relatively consistent throughout the
1860s and into the 1870s. Some exceptions and changes did take place, especially in regards
to the supplies provided and the leisure activities associated with the corps. The Newcastle
Mounted Rifles also presented in their bylaws a possibility for honorary members to join the
corps for “an annual subscription of two Guineas, or make a donation of ten Guineas to the
funding of the Corps.”50 The primary purpose of these memberships seems to be associated
with the contest events hosted by the corps, as honorary members were “entitled to shoot for
Prizes, but not vote at any elections of other business of the Corps.”51 These honorary
memberships increased the amount of funds available to the corps while encouraging larger
participation in the annual shooting contests that were held between the corps. Such an
inclusion also indicates the growth in popularity and numbers of corps by the formation of
the Newcastle unit in October 1875. So much so that members were not allowed to shoot for
prizes until they had been a member of the corps for six consecutive months, and, of course,
paid all the fines due by them up to that date.
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Another change from early corps bylaws was the attempt to address the issue of
supplies beyond general issues of uniforms and what equipment to be worn. The intricate
details about the saddle arrangement for the Newcastle corps went beyond anything that was
seen in the early bylaws of the Carbineers, with each member needing a saddle that could
carry rifle holster, a double rein bridle, as well as a pair of goose-necked spurs about one inch
long. Other required equipment included saddle blankets and knee halters for the horse,
though such equipment would largely standard issue for any persons familiar with open range
horsemanship. Changes with military technologies from the 1850s were also evident, with
officers being required to carry a revolver pistol, specifically a Colt revolver with 50 rounds
of cartridge ammunition. The Colt Navy Model was only recently adopted in 1854, but had
become a standard weapon during the ensuing decades.

Perhaps the final change that can be seen in later bylaws rested on the continuation of
the democratization process in the volunteer system. Because the corps was a system relying
on sporadic meetings that occurred quarterly at best, annually a committee of the officers and
five other members of the corps would be formed that would function for the remainder of
the year as regulators of finance, as well as “other business of a civil nature appertaining to
the Corps.”52 The committee would be elected these five members on an annual basis,
continuing the tradition of allowing the basic soldiers some say within unit business.

Though there were many unique individuals in the early volunteer corps, one of the
most well documented accounts of the early formation of the volunteers was outlined by
George Russell, a long-time resident of the colony, in his history of Durban. Russell provides
many extensive details on the makeup and early years of the Durban Rangers (later the Royal
Durban Rangers following its official proclamation in February 1855). The composition of
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the officers of the Durban Rangers was not necessarily based on military experience. Two of
the officers elected on April 13th did have previous military commissions. Patrick J. Maxwell,
a former officer in the Austrian military, was made lieutenant, and Robert Tatham, member
of the Cape Mounted Rifles, was selected as military instructor sergeant.53 The viability or
success of such military experience can be questioned, and the commitment that many of
them had to the organization remains uncertain, but such appointments are illustrative of the
advantage of previous military experience in the election of officers.

If military drills and meetings were intended to be a common occurrence within the
organization, by July 1855, the Rangers had settled into having only quarterly meetings
which included parade drills and firing practice. Of course, these meetings were also
associated with banquets and entertainment, as in July when Captain James Proudfoot hosted
an event at Boulton’s Hotel in Durban. 54 Also represented at this event were members of the
45th Regiment out of Fort Napier and the Natal Carbineers.

Following the formation of the Royal Durban Rangers, Russell was also involved in
the infantry corps dubbed the Durban Town Guard. Mustered in October 1854, the corps
included three companies totalling 150 men. The designation for the unit was quickly
changed to the “Durban Volunteer Guard” and they began taking part in drills soon after their
first muster.55 Russell, in his history, recalls that individuals who volunteered for this corps
were drawn from multiple professions and backgrounds. Brass forgers, bakers, carpenters,
and other workers from the colony joined up. Former military men, largely retired army
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pensioners, provided instruction on military order and marches, in some cases in exchange
for land from the War Department as compensation.56

This tactic was nothing new, and multiple examples can be found in the archives of
colonial officials attempting to find work or land for former soldier settling in the colony.
Major Dartnell, commandant and inspector of the volunteers from 1873 to the late 1880s, was
formerly a soldier in the 27th Infantry Regiment. An H.O. Newland requested from the
lieutenant-governor an appointment in a colonial corps while part of an imperial militia in
Ireland in 1877.57 Mr. Newland claims to have been a resident of the colony for a number of
years before his arrival to Ireland, but there is no evidence that he served in the volunteers as
an officer of any kind. He could, however, have served in a trooper capacity. Even soldier
stationed at Fort Napier may eventually decide to settle in the colony, as was the case with a
Mr. Rayson who was permitted at the end of his service to remain in the colony of Natal and
act as a settler.58 Whether Mr. Rayson remained in the colony for long or joined the
volunteers is unknown, but he provides another example of the military men who were
available within the colony. This crop of soldiers in the colony would only multiply as its
population grew, and their presence could explain the increase in discipline and organization
of the corps after their initial formation in the 1850s.

Questions of Discipline and Organization
The discipline and organization of these volunteer corps, despite the presence of
former military men as instructors, began to break down almost as quickly as the units were
formed. Even by October 1855, letters to the editor appeared in the Natal Mercury, criticizing
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the lack of proper training time and drills, as well as lamenting how the corps might “with
efficient management and proper co-operation, have been of the greatest value to the town”
in terms of colonial defence.59 An opportunity had been lost, to some colonists, to create an
effective volunteer system which would properly contribute to Natal’s defensive institutions,
while also helping to stabilize Natal as it established itself as a colonial state. The most
obvious cause for this lapse in discipline was the minimal incentive placed on the members of
the organization to continue to take part in military activities. George Russell, a member of
the volunteers and future quartermaster, gives an account of one incident involving a baker
named Sandy Forbes who simply ceased to answer his name at roll call because of the public
scorn put upon him for coming to drills with a broom instead of a rifle. This reveals how
some individuals simply left the units or refused service, despite their good intentions,
without any tangible repercussions from the units.60 This lack of discipline and failure to
create a cohesive military unit for the defence of Durban gave credence to the heightening
concerns by the colonists for the necessity of a proper defence corps. As indicated above,
problems did not lie entirely with the organization and discipline of these militias, but also
with the lack of proper distribution of equipment, arms, and ammunition.

George Russell concedes that the early military supplies provided for the Durban
Rangers by the government came in the form of “surplus stores,” or obsolete arms and
supplies from Fort Napier and the Cape Mounted Rifles. The weapons provided were a heavy
Brunswick pattern carbine that frequently jammed, making it impossible to be reliably used
on horseback. The swords, old dragoon sabres, were only useful to the skilled swordsman,
resulted in some cases men being thrown from their horses as they cut downward.61 Supplies
for the Durban Volunteer Guard were no better, and in many instances worse. If uniforms
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were supplied to the unit, they were mostly composed of remnants of sailors’ coats with some
alterations. Hats were tailor made and fashioned in the style of the French kepi, and a pewter
insignia of “DVG” was sewn to the front. Trousers, however, were not provided, and it was
assumed that the men would wear a standard grey colour. Firearms were not provided, and
most troops brought their own weapons from home, ranging from rifles to rabbit guns. Those
who did not own a firearm used wooden guns for training.62 The failure to obtain uniform
firearms directly impacted the nature of how training could be properly implemented. Though
this would eventually be changed and the corps would allow for certain funds to pay for the
volunteers, costs remained a contentious issue for much of the early corps.63 This was due to
the colonial government’s lack of additional funding for much of the 1850s and 1860s.64 It
was only exacerbated by the inability of the colonial government to allow for additional cost
to be absorbed by the state. Even when the corps were able to regularly drill and provide their
own uniforms, they sometimes incapable of dealing with additional expenses.

In June of 1873, the Durban Rifle Guard, formed in July 1861, requested from the
colonial government additional funds for the expense of procuring a bandmaster and the
musical instruments for the band. The memorial, drafted by Colonel H.J. Meller, contended
that the request, combined with the procurement of uniform for the said band, had driven up
the additional cost of the corps by £150.65 More drastically, the same year the Victoria
Mounted Rifles also requested funding from the government for the purpose of pay assistance

62

Ibid., 200–201.

63

Under the Volunteer Law of 1872, every member of the volunteers was provided “a breech-loading rifle, to be
supplied by the Government on receipt of a bond for its safe custody and return.”

64

Between 1858 and 1872, the government spent less than £2000 on pay for the volunteer corps, despite their
numbers increasing to over six hundred by 1870. Perhaps the greatest disparity occurred in 1861 when the
number of volunteers reached 449 (more than double the previous year) and the total funds provided remained
£500. Minute: Attorney General, Natal: ‘Return of Volunteer Corps & their respected strength’ and ‘Expenses
of Volunteer Corps’, AGO I/8/20, No. 196A/1878.
65
Legislative Council, Natal, Document No. 22, “Memorial from Members of Durban Rifle Guard to His
Excellency the Lieutenant-Governor, Praying for Pecuniary Assistance from Public Funds, June 8, 1863,” NCP
4/1/1/2, 1863.

67
from the colonial government. Though there were a few corps that were established that did
not receive the minimum government funds, these were usually very small contingents of
mounted men that rarely lasted more than a few years. The Victoria Mounted Rifles had been
formed in 1861 and presented their case to the lieutenant-governor for modest pay assistance
for clothing, accoutrements for both man and horse, additional cartouche (ammunition) boxes
and belts, and perhaps most importantly, tents for 50 men.66 Major George Adams,
commander of the corps, had planned for his men to “camp out for a week at some distance
from any settlement of Colonist in order that all members may have an opportunity to of
knowing by actual experience what would be required and what they might have to do for
their own comfort”.67 Neither the pay, tents, nor boxes were immediately provided, due to the
limitations place on funding for the volunteers at this time. The lieutenant-governor
forwarded the request for the next legislative council session and made appropriate inquiries
on the acquisition of the tent, but there was no immediate answer for these supplies.

These incidents illustrate some of the major limitations placed on many volunteer
corps during this early period of the colony. However, the purpose and motivations of these
units can still be seen in the acclaim placed upon the troops by their commanding officers.
Major Adams does not request additional remuneration for the time devoted to drill and the
like, but instead hoped to receive the funds for the benefit of the corps as a whole. Colonel
Meller argued that additional funds were only a small segment of the overall cost of
continuing the volunteers and that the volunteers had “incurred this liability in addition to the
sacrifice of their time, solely for the public good, and the public have derived the benefit”.68
These examples highlight the driving force behind most of these volunteer organizations: the
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continuing need for collective security outside of government involvement. Despite the
limitations placed upon the corps by funding and the lack of equipment, the quintessential
ideals of the volunteers of maintaining the defensive structures of the colonies remained. By
working through these early problems, and in some cases highlighting them to the
government, the volunteers, whether by perception or actuality, were able to establish their
place as a key pillar of colonial control within the colony of Natal. These would not,
however, be the last set of administrative and practical problems that would face the
volunteers during this formative period.

Limitations on Firearms and Ammunition
During the 1850s when ammunition was not supplied by the government, volunteers
were discouraged from forging their own bullets. Attendance at training exercises also
became scarce when volunteers were required to purchase their own powder. Such
constraints illustrate the limitations on gunpowder, guns, and ammunition during this early
period, and would remained a pivotal issue on how firearms and ammunition were regulated
within the colony for much of the 1850s.69 Laws and regulations related to the sale and
distribution of gunpowder remained a common concern in the colony until the gunpowder
trade was monopolized by the colonial government in 1859.70 Before that time, the provisions
of gunpowder were handled by private traders from the Cape Colony and the Transvaal.
Colonial ordinance had been put in place to restrict the distribution of firearms within the
colony in 1851, forbidding the shipment or selling of arms or ammunition without the express
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permission of the chief customs officer.71 Because the penalties to the 1851 ordinance had
been so steep (those without proper authorization would be given a penalty of £500) it would
have been particularly dangerous to purchase arms and ammunition from illegal or nontraditional sources.72 Such limitation on equipment would lead to suggestions that the corps
be completely reorganized, shifting toward a system in which ammunition would be provided
for training along with pay.73

Even by the mid-1870s, there was a tight hold on the distribution of ammunition to
the volunteers. When the imperial troops stationed at the colony were outfitted with the
Martini-Henry rifles in 1875, Major Dartnell, Commandant and Inspector of the Volunteers,
made a request for the Sneider carbine ammunition from the control department. Because of
the limitation placed on the amount of ammunition provided for each troop, limited to 50
rounds per man for cavalry and 100 rounds per infantryman a year, Commandant Dartnell
was initially unable to procure the additional ammunition that was no longer needed by the
imperial garrison. Under typical protocol, the supply of ammunition would be sent back to
England and distributed within the British Army. Dartnell, however, felt that “there could be
no objection to the colonial government purchasing the whole of the Snider ammunition
remaining in the colonial stores” (some 100,000 rounds) and providing their use for the
volunteers.74 Initially, there were objections from the control department as well as the
colonial government. A major question rested on why the volunteers would need so many
rounds for practice when 50,000 was the annual allowance. Eventually, it was decided that
the rounds would be placed in reserve within the colony in case of emergency, but the
71
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incident still illustrates the difficulty in which the volunteers worked within the ammunition
laws of the colony.

This issue of whether or not it was proper to supply the volunteers with certain arms
and ammunition was nothing new in 1875. Two years earlier, before the full distribution of
the Martini-Henry rifles amongst the British Army, Lieutenant-Governor Musgrave, on
behalf of the legislative council, requested 200 Martini-Henry rifles and 500 cavalry carbines.
These arms would be provided specifically for the volunteers who were being reorganized
under the new volunteer law (see below). The request, however, was initially denied and
altered to the Sneider rifles, “in lieu of the Martini-Henry, which are not yet ready.”75 The
colonial government responded that it would accept such a change, yet the colonial
government questioned such a decision based not only on correspondence received from the
War Office which directly stated that the Martini-Henry rifle had been adopted for imperial
service and was being manufactured, but also because, once again, of the issue of
ammunition. Though the Sneider rifle was “undoubtedly a most efficient weapon…superior
to any rifle in use by other European armies”, if the Henry rifle was adopted within the next
few years, the colony would face an unwanted surplus of Sneider ammunition which would
be useless with the Henry rifle.76 Though the volunteer infantry was eventually supplied with
Martini-Henry rifles, the carbines would remain Sneider for the next several years. Not
surprisingly, the ammunition surplus that was anticipated occurred two years later with
Commandant Dartnell’s request for the imperial garrison’s surplus of Sneider carbine
ammunition.
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The incident, though minute, is demonstrative of the supreme difficulty the volunteer
organizations had with both properly supplying the members of the corps, but also keeping
the units along the same parameters as the British military system, something that seemed to
not be a major concern for the colonial authorities at Downey Street. The causes behind these
actions remain unclear, but could be a result of colonial thrift, or an attempt to increase
colonial control within Natal. Whereas cost saving measures remained a consistent theme
during the formative period of the colony of Natal, it was also possible that from a central
administrative or imperial perspective, a large number guns or ammunition within the colony
amongst the white settler population could become a threat to central authority. There is,
however, little evidence that the concerns for firearms was part of a fear of a white uprising,
but instead linked to the means through which African could access firearms through white
intermediaries.77

Another major difficulty rested on the existence of rifle associations within the colony
of Natal. In many cases these rifle associations were composed of the same individuals who
took part in the volunteers, and were established with the express purpose of allowing venues
for firearms practice. Law 19 of 1862 promoted the establishment of rifle associations for the
defence of the colony, though these associations were also formed along similar lines of the
volunteer corps as a type of social club that masqueraded as an element of Natal’s defensive
institutions. One such group, the Natal Coast Rifle Association, on multiple occasions made
extensive requests to the colonial government through the commandant of the volunteers. In
1875, they requested the installation of new target plates for practice range, stipulating that
there were not enough plates to make a “first class target”.78 Such supplies could be provided
because the rifle associations were subsidized by the Natal government. The Natal Coast
77
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Rifle Association would receive £50 annually to support the purchase of ammunition so the
men involved could continue to be prepared for the possible outcome of invasion, and have
the rudimentary training necessary to act as a possible second line of defence on the chance
of the failing of the volunteers.79

With this overall expectation for funds and ammunition from the government, it came
as a surprise when a request for more ammunition in June of 1878 was met with some
resistance from the controller of arms. The Natal Rifle Association had just received 20
Swinburn Henry (a derivative of the Martini-Henry) rifles and submitted a request for 500
rounds at cost. The controller of arms would typically have no major problem such requests
in light of the special relationship which developed between the rifle associations and the
controller of arms, presumably because the controller of arms was part of or knew several
members of the rifle association. Due to the number of rounds being requested, however, the
controller of arms needed to confirm his the requisition with the colonial government.
Despite some small reservations from Commandant Dartnell on the number of rounds
requested, the rifle association was permitted to purchase the ammunition at cost.80 Such
cooperation between civilians and the government over the issue of ammunition illustrates
the degree that firearms and ammunition in the hands of government approved individuals
had meliorated by the 1870s compared to the early restrictions of the 1850s.

Keeping a solid control over the number of firearms within the colony and in the
possession of the volunteers would remain a major issue within the colonial government even
to the build-up to the Anglo-Zulu War. Even by July of 1878, there were continuing
questions as to the number of firearms in the possession of the volunteer corps. The attorney
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general, in response to the Home Defence Bill of 1878, even requested from the commandant
a systematic summary of the number of firearms possessed by the volunteers since 1865, both
accounted and unaccounted for. By 1877, an average of 603 rifles per year had been issued.81
In comparison, cost of issuing these firearms had remained around £2000 for this period.82
Some weapons were listed as unaccounted for, though the commandant does not go into
considerable detail about this issue. What this request does illustrate is that firearms, and the
limitations posed on those firearms, were a central component of the volunteer organization,
though not the only component of their existence. The limitations on firearms, though an
initial hurdle in the corps existence, was eventually overcome with greater formalization.
Such formalization not only characterized the growing colonial government and colonial
population, but also provided a clear avenue to understand the changing role of the volunteers
within the colonial state. Firearms and ammunition, however, was only one of the early
limitations that defined the volunteers. There remained basic questions, even within the first
decade of the volunteer’s formation, over the commitment and readiness of the men involved
in these corps to take part in military manoeuvres and remain a viable component of Natal’s
defensive institutions.

Readiness, the Fear of Invasion, and the Volunteers
In 1859 within the pages of the Natal Mercury, a summary of a drill book for
volunteer riflemen in England was presented as an overview of the requirements and
necessities to create a successful volunteer unit. It featured the opportunities for promotion
for fulfilling ones duties, the levying of fines for volunteers that do not take part in drills and
81
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other training, the proper implementation and distribution of arms, and most importantly,
discipline. Without discipline, the volunteer corps would become an “armed mob, more
dangerous to themselves than others.” 83 Published in 1859, these suggestions seem to be a
direct commentary on the dismal situation within the volunteer corps a few short years
before. Volunteers had many problems with the aspects of “soldiering.” Some had difficulty
with the complex cross belt that held a cartridge box, bayonet, and cap pouch. Others
struggled with the procedures for loading the muzzle musket.84 But perhaps the most striking
problem lay in the failure or repeated failures of these infantrymen to fire the large calibre
muskets of the British infantryman. Notoriously inaccurate, these muskets greatly differed
from the smaller calibre firearms the volunteers would be accustom to when hunting small
game within the colony, some having difficulty in even pulling the trigger. And when the
trigger was pulled, it sometimes knocked a man back several paces. Consistent accuracy was
nearly non-existent during target practice, as evidence by low expectations: “the man whose
nerves and muscles enabled him to hit the target twice in succession at 150 yards was
regarded as a marksman.”85 Of course, a bullseyes was seen simply as a “chance shot” and no
indication of any accuracy of proficiency with the firearm. If such experiences were typical
for most military recruits during this period, since the volunteers were never consistently
trained, they likewise remained unaccustomed to the discipline or military tactics of the
corps, as well as simple practice of firing their weapon. Such problems would not be solved
in the short term. Even by the 1870s, the level of training and skills among the volunteers was
still a point of contention, as was outlined in one episode in a paper on colonial defence:

I was herding sheep when the volunteers had their meeting at Estcourt, and a man of
Langabalele’s [sic.] named Newabyala and others were returning from witnessing
their evolutions. This man said, if that was the only way they managed their shooting,
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and those were the plains on which they shot, Langalabalele’s [sic.] people could
easily manage them.86

Such an account was taken shortly before the Langalibalele Rebellion, but still illustrates the
considerable lack of confidence possessed by many for the volunteers to successfully
complete their task as a pillar of colonial defence.87 There was, however, a growing concern
by October 1855 of a Zulu invasion of Natal caused by growing power struggles within the
region, including the threat of civil war within the Zululand spilling over into Natal.

For European colonists, there was a real apprehension of war within the Zululand
directly impacting the lives and livelihood of the colonists. Because of the proximity between
these two areas, any major political shift would greatly impact the safety and security of the
colony as a whole. A deeper anxiety was felt by the colonists of the possibility that if Mpande
(referred to as “Panda”) was defeated in his personal power struggles of the 1850s, he would
attempt to take refuge in the district of Natal. In 1840, Andries Pretorius had aided in the
overthrow of the Zulu King Dingane and was partially responsible for the installation of
Mpande as king.88 Pretorius had, in fact, proclaimed Mpande King of the Zulu and stipulated
that Mpande would act as a vassal to the Natal Republic.89 During Mpande’s exile in 1838
from the Zululand, where he was forced to flee the country and consolidate his forces, 17,000
Zulu fled the war torn region and sought safety in Natal. Many remained once Mpande
returned to Zululand. Colonial views that the African population was already on the brink of
overwhelming the European colonists were only exacerbated by the news of the possibility of
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yet another Zulu exodus following internal political conflict within the Zululand.90 Rumours
even began to circulate within the press of a possible invasion by Mpande from the Zululand
into Natal. Such speculation elevated concerns within the colonial population about the
readiness of Natal’s defences against outside attacks, particularly in Durban, which was
outside of the protection of Fort Napier.

Colonial Secretary William Sargeaunt sent his assurances to the offices of the mayor
of Durban in regards to the unrest taking place in the Zululand. These assurances first
included a dismissal of the possibility of attack by Mpande, largely due to the impassability
of the Tugela River due to weather. The government’s concern for the colonies military
preparedness was minimalized by the listing of the organized defences which already existed
within the colony. In the primarily Afrikaner counties, composed of holdover farmers from
the Trek period, the rigid military structure that existed within these groups gave, according
to the colonial government, full assurances of their military preparedness, as these groups
would organize “under the field cornets of their respective wards” into commando units that
would function as a local militia.91 Such an organizational structure was not present in the
more British counties, composed of settlers who had more recently arrived in the colony. Yet
the colonial secretary boasted of the presence of the British military at Fort Napier as well as
the volunteer corps which had been recently established.

The colonial secretary also emphasized the presence of a male population that would
be willing to volunteer at a moment’s notice to defend their respective towns. These men,
however, would be “comparatively useless in the event of an invasion or other emergency”
because of their ill-discipline and lack of proper training.92 With this declaration, the colonial

90

The Natal Mercury, October 12, 1855.

91

The Natal Mercury, October 26, 1855.

92

Ibid.

77
government of Natal in essence created a recruitment call for the volunteer military
organization. All males (assumingly white) between the ages of 16 and 60 were called upon
to join their local volunteer corps, without delay. Offers of uniforms and equipment were
made (without reference to the second hand items which were likely given), as well as pay
and rations if the corps was to be called up in the case of colonial defence. The stipulation,
however, was made that at least three years of service and a considerable amount of drilling
would be required for the volunteer corps to be seen as a success, and achieve some sense of
military discipline. The final note by the colonial office allays fears once again, stating that
this call to action would be a “fitting opportunity of arousing the colonists of this district of
their duty [as opposed to] from any fear of an invasion from Panda [Mpande].” 93 Within this
report, however, there is no mention of the indigenous forces that could be called up within
the colony. This could be because indigenous forces were largely perceived to be used only in
internal matters, such as the acquisition of cattle from chiefs as a form of punishment within
the colony. It is also possible that the colony simply dismissed the importance of the African
military units in the facilitation of colonial defence. The complete absence of this large
section of the colonial military structure leaves question of how these indigenous military
organizations were perceived in not only the press, but also the government’s own
reporting.94

Despite the actions of the local volunteer corps receiving praise, there still remained a
greater demand to organize and standardize the corps within Natal. The culmination of this in
many ways would be the volunteer laws of 1872, but there was a gradual attempt to
professionalize the volunteers over the decades between the founding of the first corps and
the Anglo-Zulu War. A minor example occurred in 1864 when Horse Guards made addressed
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the volunteer corps in Natal. New regulations in the British Army applicable to the officers of
the Army and Royal Marines were applied to the officers of the militia, yeomanry, and
volunteers, or simply “All Officers of Yeomanry and Volunteer Corps rank, as juniors of
their respective ranks, with Officers of the Regular, Fencible, and Militia forces.”95

The brief recruitment call of the 1850s did nothing to solidify the readiness of the
volunteers, as both discipline and turnover continued to be major shortcoming of the
volunteers. Turnover was simply inevitable in a civilization, volunteer based organization,
but left many corps simply unmanageable. Between 1865 and 1870, an average of three
officers a year resigned or were no longer in service to the colony. These resignations did not
originate from one unit, or evidently coincide with any particular event in the colony, but
instead were indicative of the fluid nature of many volunteer’s membership to the corps.
Officer positions, though consistently filled throughout the 1850s and early 1860s, became
more and more commonly vacant by the early 1870s, especially in the case of lieutenants and
second lieutenants. The Alexandra Mounted Rifles, formed in 1863, had the positions of
second lieutenant and surgeon vacant from 1866 to 1873, and continued to lack a surgeon
until 1881.96 Though the new Volunteer Law of 1872 and the arrival of Major Dartnell as the
new commandant and inspector of the volunteers would attempt to rectify many of these
problems, difficulties would continue to mount creating greater frustration with the volunteer
system.

Possible Solutions
An invasion from Mpande in the 1850s never materialized, despite fears from within
the colonial population. The call to arms from the colonial office also seemed to have little
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long term impact. The Durban Volunteer Guard remained ill equipped and in disrepair until it
eventually broke up following its last meeting in July 1856.97 A second volunteer corps was
established in 1859 under the name the Durban Rifle Corps, with many of the same members,
including George Russell who was made a staff officer for Colonel Henry James Mellor.
Similar attempts were made in Pietermaritzburg, but with its proximity to Fort Napier
“Maritzburg” did not seem to express the same degree of “martial fever.”98 The funding and
military preparedness of this group seems much greater than the original volunteer corps,
despite their initial enrolment of only 110 men. Enfield Rifles were provided for the unit as
well as uniforms ordered from England, of a much better quality than the second hand items
of the first infantry corps. According to George Russell, the corps increased in size and
proficiency, eventually taking part in multiple public functions, including taking part in a
military parade for Prince Alfred during his visit to the colony in 1860, as well as “giving off
a branch to the Artillery.”99 Despite these successes, financial difficulties of the mid 1860s
resulted in the corps eventual demise.

The attitudes within the colony regarding the failures of the volunteer corps (at least
in Durban) created an opportunity for individuals to put forward their own views on how to
deal with military security within the colony. One of the most striking views in regards to
military reform came in the form of a series of editorials by an anonymous contributor to the
Natal Mercury who signed as “One of the People.” His solution to the military issue as well
as concerns regarding the indigenous population was to form a “Natal Guerilla Corps” within
the colony. The writer has an obvious fear of the large indigenous population within the
colony, making clear that the Royal Durban Rangers and Natal Carbineers, as well as the
military stationed at Fort Napier, would not be well suited in dealing with a large indigenous
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attack (whether external or internal). According to the writer, “savages are enemies that
cannot be dealt with according to European warfare, but require to be dealt with in an entirely
different manner.”100 The Africans, in his mind, were capable of a different type of warfare
with different standards. With a guerrilla corps, a type of commando unit which would roam
the countryside in a less organised fashion, the colony would be able to maintain its safety in
the event of outside attacks in conjunction with internal strife. In the opinion of this writer,
such a unit would allow for the colonists to respond to attacks from the Zululand, or internal
uprisings from Natal’s African population.

This is possibly why there continued to be a commando presence in the colony despite
the existence of the volunteer corps. In 1863, the colonial government formalized the
existence of these commando or “burgher forces” under Law No. 26, 1863 to promote the
“Establishment of a Volunteer Mounted Burgher Force for the Defence of the Colony.”101
The burgher forces were a continuation of the commando tradition that had existed in Natal
since before the British arrival and would have been a strikingly similar system as the one
suggested by “One of the People.” The creation of this force was not particularly new. The
Cape Colony had also experimented with a combination of volunteer, burgher, and mounted
police during the same period. In most cases, Afrikaners would form commandos in the rural
areas while volunteers would be from the towns and predominantly British. Nevertheless, this
force that was established was distinct in many ways from the volunteer corps. Though also
based largely on regional recruitment, the burgher forces were more irregular forces than the
main volunteer contingent. They were not commanded by an elected officer system, but
instead reported to the local field cornet when needed. Drills were not required, and
100
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individuals who wished to join only needed to apply for admission to the field cornet and
receive a certificate of enrolment. Uniforms, horses, and weapons were provided by the
individual, and pay of up to six shillings was only given when the forces were deployed.
Fines (of the maximum of 20 shillings) were still handed out to individuals who mustered
with “arms and accoutrements in an unserviceable or slovenly state”, or for a horse that was
not “serviceable and trained to stand fire”. Members who were found guilty of
insubordination or disobedience of orders in the field could be fined up to £5.102 In essence,
this burgher force was a compromise to some extent between the colonial government and the
Afrikaner population that allowed many who did not approve of the British military system to
retain their own methods of combat. The commando tradition, which stretches back to the
time of the Great Trek, was more in keeping with the voluntary militia system which imposed
itself less strictly on the Afrikaner population.

Despite this compromise between the colonial government and the Afrikaner
population, the major limitation of these burgher forces was their role as a defensive force.
Rarely would they be required to leave their home district, and would never leave the colony.
Instead, their primary purpose was to act as a supplemental force to the other elements of
defence that existed in the colony. In light of this limitation, many European settlers would
continue to see the opportunities presented in the volunteer corps as a means of not only
maintaining colonial control, but also acting as a fundamental pillar in colonial security to
threats within and outside the colony.

By the 1870s, others would see the burgher forces as a component of Natal’s
defensive structures that was undermining the volunteer system within the colony. In a letter
sent to the Newcastle district magistrate, Captain J.S. Robson of the Buffalo Border Guard
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lamented the internal conflict and tension which seemed to exist between the volunteer
system and the local Afrikaner population, at the same time putting forward his of
suggestions for improving the current system. Robson, who also acted as the field cornet of
Newcastle’s No. 2 ward, presented his scheme for increasing recruitment and dealing with
the lack of enthusiasm for volunteering among the Afrikaner population. Newcastle, by all
accounts, was one of the more remote townships in Natal during the formative period. At the
time of Robson’s letter in 1873, it had just recently been separated from the Klip River
District into its own county for the convenience of the magistracy. The township lay between
the Drakensberg range and the upper branches of the Tugela River and was precariously close
to the Zululand and Orange Free State Border. There were also a number of Afrikaner
farmers in the region, due to the massive amount of land that was available; 600,000 acres of
crown land by 1874.103 The presence of a large Afrikaner population helps explain Captain
Robson statement that “volunteering is not generally in favour up-country.”104

This region of Natal was largely devoid of a reliable burgher force, or at least its
reliability was somewhat in questions to Captain Robson. Robson pointed out that the vast
majority of these Afrikaners had come to the Newcastle region to be as far from British rule
as possible, yet “at the same time under British protection.”105 Robson’s concerns, however,
stemmed from the contradictions between public and private statements made by the
Afrikaners, where on one hand they promised to be ready, willing, and able in the event of a
confrontation, privately they were less enthusiastic. Robson states that in private
conversation, the Afrikaner’s opinions were strikingly different:
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In case of a row you must not think that I shall be fool enough to help you. I shall be
off to any place where my stock will be safe. If there is space in the Free State, I go
there; if there is space in the Transvaal I go there if the road is open. When the niggers
have killed you all, or you have killed the niggers I shall come back to my farm. My
land will not run away, but you don’t catch me fighting for the English man. He
brought the Kafirs here, let him fight them.106

This account is Robson’s interpretation, yet such language illustrates an undertone of disdain
for the British. Robson goes on to describe multiple occasions during the Crimean War,
Indian Rebellion, the British Abyssinian expedition of 1868, and the Ashanti Wars in which
the Afrikaners would allude to “their time coming”, illustrating the continuing hope that
British rule would depart or simply collapse. Ironically, this wish for the decline of the
British Empire is not at the centre of Robson’s concern, but instead the captain laments the
lack of respect and appreciation for the defensive institutions that existed within the colony.
Robson calls it “unfair” that the Afrikaners were allowed to “shirk the task of defending the
Colony, and sit at home at ease” as the units of the mostly British volunteer corps took up the
duty of defending the colony.107

Robson’s proposed solution to the issue was to impose a head-tax on all able bodied
men in the district who did not belong to a volunteer corps. This tax would correspond with a
small increase in the number of volunteers in the district, as well as an overall increase in the
number of days the volunteer units would be able to drill. Interestingly, at this point in the
letter Robson’s concerns for the Afrikaner population are replaced by an overall concern for
the readiness and abilities of the volunteers. The captain argued that the number of days the
volunteer should be paid for drilling per annum should be increased from 10 to 20, largely
because in his opinion, “ten days drill in a year will not make a man an efficient soldier”.108
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Robson in this instance was indicative of the greater role the volunteers had within colonial
society, as well as the perceived place of these volunteers by its members. Robson saw
himself as a critical component of the colony of Natal, claiming that he took “the greatest
interest in volunteer affairs, and would like to see them go ahead.”109 Robson even went so
far as to dismiss claims by some in the colony that the volunteer corps were becoming less
and less important to colonial security with the expansion of the Mounted Police.110He went
so far as to say that the volunteers were the “natural defence of the Colony” and the
opponents of the volunteers should be foolish to think otherwise.111

Robson’s proposal, though initially receiving the support of the resident magistrate,
appears not to have gained any ground following its submission to the colonial government.
This was almost certainly due to the needs of the colonial government to maintain good
relations with the Afrikaner population, and to maintain the status quo in light of increased
tension following the Langalibalele revolt and activity in both the Zululand and Free State.
Robson did, however, see an increase in the number of volunteers in the Newcastle District
with the creation of the Newcastle Mounted Rifles in October of 1875. Ironically, Robson’s
own unit would lose six troopers over the next year (reducing the force to 24, barely enough
to remain a viable volunteer corps) and the Buffalo Border Guard would cease to exist in
1879 after being nearly wiped out at Isandlwana during the Anglo-Zulu War.112 Despite
Robson’s lack of success, his view still represents an important component of the volunteer
mentality that only with a well-trained, well-equipped, and well-disciplined force could the
European colonists of Natal defend themselves from outside aggression. The major threat,
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according to Robson as well as the Afrikaners in his district, was not the Free State to the
west, the Transvaal to the north, or even the Zululand to the east, but the indigenous Africans
who resided within the colony itself, fuelling the need for white European elements of
security.

“One of the People” and Robson are only two examples of alternative methods and
solutions to the problems of colonial defence. Another came in a paper on colonial defence
written in February 1875, printed in the Natal Mercury, and forwarded to the colonial
government that attempted to completely redesign the volunteers and defensive structures of
the colony of Natal. The author of this proposed reform was H.E. Stainbank. Stainbank was
the manager of the Natal Coffee Works in Umgeni and saw himself as an important member
of the Natal community as he viewed “coffee planting [having] always been looked upon as a
gentlemanly pursuit.”113

Though it remains unclear what was Stainbank’s expertise in the area of defence, his
concerns were very similar to “One of the People”: the presence of the indigenous African
population and the readiness of the colony to defend themselves. It was Stainbank who
supplied the quote from the Colenso bluebook illustrating the contempt the Africans showed
to the drills of the volunteers. Stainbank argues in his account that this contempt was not
confined to the Africans: “It is of no use comforting ourselves with the idea that because
many Colonists have at some time or other been drilled in the Volunteer Corps, they would
be therefore available in an emergency.”114
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The coffee planter argued that a major reason veteran volunteers did not join new
corps (a statement that is not entirely accurate), was because they had learned “the futility of
such organization”.115 To make matters worse, in his opinion the new commanders of the
volunteers did not have the same “cross-country” experience as the early commanders of the
volunteer corps.116 Instead many of the current volunteer corps were not under the command
of veterans considered necessary at the time of an emergency, but instead were “under the
command of a Durban merchant who [had] scarcely been outside the Borough expect by
means of the post card”.117 The current volunteer officer, according to Stainbank, was little
more than a man who wore a sword on parade, or acted as ornamentation at a public ball.
Ironically, Stainbank complaints that one of the major failings of the current system was the
possibility of volunteers being commanded by regular officers in cases of emergency, making
his concerns with the qualities of the officers rather dubious. The root of such problems
stemmed from the volunteer system itself, including the drills and officer structures that
weakened colonial security and lessened the likelihood of able men taking part in colonial
defence because of the time constraints caused by the drill system.

Stainbank’s solution to the issue was, not surprisingly, a complete redesigning of the
defensive system of the colony of Natal. He understood the merit of a volunteer system and
its tradition that stood against the premise of conscription, taking examples from a council
member who reportedly said he “did not come to Natal to be made a ____ soldier of” or the
phrase “one volunteer is worth twenty pressed men.”118 Nonetheless, quoting Garibaldi that
“volunteers cannot be kept up without enthusiasm”, Stainbank argued that once volunteers
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were sent into the field, the training they had experienced would be inefficient and the
discipline instilled in them would quickly dissipate on anything beyond a short excursion.119
Instead, Stainbank argued for the creation of a militia system which would “never require
compulsory action except under improbable circumstances.”120 The colony would be divided
into districts and officers would be appointed by merit, instead of election, and the unit would
be one body instead of a collection of regimental corps. The only somewhat formalized
organization would be four man groups called “units of cohesion”. These men would
preferably be neighbours and would not leave each other’s side in the field.

Notwithstanding the impracticality of such a system, the most glaring difficulty in this
hypothetical system would be the manner in which the troops were trained. Stainbank argued
that it was not necessarily important that a trooper for this hybrid militia-volunteer drill, but
simply that he should “know his drill” which would be decided by a six-monthly inspection.
If at this point the trooper could not show his efficiency, then he would be forced into
compulsory drilling. Major Dartnell, when made aware of this manifesto, commented that
“Mr. Stainbank evidently does not understand the subject upon which he writes and I
consider his system infinitely more complicated than the one at present in use.”121 This could
explain why, when presenting his suggestions three years after their publication to the
colonial government, Stainbank appears less enthusiastic about his overall plan. He remained
“doubtful whether any militia bill would now be passed by the Legislative Council” and went
so far as to state “it would be manifestly unjust to do away with the Volunteer Corps
altogether”.122 Stainbank’s change in opinion could have been caused by a multitude of
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factors. The Volunteer Regulation Act of 1877 had come into effect and solidified the
volunteer’s place within the colony. Tension along the border of both the Zululand and the
Transvaal would also cause pause in a complete overhaul of the colonial defence system. Or
perhaps time and the personal responses to his opinion in the Mercury had stifled his former
enthusiasm. Whatever the reason, Stainbank concluded his later letter that accompanied his
piece on colonial defence with a more modest suggestion of creating a reserve “midway
between the Volunteers and private people”.123 This could be taken up by the local rifle
association, if the money’s received by the association could be replaced with the supply of
arms and ammunition annually, similar in vain to the volunteers. Though this suggestion was
met with some enthusiasm by Major Dartnell and others, it was dismissed due to the lack of
available funds.

Though Stainbank, “One of the People”, and Robson all made suggestions for major
changes within the colony, none of their recommendations were every fully implemented.
The discourse and debate over the role of the European volunteers, however, illustrate how
defence and colonial order remained pivotal disputes in the development of the colony of
Natal. In some cases, such as the suggestion of the creation of a commando unit, elements of
these debates would shape the creation of a policy, seen with the greater emphasis on cavalry
than infantry under the volunteer system. Also, these men were not wrong in many of their
assumptions about the volunteer and defensive systems of the colony. Stainbank was almost
prescient in his apprehension about the readiness of the volunteers in a prolonged campaign,
as would soon become evident after the outbreak of the Anglo-Zulu War. The problems of
desertion, inability to stay in service, the draw of remaining on the home front, and simple
homesickness all stem for the problems with the volunteer system cited by Stainbank.
Whereas these solutions to the problems of Natal’s defence were impractical, unreasonable,
123

Ibid.

89
or costly, these editorials illustrate at least a small element of the public debate about colonial
security that remained on the minds of the colonist and their government throughout this
formative period.

Frustrations with the System
Tangible reform did, however, take place at the same time as many of these calls for
action from the colonial population. Perhaps most importantly, the Volunteer Law of 1872
made a strong attempt in creating a more formalized volunteer force which could better fulfil
its duties within the colony. The law “For the Better Regulation of the Volunteers in the
Colony of Natal” was intended to replace the old volunteer law of the 1850s and provide a
more refined defining to how units would be organized and run.124 More importantly, existing
corps were given a 60 day grace period to resubmit their bylaws in the new law, and those
which did not were no longer considered active. Considerably more power was given to the
inspector and commandant of the volunteers, and greater detail was provided for the
responsibilities which fell under said offices. Though both were occupied at the time by
Commandant Giles, the predecessor of Dartnell.

The importance of the shift in government involvement after the Volunteer Law of
1872 cannot be minimized. The new advantages and rights granted to the volunteer while on
duty illustrate not only their growing perceived importance to the defensive structures of the
colony of Natal, but also the formalization of the governmental systems within this ever
evolving colonial state. The language of the law illustrated a shift toward a more government
regulated military system that relied heavily on a more formalized system of control that
moved from the lieutenant-governor to the commandant and inspector of the volunteer forces,
and eventual to the local commanders that were granted approval to form units by the
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lieutenant-governor. This change in the command structure was strikingly different from the
original Volunteer Law of 1854. The chain of command and the manner in which orders
would be transmitted throughout the volunteer system was given much greater detail and
attention within this law. Though an inspector of the volunteers, typically under the rank of
captain, had been part of the system since 1865, his authority within the volunteer system had
not been clearly outlined by law.125 The new position of commandant would be appointed by
the lieutenant-governor and whose eligibility for office rested on having “served not less than
six years as a commissioned officer in Her Majesty’s regular army.”126

The chief responsibility of the inspector and commandant was not only to act as the
representative of the lieutenant-governor and commander-in-chief, but also to manage the
arms and equipment of all volunteers. As has been noted, a major disadvantage of the early
volunteers was a lack of supplies, weaponry, and serviceable gear. Instead of commanding
officers simply sent reports to the office of the lieutenant-governor, the inspector would
biannually visit the headquarters of all the corps to examine arms, ammunition, and stores to
insure that they were in a proper military state. What made this system even more effective,
in theory, was the authority of the inspector and commandant to have unlimited access to
these stores for inspection, in essence providing a nearly free hand by the government to
these civilian institutions. In return for this greater oversight, the Natal government would
become responsible for the distribution of arms to the corps, specifically breech-loading
rifles, “to be supplied by the Government on receipt of a bond for its safe custody and
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return.”127 The volunteers would also receive field equipment, pack-saddles, picket poles,
ropes, and other the materials necessary for it to move out on short notice if actual service
was necessary. Such formalized supply systems was a major break from the self-sufficient
and undersupplied parameters of the 1850s and 1860s, but not without cost to the original
spirit of the volunteers.

One of the more substantial changes in the makeup and organization of the volunteers
under the 1872 law rested on the individual agency and authority volunteers maintained
within their own units. The selection of officers was now initiated and approved by the
lieutenant-governor, though names would not be submitted without the approval of at least
one half of the members of the corps. The names submitted, however, would first be forced to
pass “a satisfactory examination as to his proficiency in drill before a board of officers to be
appointed by the Commander-in-chief, of which the Inspector shall be president.”128 To make
matters even less democratic, non-commissioned officers were no longer elected by the corps
but were instead appointed by the officers of those corps. The reasons behind these changes
are self-evident: the flaws within the volunteer system during the 1850s and 1860s stemmed
extensively from a lack of discipline and military precision within the volunteer corps. Such
changes also indicate a growing concern for the necessities of such security to be raised up to
the same level of the ever evolving colonial state. In essence, Natal’s government did not
need such formality during its early years, simply because of the lack of both population and
members of government. The colony had not yet received its charter in 1854, but by 1872 had
established itself as a viable component of the British Empire. This is even more evident in
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the inclusion of an oath of allegiance that would follow an individual’s enrolment in the
corps, issued before a Justice of the Peace, or commissioned officer of the corps:

I, A.B. [stand in for the name], do sincerely promise and swear, that I will be faithful
and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Victoria, Her Heirs and Successors,
and I will faithfully serve in the Volunteer force until I shall lawfully cease to be a
member thereof.129

As a sworn member of the volunteer corps, this social club environment became more and
more a military institution within the colony of Natal.

This greater formalization also resulted in more stringent discipline. When pressed
into actual military service, the volunteers would fall under the statutes of the Mutiny Act, in
essence making them “entitle[d] to the benefits thereof in all respects as the officers and
soldiers of Her Majesty’s army for the time being” and forcing them to fall within the greatly
restrictive systems of the Imperial government.130 Such matters on the role of discipline and
how the volunteers would fit within the Mutiny Act would be a major issue during the AngloZulu War (see below).

Discipline, even before the Anglo-Zulu War, remained the key hallmark to this new
law, insuring greater discipline for both the officers and troops under the system. Though, in
keeping with the volunteer tradition, harsh discipline would only “take effect and be in force
when [the volunteer corps] are on actual military service”.131 Despite this extension of the
volunteer laws, there remained a disparity between the law and the implementation of said
129
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law. Though it remained the responsibility of the inspector to “superintend the drill,
discipline, and organization of the several corps” and to “make at least two visits of section
each year to the Headquarters of all the corps”, if the corps could and would not muster, it
made such responsibilities impossible.132 This became the source of considerable frustration
for the commanders of the volunteers over the ensuing years.

A striking example of the overall lack of discipline and organization by the early
1870s can be found in the yearly report of Commandant Giles in 1873. In the report, Giles
makes numerous attempts to illustrate the progression of the volunteer corps and their overall
growth, especially in the number of units being formed. The attempt to organize the yearly
drill at two camps, one at Uys Doorns (outside Pietermaritzburg) and the other at Estcourt, by
the commandant demonstrates the extreme disorganization and lack of military precision that
existed.133 The Natal Carbineers lacked a commanding officer and the Maritzburg Rifles
commander stated that “in consequence of nearly all of his men being employed in stores in
the town, he could not bring more than 18 to camp” (with the official muster size being
105).134 To make matters worse, the commander of the Victoria Mounted Rifles wrote: “The
sugar planting was then just coming on, and to attempt to force the corps to march to Uys
Doorns would result in breaking it up altogether.”135 The only way these men could be
mustered was if they received service pay for the drill; a request summarily rejected by the
lieutenant-governor.136 So bad was this attempted muster that Giles was forced to cancel the
camp for the year. His recommended solution to the problem rested on the increase in travel
expenses for the corps, from £10 to 15 per year, but the ten day camp period would need to
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be increased to sixteen days. Though the camp at Estcourt was more successful, with only
one corps out of five failing to muster, the event illustrated how service in the volunteer corps
was not always the primary concern of the citizens who took part in them.

The following year, the newly appointment commandant, Major Dartnell, did little
better. Dartnell again attempted to hold the annual camp at two locations, Camperdown for
the Coastal and Midland corps and Estcourt for the Up-country corps. Once again, the coastal
and midland meeting was a complete failure. The coast corps “had suffered so severely from
horse sickness at the commencement of the year that nearly half were dismounted…the Ixopo
Mounted Rifles were without arms, and the Richmond Corps were almost defunct [having
dropped below twenty members].”137 The camp at Estcourt also failed, but largely due to the
expense of travel and the lack of arms. Others, including the Weenen Yeomanry Corps, were
unwilling to turn out due to recent incidents (assumedly the Langalibalele revolt), fearing
they would “leave their farms unprotected.”138 Again, the overwhelming concern for most of
the volunteers rested on events at home and not within the corps.

Dartnell’s frustration was evident in his report, but he also expressed a practical
understanding of the situation. Though he understood the purpose of Major Giles
recommendations from the previous year, he saw them as entirely impractical: “I doubt very
much if yearly Camp meetings will ever become popular amongst the Volunteers generally,
for no matter whether it be a Coast, Town, or Upcountry Corps, the majority of the members
cannot afford to give up sixteen consecutive days to attend a Camp of exercise.”139 Dartnell
argued instead that the “esprit de corps” that these camps hoped to establish were “not
absolutely necessary for the work Volunteers would be called upon to perform in case of an
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outbreak in the Colony.”140 Darntnell was largely acting under the assumption that the
volunteers would serve as a home defence force that could be used is a limited formal
military capacity and less as a commando unit that many aspired it to be.141 Dartnell instead
suggests that attendance to the camps be left optional, and volunteers who attend would
receive the extra pay for their attendance. This is because, to Dartnell, the yearly camps that
required volunteers to arrive and perform their duties in a military fashion over ten days went
against the spirit of the volunteers:

If attendance at yearly Camps of exercise is made compulsory, and the men are placed
under the Mutiny Act [working under strict military guidelines] during the time they
are in Camp, they would be no longer Volunteers except in name, but would be, to all
intents and purposes, Militia, in which case every able-bodied man in the Colony
should be obliged to join the force, or contribute directly to its support.142

Though it remains unclear in his report if Dartnell was seriously suggesting the formation of
a conscript system, he did successfully summarize the spirit of the volunteers: a group of men
who are not forced to join, but choose to join an organization focused on the collective
defence of the colony. Lapses in training and discipline were an intricate part of this type of
system.

Defence Commission of 1875
The frustration with the volunteer system from its commanders, combined with the
Langalibalele Incident of 1873 (which will be discussed later), caused a greater demand for
changes in the volunteer organization by the mid-1870s. Not surprisingly, the volunteers were
one of the central topics for the Defence Commission of 1875. The commission attempted to

140

Ibid.

141

Dartnell presumably envisioned this role falling upon the Natal Mounted Police that would be formed the
following year which will be discussed in Chapter Four: European Police.

142

Legislative Council, Natal, Document No. 112, 1874. “Report of Commandant of Volunteers on the
Volunteer Forces of the Colony, November 19, 1874,” NCP 4/1/1/3, 1874.

96
address whether to completely reorganize the volunteer system, or alter the existing
structures. It concluded that several alterations would not only improve the defence of the
colony, but also make the force itself more efficient. Questions remained as to the efficiency
and outright need for an increase in the volunteer force, especially in light of the
establishment of a European mounted police force, known simply as the Natal Mounted
Police, in 1875.143 The commission outright dismissed in its report the possibility of
increasing the number of troops, stating that 1,000 cavalry and 400 infantry and artillery were
as much as the colony could supply, considering Natal’s “small and wisely scattered
population, and the necessity of providing for the defence of those left at home.”144 This idea
was largely contradictory to the actual situation in the colony, in which there were nowhere
near as many troops active under the volunteer system.145 Such expectations show optimism
for the numbers available, yet the commission also recommended that infantry corps only be
established in large towns or centres of population, largely because “small isolated bodies of
infantry do not add proportionally to the strength of the available field force.”146 These
conclusion were undoubtedly a response to the failures to muster both commandants reported
in 1873 and 1874. The commission also recommended in certain cases the lieutenantgovernor have the power to limit the numbers of infantry or cavalry corps from 100 or 60 to
150 or 85, respectively. Such changes would, in the words of the commission, “avoid
unnecessary multiplication of independent corps.”147 These suggested were actually
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implemented by the lieutenant-governor the following year.148 Again, these reforms centred
on an attempt to consolidate and perhaps make more efficient the volunteer system of the
colony.149

Another central concern for the commission was the overall lack of multiple volunteer
artillery units. One unit, the Durban Volunteer Artillery, had been in existence since 1870 and
typically numbered around 45 men. The commission, however, questioned whether this was
sufficient for inland areas of the colony, particularly Pietermaritzburg (largely ignoring the
presence of Fort Napier). Perhaps a more important component of this need for artillery was
its purpose. The commission did not envision large calibre artillery like that which defended
Port Natal in Durban, but instead saw the necessity for “the lightest pattern of Mountain
Guns, such as was used in Abyssinia and Ashanti and with portable carriages and pack
equipment and further that each battery be provided with rocket equipment.”150

This request is particularly telling. The defence commission was obviously aware of
the war with the Asante in 1874 and the invasions of Ethiopia in 1867-68. The use of artillery
in these campaigns clearly had a major impact on the members of this commission, to the
extent that it was one of the first points made by the commission for improvement of the
volunteers as a whole. More importantly, however, it’s the acknowledgment of other British
forms of military defence within a colonial system that the leaders of Natal were attempting
in some ways to emulate. The additional artillery corps was never formed before the Anglo-
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Zulu War, and the suggestion was outright dismissed by the Lieutenant-Governor Bulwer,
claiming “so long as there was a force of Royal Artillery in the Colony no new local artillery
corps ought to be raised.”151 The cost was simply impractical in relation to the need.152

The commission also made numerous attempts to alter the command structure and
organization of the volunteers in conjunction with the newly establish mounted police force.
A major point of contention rested on the positions of commandant and inspector of the
volunteers and the nearly created commandant of police. By 1875, both of these positions
were held by Major J.G. Dartnell, who had acted as commandant since his arrival in 1873.
The commission, which Dartnell was a part of, recommended that the position be taken up by
two individuals. In the committee’s opinion, these two positions could not be successfully
done by one man, with the union of the two positions being seen as “a temporary and
tentative measure”.153 With the increase in the police force, such a tentative situation would
only grow worse, in the opinion of the committee. This was presented as more dire by the
committee due to the likelihood that if an incident occurred within the colony, Major Dartnell
would in all likelihood be the first to respond with his mounted police force, as this was the
primary reason the unit was established. The committee feared that this would leave the
volunteers and the lieutenant-governor without their commandant and the military advice he
would be able to provide in an emergency. Though a reasonable observation, the
recommendation was categorically denied, and Major Dartnell would retain his duel position
for the next decade.
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A major exegesis for this decision could simply have been cost. Dartnell received
£450 annually for his position as commandant of the mounted police, but he also received
£150 for his work as commandant and inspector of the volunteers. Comparatively, Major J.
Giles, the previous inspector, only received £300 in 1873 as commandant and inspector of the
volunteer corps.154 If another individual would have taken over the position, it would have
been assumed he would receive at least the same salary as Giles. Though small, a savings of
£150 could have been reason enough to avoid a new appointment. The commission instead
recommended the complete elimination of the position of commandant of the volunteers,
recommending that the duties of the inspector be performed by a member of the military
garrison at Fort Napier. In essence, the officer from the garrison would act as an adjutant to
the lieutenant-governor, who was officially in command of the volunteers. By removing the
position of commandant, the commission believed that the officer acting as the inspector (or a
rank no higher than captain) would receive a small allowance for his additional duties,
presumably around the £150 Dartnell received as commandant and inspector of the
volunteers. Despite these recommendation for the highest ranking officer of the volunteers,
perhaps the most significant suggestion regarding the officer corps came in the form of how
the volunteer officers and non-commissioned officers would receive qualified training. The
commission suggested that those “wishing to qualify themselves by a course of instruction
should be permitted to join the Regiment or Battery in Garrison for the purpose”, in essence
bringing the officers into the fold of the formalized British military from a training
perspective and in theory instilling the same level of discipline and training into the volunteer
corps.155 This once again illustrates the overriding view that the volunteers, to become more
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effective as a military force, would form themselves less as a social club and more as an
official military unit in the structure of colonial defence.

Though the vast majority of the suggestions made by the commission were either
ignored or never fully implemented, they illustrate the calls for reform that characterized the
period between the build-up to the Anglo-Zulu War and the post Langalibalele era. The
suggestions of increase in volunteer compensation and the willingness for the lieutenantgovernor to consider, though not fully implemented such suggestions, still illustrates the
importance of defence within the mind-set of the colonial government. Natal was moving
toward a more formalized form of defence that not only fell in line with a more traditional
British military system, but also increased the expectations for its members as a military
force. The balance between civilian life and the leisure activities of the volunteers was
quickly coming to an end, especially as war with the Zulu kingdom could be seen on the
horizon.

The Indian “Volunteer” Corps
A largely ignored component of the population (outside of the Africans who worked
as a crucial element of colonial security) was the Indian migrant population that became a
prominent force in the colony following the import of Indian indentured labour in 1860. In
1875, the legislative council approved a bill that would allow for the creation of an Indian
Volunteer Corps within the colony. The bill (and eventual law in 1875) amended the
Volunteer Law of 1872 and 1873, increasing the maximum number of troops by 1,700, with
“the proportion of Indian Immigrant Volunteer Infantry [being]…one thousand three
hundred.”156 “Volunteer” does not fully illustrate the involvement of the Indian migrants in
this newly created defensive structure. The vast majority of Indian labour in the colony was
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focused on the sugar industry and the construction of the Natal railway system. In light of
this, the bill stipulated that the volunteer force would be formed into corps “provided that the
Indian Immigrants employed in the Civil Engineer’s Department shall be divided into so
many separate Corps, and consist of such number of Volunteers as the Civil Engineer may
from time to time appoint.”157 The use of the term “appoint” is a linguistic deviation from the
original message of the earlier volunteer laws. This becomes even more striking when the bill
stipulated that “any planter who can raise such a corps of Indian Immigrants as aforesaid
shall be, on the approval of the Lieutenant-Governor, appointed Captain of the same, and
shall appoint his subaltern officers, subject to the approval of the Lieutenant-Governor.”158
Because planters possessed so much power within the colony, especially over their Indian
labour force, such a stipulation illustrates the supreme possibility that planters could force
their workers to join these corps, and immediately act as both their military and civil
commanders.

To make matters worse, the democratic elements of the volunteer laws were largely
removed or did not apply to the Indian “volunteers”. While officers in the white volunteer
corps would typically need the approval of “not less than one-half of the enrolled members of
any such Corps”, this element of Section 18 of the Volunteer Law of 1872 was not applicable
to the Indian volunteers.159 Captains were to receive the entirety of the corps grants from the
government, and it was his responsibility to distribute funds for drills and other payments.
This system of payment was not a striking deviation from the traditional volunteer system,
yet the Indian volunteers would receive around half the pay for their service (one shilling six
pence versus three shillings for white volunteers) while officers would continue to be paid the
standard amount. To make matters worse, the Indians were not trusted with the firearms they
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were provided by the colonial government as arms when “not in actual use shall be returned
in safe keeping by persons to be appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor.”160 Even the bond
which would be granted to the volunteer for the safe return of his rifle was never provided to
him, but instead was exclusively handled by the commanding officer.

Perhaps the most jarring deviation of the Indian Volunteer Law from the volunteer
law was the treatment of the volunteer in the event of his death or injury while in service.
Under the Volunteer Law of 1872, the widows and children of those engaged in “actual
military service” would be entitled to compensation, “in the case of a widow such
compensation shall not be less than a gratuity of Three hundred pounds” and if wounded or
seriously injured, would receive compensation “according to the scale of compensation for
the time being in force in the regular army of Great Britain.”161 For the Indian Volunteer, no
such amount is stipulated for those being killed in action, but instead the executive council
would “award such a rate of pension or such a gratuity as the circumstances of each particular
case shall require.”162 By implication this meant the colonial government did not see it as
suitable to guarantee £300 for the life of a dead volunteer if he was Indian.

There is no evidence that any Indian Immigration Volunteer Corps was ever formed
as there is no trace in the colonial records or other expense reports the decade after its
creation. The law, however, is still quite telling about the relationship between the needs for a
defensive force, and the inherent racial undertones of the colonial system. Such instances
would become even more glaringly obvious with further examination of the role of
indigenous Africans in colonial defence.163 The Indian population by the 1870s was
becoming a critical component of Natal’s economy, and the inclusion of them in the networks
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of colonial defence was a foreseeable conclusion. Yet there still remained a supreme
apprehension in providing too much autonomy to these Indian forces. The Indian Rebellion
of 1857 and its enduring memory in the 1850s and 1860s had caused an important shift in the
racial perceptions and debates over race within the British Empire.164 Such debates over the
place of Indians in the military would continue throughout the nineteenth century, though the
response from Africans to the idea of Indian troops within the colony will be discussed in a
later chapter. Ironically, one of the few longstanding impacts of this “Indian Volunteer” Law
was its use by Gandhi in 1905 and 1906 as a pretext to for allowing the creation of an Indian
volunteer corps in response to the Bambatha Rebellion.165 The law does represent a clear
understanding of the needs of defence in Natal, while still taking into account the strikingly
racialized attitudes of the colonial government. It was these same racial attitudes that would
influence the response to one of Natal’s most infamous incidents during its formative period:
the Langalibalele Incident.

The Langalibalele Incident
Over the ensuing decades, the growth of the volunteer corps would continue within
the colony of Natal. The volunteers would not be part of a major military incident during this
period, the era could be characterised by relative peace.166 By 1873, the volunteer corps
numbered 20 cavalry and four infantry corps, with a total of 819 men. Then, Natal
experienced perhaps one of the volunteers most famous, and most commemorated, event in
the history of the volunteer corps: the Langalibalele “Rebellion” or Incident of 1873. Put
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simply, the incident centred on the actions taken by Langalibalele, Chief of the Hlubi over the
issue of firearms procession. John Macfarlane, resident magistrate at Estcourt, demanded in
1873 that Langalibalele, a powerful chief between the Bushman’s and Little Thukela Rivers,
turn in all unregistered firearms under Natal’s gun laws. However, the grievous action was
Langalibalele’s refusal to appear before Theophilus Shepstone. Ironically, Langalibalele had
on multiple occasions aided the British in organizing and subjugating other African leaders
under the Shepstone system.167 In light of this confrontation, Langalibalele, along with a
number of his followers, fled to Basutoland.168 At this point, the volunteer corps of Natal
came into prominence as they marched on Bushman’s River Pass.

The history of the Langalibalele Rebellion has been thoroughly examined within the
Natal historiography, but a few basic facts about the Bushman’s Incident in November 1873
are critical to understanding its importance to the volunteer corps. A number of volunteer
regiments were called up in response to Langalibalele’s refusal, including the Natal
Carbineers. The plan of action included two columns which would move into the Bushman’s
River Pass in an attempt to prevent Langalibalele from fleeing the colony. Yet the columns
did not successfully meet up due to military blunder, leaving a section of the Natal Carbineers
under the command of Major Durnford to discover a contingent of Hlubi at the Pass on the
morning of November 4th. A short engagement broke out, and outnumbered, the Carbineers
were forced to retreat. When the dust had settled, three volunteers were dead, along with two
indigenous interpreters reporting to Shepstone, and Langalibalele fled toward Lesotho. He
was eventually captured on December 11th and was paraded through Pietermaritzburg. The
death of the volunteers and his refusal to fall under British administrative rule eventually
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acted as the catalyst for Langalibalele’s trial conviction for ‘treason’ and banishment to
Robben Island in Cape Town. He was ultimately permitted to return to Natal, where he died
in 1889.169

The memory of Langalibalele would have a prominent impact on the history of the
volunteer systems in Natal. Not only would the failures of the volunteers lead to greater
concerns over discipline during the remainder of the 1870s, they would also be whitewashed
in the history of the volunteer corps. Blame would be ostensibly shifted to the African troops
under Captain Allison who failed to arrive on time.170 Accounts of the incident are filled with
allusions to the defence and valour of the Carbineers.171 Little overall criticism of the troops
under the command of Major Durnford was evident. The most widely circulated account of
the incident was written by Charles Barter, member of the legislative council and commander
of the Karkoof Troop who accompanied the contingent of Carbineers at Bushman’s Pass.
Barter’s account does reveal the lack of discipline and inexperience that many members of
the volunteers possessed during this conflict that would repeat itself years later during the
Anglo-Zulu War. Barter acknowledged that even the “oldest and steadiest” of the volunteers
on being surrounded saw that they were possibly trapped and began to panic.172 Matters
deteriorated more when Barter claimed that Sergeant Clark “loudly shouted that we were
going to be murdered”.173 Panic was presumably exacerbated by Clark’s experience fighting
Africans in the regular British Army during the Xhosa Wars and his experience in the Cape

169

For a more detailed account of the incident see Bill Guest “Colonists, confederation, and constitutional
change” in Duminy and Guest, Natal and Zululand from Earliest Times to 1910, 146–169; and Jeff Guy,
Theophilus Shepstone and the Forging of Natal: African Autonomy and Settler Colonialism in the Making of
Traditional Authority (Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2013), 388-399.
170

This will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Six on African military units.

171

One of the more complete, if not dated, collection of account can be found in R. O Pearse et al., eds.,
Langalibalele and the Natal Carbineers: The Story of the Langalibalele Rebellion, 1873 (Ladysmith: Ladysmith
Historical Society, 1973).
172

Times of Natal, November 8, 1873.

173

Ibid.

106
Mounted Rifles. It should be noted, however, that Sergeant Clark would defend himself
vehemently in the press after Barter’s accusations surfaced. Clark claimed that Durnford’s
order to extend the troops across the extended front of the Pass to show the forces strength
was “a fatal error on the part of our commander [Durnford]” as such actions revealed the
volunteers were outnumbered and gave confidence to the Hlubi troops.174 Though Clark
claimed not to remember shouting the troops would be murdered, he did note that Barter
would have known that such talk was “in the ranks for more than an hour” and that if he did
say such things, it was “to bring our stubborn commander to his senses.”175

The discrepancies between Clark’s and Barter’s accounts is revealing of the state of
confusion which dominated the incident. In Durnford’s report to the lieutenant-governor, he
claimed that he was informed by the senior officer (Barter) that “the Carbineers, many of
whom were very young men, could not be depended upon” saying “they were surrounded,
and would be massacred.”176 Durnford also laid the blame for the panic on “their drill
instructor, an old soldier of the late Cape Corps [likely Clark], up whom they naturally
looked.”177 Both Durnford and Barter were confident that if they had arrived at the Pass
before the Hlubi, they would have been able to defend themselves, but the ill timing remained
the key failing, not the conduct of the volunteers. Fault, at least for the likes of Barter, did not
rest on Durnford, calling the major “as gallant and determined a man as ever breathed, [who]
would have cheerfully sacrificed not only us, but himself, in the execution of his order.”178

Like Clark, there were others who called into question Durnford’s actions. His
abilities as an officer and his strength as a commander were incompatible with the mentalities
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of the volunteers. The special status of the volunteers was again emphasised by some of the
troops. One anonymous writer even claimed that Durnford treated the volunteers as “if we
were niggers—not volunteers.”179

Guy argues that such attacks against Durnford were a defence mechanism by the
volunteers in an attempt to save face, evident in the controversy over the orders not to fire
first.180 If this was the case, it is odd how the memory of Durnford is so positively preserved
in the accounts of Barter, a volunteer and respected member of the community. Durnford was
an outsider, who was the son of a general, and brother to a colonel in the British Army, who
brought to Natal “that confidence, that conviction of class superiority that many settlers left
home to escape.”181 Twenty years after the affair at Bushman’s Pass, Barter wrote in his
“Stray Memories”:

Durnford was there, the Engineer;
A man to those he trusted dear:
As eagle bold, with haughty crest,
Yet with deep feeling, though represt;
Cool and contemptuous in tone,
No counsel pleased him but his own:
Proud of his flag, a soldier born,
He held the Volunteers in scorn.182
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Whether Durnford was deserving of such contempt, or whether he was truly as ill prepared as
a commander as it appears, is not as relevant as the memory it created in the minds of the
volunteers. Of course, it should also be remembered that this was the same Major Durnford
who many blamed for the disaster as Isandlwana during the Anglo-Zulu War. Military
disaster, it seems, was a common theme for the much of Durnford’s military career.183

This attempt at deflection from the volunteers for the failure in the Langalibalele
Incident shows how it remained such a defining moment for the volunteers’ organizations
within the colony of Natal during its formative period. Like so many of the shortcomings of
the volunteer system, fault was attributed to other incidents or individuals, and not the
volunteers. The men who died at Bushman’s Pass were victims of a military blunder, but
their perceived sacrifice was hailed as a testament to colonial power. This is particularly
telling in the official history of the Natal Carbineers, which outlined the dispute between
Durnford and the regiment, but concludes that all disagreements “were silenced fore ever”
five years later when “by the streak of Fortune, the same commander, and two-and twenty of
the same Regiment [the Carbineers], who had carried bitter thoughts of one another in their
treat from the Bushman’s Pass, had fallen together…on the field of Isandhlwana [sic].”184 It
is almost fitting then that the monument to the Anglo-Zulu War in the shadow of
Pietermaritzburg’s City Hall stands across the street from the monument dedicated to those
that died at Bushman’s Pass, a stone monument in Carbineer Gardens, linking these two
events in the formative period of the colony of Natal. It remains important to emphasise that
both incidents revolved around the failure of the volunteers to act as proper soldiers, and to
maintain the discipline that was expected in such a web of defensive structures.
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Discipline and the Anglo-Zulu War
Discipline and training were important elements of the volunteer system, which
continued to be emphasized during this formative period. It was emphasized for the vast
majority of volunteers, yet membership in the corps was only a small component of their
everyday lives. With troops expected to only take part in drill for ten to twenty days a year,
and the number of incidences in which they would be called up few and far between, these
volunteer organizations were a step above social clubs. In some cases, membership in the
volunteer corps would distract from other responsibilities within the colony, much to the
irritation of other colonial officials. This became even more evident within Natal’s colonial
society during the build-up to the Anglo-Zulu War. These instances of lapses in discipline
and the complex response to actual military action reveals in the broadest fashion the true
impressions of the volunteer corps and their place within the colonial defensive institutions of
Natal.

Of course, as has been shown, problems with discipline were not unheard of within
the volunteer corps before the Anglo-Zulu War. In March 1875, Francis Hill, Captain of the
Natal Hussars, a cavalry corps formed in October of 1865, requested permission from the
commander-in-chief to remove two members; Trooper P.G. Lietsman and Corporal J.
Alcock. Both men, according to Hill, had not attended drill since May of 1873, and had
received fines but had failed to answer notices. The letter showed a distinct level of command
structure that had developed in Natal following the revised Volunteer Laws of 1872. Captain
Francis was not empowered to dismiss these two troopers, and was therefore forced to move
his concerns “up the chain of command.” The recommendation for dismissal was submitted
by the commander-in-chief, and the two men were dismissed after notices were sent and
proper time was allowed for response. Moreover, Captain Hill’s language in his letter
illustrates a level of disdain and dismissal of these men who were intended to be under his
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command, calling them “an encumbrance to the corps and not amenable to discipline of any
kind”.185 Troopers could not simply join these organizations and then not take part in their
duties without being noticed. For one, the size of these corps would simply not allow such
activities, especially in the cavalry corps like the Natal Hussars, whose numbers had dropped
by 1875 from 65 and 55 between 1870 and 1873 respectively, to 29 by 1876.186 This
exchange also illustrated the principles that many officers held for the necessity of these
volunteer corps to defend the colony and uphold what was becoming a type of military
tradition within the colony.

Such incidences became more and more common as the colony of Natal drew closer
into conflict with the Zululand in 1878. In July and August of 1878, the Second Clerk of
Customs, E. Charles M. Tynell, requested six days leave of absence to attend the Durban
Mounted Rifle Volunteer’s “Camp-Out”. Such activities would have been part of the standard
period of drills for members of the volunteer corps, with Tynell taking the appropriate
precautions in his request by prearranging with the Warf Clerk, a Mr. Cochrane, to take over
his duties while away. Tynell emphasised that Cochrane would not cause “extra charge or
expense to the Government.”187 Despite these precautions, there was an air of frustration
from the collector of customs as he forwarded the request to the colonial secretary. Mr.
Rutherford posits that he had not been made aware of Mr. Tynell joining the volunteer corps.
If he had been, Rutherford would have advised Tynell against joining, largely due to the
possibility of it “clashing with his immediate and proper duties as an Officer of Customs.”188
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Rutherford’s comments illustrate not only a continuing problem with the volunteer
system from within the colony, but also the conflicting interests that these volunteers would
have to contend with in balancing their lives outside of the corps with the service required to
maintain their membership. Rutherford’s view of the volunteer corps as a distraction and
threat to the stability of colonial revenue shows a clear apprehension for the divided loyalties
such systems represent. Membership in the corps would only “distract from the efficient
attendance to their proper duties” with “confusion and embarrassment” sure to arise.189
Rutherford even went so far as to allow Tynell leave of absence under the description of
“health and education” instead of the official grounds of the request. Conversely, the office of
the lieutenant-governor was unwilling to discourage anyone from completing their service in
the volunteers and provided Tynell with final approval.

As troops began to muster for the coming war with the Zulu, many individuals were
forced to come to terms with their “divided loyalties” within the colony. Those who worked
on the railway were given such a “choice” in writing. One such individual, a J.P. Lymon, Jr.
was ordered on November 29th to either resign his position in the Natal Carbineers or his
employment in the Natal Government Railway, with the district engineer suggesting that
Lymon resign from the volunteers. Unfortunately, Lymon had already received orders on
November 24th that the Carbineers had been called out for active service. This placed Lymon
in what was viewed as a serious conundrum. Since he had already reported to the front and it
was impossible for Lymon to leave with the threat of desertion hanging over him, he was
faced with the choice to “resign or be disgraced [on which he] preferred to adopt the former
course.”190 Lymon is a clear example of the overwhelming sense of duty that the volunteers
exhibited both to their positions in the corps, but also to the government they defended.
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Lymon illustrates the deeper conflict that took place within the volunteers during wartime.191
Lymon’s attitude, however, is not entirely that of an enthusiast for the war, especially when
he admits that if the notice from the railway had arrived earlier, he would have had a
legitimate reason to resign from the Carbineers. Troopers did not always choose the
volunteers over their other activities within the colony.

Alfred Tucker of the Newcastle Mounted Rifles requested on December 2, 1878 that
he be exempt from active service. Tucker’s reasoning rested on the contracts he had acquired
for the supplying of troops at Newcastle, Derby, and the Utrecht District which would “be
impossible…to fulfill if I proceed with the Volunteers to Helpmekaar [the staging area for the
front just east of Dundee].”192 Colonel Evelyn Wood, commander of the fourth invasion
column, agreed, informing the military secretary that the fulfilment of this contract was “of
primary importance to the troops” especially in light of Tucker being partners with Mr.
White, the man contractor.193 This relationship with the contractor was seen as so invaluable,
Tucker was insured his place away from the lines. Though Tucker was in a unique position to
aid the war effort while staying away from the front, he seems to represent the minority of
troops who remained with their corps.

Perhaps one of the most striking incidents of this chain of command and the
ambiguity of discipline during the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 involving the Durban Mounted
Rifles. Founded in 1873 by F.W.B. Louch, by 1879 the unit was under the command of
Captain W.E. Shepstone, the son of the former Secretary of Native Affairs, Theophilus. The
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unit was assigned to Pearson’s column during the invasion and avoided the catastrophe at
Isandlwana.194 By March 1879, the unit had been in the field for over three months, and some
members of the corps did not wish to continue taking part in the war. Three troopers request
to Captain Shepstone that they be allowed a leave of absence to “go down to the Tugela and
take a chance of getting into a corps going across the river”.195 The idea behind this request
was to leave the campaign without outright desertion by transferring to a unit that was
mustering out. The request was summarily refused by Shepstone. In response, Troopers Fred
Brooke and John Maydon attempted to flee the camp, only to be caught before leaving the
picket line. Instead of charging the troopers with desertion, Shepstone chose to simply charge
the men with insubordination and fined the men appropriately. The reason for this light
punishment is unknown, but Shepstone was assumedly attempting to avoid the show of a
court-martial and the possible disciplinary problems it would cause in the unit.

Brooke and Maydon were unsatisfied with this result, and directly petitioned the
lieutenant-governor for approval of a court martial and further investigation of the charges.
Why? Shepstone suspected that Brooke and Maydon were hoping the court martial for
desertion would force the corps to remove the two troopers from the field and in so doing,
take them out of harm’s way. In essence, Brooke and Maydon were attempting to be kicked
out of the corps. Captain Shepstone suspected that the men wished to leave the front so they
could have the chance to return to Natal and take advantage of the opportunities for wealth
provided by the war effort, such as Alfred Tucker of the Newcastle Mounted Rifles had done.
Unfortunately for Brooke and Maydon, their understanding of the outcomes of their actions
were less ideal.
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According to the attorney general who reviewed the case, because the unit was “now
in the field on actual Military Service” the rules of the Volunteer Law of 1872 were overruled
by the Mutiny Act of 1855. In such a case, officers or volunteers would face the same
discipline and punishment “under the provisions of the Mutiny Act and Articles of War as if
they were officers or soldiers of Her Majesties regular army” though they would not face
corporal punishment, as stated in the addendum to the Mutiny Act in conjunction with the
volunteer law.196 Shepstone must have been fully aware of this possible outcome, as he stated
to the colonial secretary that his intention of not bringing up the charges of desertion was
largely an attempt to avoid the troopers being confined to penal servitude, the probable
outcome of a court martial. The attorney general would recommend that the original
punishment placed on them by Captain Shepstone would be appropriate and no additional
court martial proceedings would be necessary. The lieutenant-governor approved and the
matter was closed.

This incident illustrates the extent to which some volunteers would attempt to remove
themselves from the hostile environment they found themselves in during the war in 1879.
The primary interests and goals of these young men did not rest in the Zululand, but instead
within Natal. It is particularly telling that, according to Captain Shepstone, these men were
“three of the youngest members” of the corps.197 The volunteers were more citizens than
soldiers. This does not imply that the troopers who took part in the Anglo-Zulu War did not
perform adequately, but instead illustrates the priorities of the troops that marched across the
Tugela River in 1879. Even when troops did not perform exemplary, they were still treated
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with a respect and softness that would not have typically been offered to troops of the British
Army.

All officers in the volunteers were dealing with the first major campaign in their
corps’ existence. In light of this, questions over legality were nothing particularly unique. At
the siege of Eshowe, a member of the Alexander Mounted Rifles was charged with
cowardice. The deputy adjutant general, Colonel Bellairs, was unsure of the proper
proceedings, initially wavering between military tribunal and corporal punishment. It was
quickly pointed out to the military by the colonial secretary’s office that while the trooper
“may be tried under the Mutiny Act…he is not liable to corporal punishment”.198 The trooper,
who remained unnamed would be tried by a tribunal of officers from his own corps and
receive his punishment within the parameters of the volunteer law. Another telegraph to the
attorney general’s office from Major General Crealock also inquired as to why a Trooper
Nieker of the Natal Hussars had not been tried. Crealock was unsure if the trooper was liable
for a trial at all or under what method it could be done. Again, the attorney general stated he
could be tried while in actual military service under the volunteer laws, but once again could
not be subjected to corporal punishment.199 Details of the trooper’s actions are not included in
these reports, but such activity from the young men of Natal would be the source of
considerable anxiety from the colonial population on the home front.

The exposure to the front among “these young men of Natal” was a grave concern for
many members of the Natal community. This grew even more apparent in the ensuing
months as the war dragged on, even though most of the major fighting for the volunteers
subsided with arrival of more imperial troop reinforcements after Isandlwana. Some back in
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the colony feared their young men were becoming negatively affected by the front. William
Palmer, former mayor of the city of Durban, petitioned the lieutenant-governor to allow the
volunteers to “return to their homes and their ordinary engagements.”200 Palmer points out
that the reinforcements, especially the cavalry, which had arrived in the colony was a clear
illustration that the services of the volunteers were no longer needed. Moreover, the former
mayor worried that the “nomad life” of a soldier on campaign would seriously impact their
character, and threatened to “destroy the prospect of many of them settling down again to
citizen life.”201 This concern that the young men might be changed by war was less in line,
surprisingly, with the popular nineteenth century idiom that war “built character”. Instead
Palmer openly admits: “I naturally feel the anxiety for the future welfare of our colonial
youth. I see a danger which will arise for want of the ordinary restraints of home and
domestic influence.”202 Palmer’s concerns could be easily dismissed as concern for the
wellbeing of the colony post war, especially with his purveying interest as a politician and
businessman.203 His comments could even be more easily brushed aside because he had a
nineteen year old son who was in the Zululand with the Durban Mounted Rifles. Palmer’s
apprehension, however, about the moral and mental state of the troops did have particular
relevance as the war would continue into its fourth month.

On April 30, 1879, a petition was presented to the Lieutenant-Governor Ernest
Bulwer written by T.R. Haddon and signed by the 33 members of the community of
Newcastle on behalf of the Newcastle Mounted Rifles. In it, the community requested that
their volunteers be allowed to return to their homes. They cited the five months which had
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passed since they first took the field on December 3, 1878 and their prompt and enthusiastic
response to the summons to muster. Particular reference was made to this point not only
because “such a relinquishment of home & business was to many…a great sacrifice” but also
due to the corps losing around one fifth their numbers in the ensuing war.204 Though this
sacrifice of life was an important point to the memorial, greater emphasis was placed on the
long term impact this deployment would have on the livelihood and prospects of the men of
the corps. The absence of these men, according to the memorial, not only cost the men
valuable time, but would also cost them valuable business prospects or position. To illustrate
that their absence would not only hinder the men of the volunteers, the memorial highlighted
that these loses would press “with an incalculable severity on not only the men themselves
but on those dependant [sic.] on them and on the town & district of Newcastle.”205 This
included the businesses, wagon building, and blacksmithing establishments in Newcastle
which had been closed since December due to the absence of their owners or workers.

The petitioners did not make this memorial with the express intention of limiting the
number of forces available in the war, but instead it was once again a response to the
reinforcements that had arrived the month before. In light of these regular troop
reinforcements, the community believed that the corps’ services was no longer necessary, and
their sacrifice being enough for their volunteer service. Instead, they “do not wish to ignore
the duty of all colonists to meet cheerfully any sacrifice necessary for the public good but in
this case submit that the sacrifice is unnecessary any longer and presses with great and most
unequal severity on many especially on heads of businesses and of families.”206
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The lieutenant-governor forwarded the information to the Major Dartnell,
commanding military district one, which included the Klip River region and Newcastle.207
Both Dartnell and Bulwer agreed that it would be impossible to recall the volunteers under
the current circumstances. Dartnell suggested instead that because of the length of time of
their period of service, some kind of leave system should be established that would allow for
a certain percentage of the troops to systematically return to their homes for a short period of
time. Dartnell’s initial suggestion was twenty percent of each corps would granted 14 days
leave, and “that in some cases men may be allowed to provide substitutes” for their
service.208 Eventually, a circular was distributed to the volunteer corps in the field that each
unit would be authorized ten days leave, with five to ten percent of the men leaving at a time.

This concession to public demand again illustrates how the volunteer corps were not
simply an extension of the British Army, but instead part of the network of control that
existed within the colony. Not only were these volunteers important members of the
community, they were also part of the fundamental nature of economic and social security
within the colony. The volunteers during the build-up to the Anglo-Zulu War were a point of
pride to some, but to many it was a means to cope with concerns about collective security and
the possibility of invasion.

By the conclusion of the Anglo-Zulu War, the volunteers had become a symbol of the
power of action amongst the European colonist, whether legitimate or a facsimile. The
number of deaths in many volunteer corps like the Newcastle Mounted Rifles became part of
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their collective importance to the colony as a whole, just as the death of the Carbineers during
the Langalibalele Rebellion marked their significance to Natal’s defence. More importantly,
their actions in requesting to return to their homes did not diminish their standing within the
colony. In November the same year, another memorial was put forward, but this time to
request the erection of a “Memorial Hall” in Newcastle to commemorate the services of the
volunteers in the colony.209 Nowhere in this memorial is the previous request to return home
before the end of the war mentioned. Nowhere does it discuss the economic contributions that
those who returned home made on Newcastle (though a number of signatures are the same
for both memorials). Instead the call for commemoration illustrates the unique place that the
volunteers retained in the consciousness of the people of Natal, and the nature of service and
defence in the colony of Natal as a whole.

Conclusion
Though the volunteer corps acted as only one example of a Natal’s military
institutions, they reveal the greater militarization of society which continued throughout the
formative period of the colony, from the British Annexation of Natal in 1843 to the AngloZulu War of 1879. Government regulations between the enactment of the Volunteer Law of
1854 and the Volunteer Regulation Act of 1877 illustrate the evolving nature of these
concerns within the colonial state, as well as legitimate concerns for the issue of security. The
volunteers, despite their many failures, would remain one of the most widely praised and
publicized component of Natal’s military web of structures.

As has been shown, there remained considerable debate over their discipline,
practicality, cost, and even military viability when called upon within Natal society. Because
the ruling elite of the colony were an active part of this institution, it would continue to retain
209
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the support of many members of the colonial community and government. The idea of the
volunteers as a successful institution continued to evolve and change over the formative
period and lingered to influence thoughts of security within the colony for decades to come.
Whether these thoughts were related to the implementation of new rules and regulations, the
democratization of defensive structures, criticism of the failings of such regulations, or
simply an attempt to address what must have been the major concerns of many colonists
within Natal, these military systems cast a clearer picture of the volunteers’ role in the
formation of Natal as a colonial state and society within the British Empire.
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Chapter Four: European Police
Introduction
David Killingray, a pioneer in the history of colonial police and soldiers in Africa,
stipulated that effective colonial government rested on two pillars: the collection of revenue
to finance the colony and the maintenance of law and order to preserve the administration of
the colonial state. At the founding of the colony of Natal in 1845, it possessed neither a
system of revenue and finance, nor more importantly a police force which would allow it to
maintain some semblance of colonial security. A fully functioning police force would not be
established in the colony until the 1850s and an organized and well-disciplined unit of police
would not exist until the Anglo-Zulu War. Yet, by 1906, the colony of Natal was able to
produce a 190 page set of police rules and regulations with detailed instructions and
parameters on how to deal with all elements of the colony, from railways to thefts to
agricultural problems.1 Within 50 years, Natal had established a police force that became a
critical element in its internal security and fully established itself as a “pillar” of colonial
authority.2 This chapter will attempt to address how the police and law enforcement systems
within Natal acted as a key example of a society attempting to come to grips with the
problems of security and safety which continued throughout the formative period of the
colony.

There was no single unified system which the colonial authorities attempted to
establish during this period. Local constabularies were strikingly different from their rural
counterparts, and the only European police institution which addressed the colony as a whole
was the Natal Mounted Police, officially created in the 1860s but not solidified as a colonial
1
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institution until 1875. Though the Natal Mounted Police, and later the Natal Police, would
normalize the level of discipline and consistency (if not fairness) in the police system of the
colony following the Anglo-Zulu War, topics of expense, security, racial divisions, and the
extent of violence and criminality within the colony were all galvanized during this formative
period. Without the creation of some institutions that could answer these problems of internal
security, Natal would be unable to fully establish itself as a viable colonial state during the
latter half of the nineteenth century. Though this chapter will focus largely on the European
police institutions within the colony, the models and methods of colonial policing were
transferred extensively to the European’s African counterparts. As the next chapter will
reveal, many of the same rules and regulations that dictated police action applied to all police,
both white and black. Nevertheless, the Natal Mounted Police and its predecessors did
represent some attempt to form an exclusively European system of police control (though
there were Africans within these same institutions). Despite this attempt at exclusiveness,
there will be considerable overlap between this chapter and the next when examining the
nature of colonial police work within Natal.

Police have been widely accepted as a key component in the development of the
modern state in Europe and the West. Eighteenth century Hanovarian publicist Johann von
Justi contended that “police in the strict sense refers to everything needed for the maintenance
of civil life, thus for discipline and order and well-being among the subjects in the town, and
for the growth of the peasantry.”3 Modern police were perceived as an institution of progress
which defined ideas of free enterprise and fair government, and were fundamental in the
emergence of the modern state system. This perception, according to Liang, solidified as
domestic politics overshadowed foreign affairs, and was pushed forward along with
3
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Rousseau’s “general will” that linked perfect police control with the age of democracy.4 Such
“enlightened” assessments were typically why police and police institutions were viewed as
an important component in the development of Western states during the nineteenth century.
Nonetheless, the police’s role in colonial encounters has been less defined.5 Despite attempts
to place most colonial police under a specific model or system (usually either that of the
London Metropolitan Police, also known as the “New Police”, or the Royal Irish
Constabulary), it has become generally accepted that policing in the colonies had many
distinct qualities that separated it from its European counterparts, especially in Britain.6
Moreover, as Anderson and Killingray have asserted, unique institutions and structures of
authority in the colonial setting illustrated a powerful coalition of interests that forced more
direct actions in the colonies, demonstrating that it would be wrong to “assume that policing
the empire was much the same as policing Limerick, or London, or Leicestershire.”7

According to Sir Charles Jeffries, creator of one of the founding works on colonial
police, in Africa there were typically two lines of development that took place in the
establishment of police institutions, which mirror in many ways the methods of control
imposed by the Europeans during the age of colonization. One involved the creation of
organizations headed by African rulers which were trained into local police forces that did
not report to the central government but instead to local authority “on the analogy of county

4
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and borough police forces in Britain.”8 The other would be a police force that reported to the
central government and extended its influence over the whole of the colony, “absorbing or
replacing any local bodies which in the past have functioned in some way in lieu of a proper
police force.”9 Natal, however, did not fall strictly under either of these conditions, but
instead created a hybrid system that challenged the general need for the creation of a standard
of efficiency and impartiality that was the responsibility of the colonial government. The
striking divisions between urban and rural and the lack of an organized plan from Natal’s
government ensured that the formative period of Natal’s police forces was anything but
simply defined. Jeffries does provide a key blueprint that will aid in understanding how
Natal’s police institutions developed during this formative period, but these unique elements
illustrate the colony’s distinctive development compared to other segments of the Empire.

Early Colonial Police
The police institutions within the colony of Natal represent an attempt to maintain law
and order along the British frontier. The frontier marked, as Killingray describes, “the
temporary limit of conquest, administration or settlement.”10 These “troublesome or
backward regions” would require unique types of policing and special forms of
administration compared to the police institutions of other colonies. Natal’s police forces,
both white and black, represented imperial authority responding to concerns on that frontier.
Far from the Ballarat of Australia, Natal did experience rapid growth within the first few
decades of its existence, creating an ever growing need for organized police institutions that
would be able to implement law and order seen as crucial to the development of Natal as a
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colonial state.11 This process, however, was gradual and only slowly developed after the
establishment of Natal’s colonial government and political order in the 1840s and 50s.

Natal possessed anything but a highly organized police institution during its early
years in the late 1840s and 1850s. This was clearly evident in the police’s cost and
organization. The vast majority of police work was actually accomplished by the Natal
Native Police Corps, a sizable organization that would eventually be disbanded by
Lieutenant-Governor Benjamin Pine in 1851.12 Small constabulary forces in both
Pietermaritzburg and Durban represented the vast majority of police presence within the
colony outside of this Native Police force. These urban constabularies, however, did not
necessarily expand in their scope following the disbanding of the Native Police in 1851.
Between 1850 and 1854, the cost of the colony in police and gaols actually decreased from
£1382 to £627 (a decline of roughly £200 a year). The number of men appointed to the
colony also dramatically dropped during this period. In 1850, Pietermaritzburg had 12
constables (all European considering their pay of £36 a year) and Durban claimed five
constables. The remainder of the police force was stationed in the Klip River District
composing of two European constables and eight “native” constables.13 The number would
dramatically decline within four years. By 1854, Durban and Pietermaritzburg retained the
most number of officers, with six European and four to five Africans. But the other divisions
of the colony possessed no more than one European constable and in some cases only African
11
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constables. The decline in numbers was indicative of two factors: the increased disparity that
existed between the urban centres of the colony and the other divisions, and the increased
reliance’s on fewer and fewer officers to patrol and administer the colony due largely to the
need for greater fiscal responsibility from the Natal colonial government.14 Such a lack of
Europeans within the districts as a whole would be a constant theme within Natal throughout
the formative period of the colony.

Regardless of this decline in numbers, the constabulary of Natal did fulfil a critical
need within the colony when they were capable, that of a law enforcement division set on
keeping the peace and apprehending offenders. As the physical representatives of the local
resident magistrates, the police were responsible for the implementation of British law where
it was relevant. Crimes against the Crown were the most typical instances that drew the
police’s attention, as was the case in 1854 when constables searched the Umvoti Location for
an African charged with murder. Searching the bush was the primary job of the constabulary,
whom in this case consisted of only one European and four Africans, though it was
eventually revealed that the suspect was under the protection of the local chief, making the
task nearly impossible.15 Because of the nature of Natal’s legal system, administered
extensively by Shepstone, the local chiefs had considerable power over domestic affairs.
Capital crimes, such as murder, though usually handled by the local resident magistrate and
administrators of native law, sometimes fell under the chiefs jurisdictions’, varying
extensively to the power and tendencies of each chief.16 It was not until the Native
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Administration Law of 1875 that such discrepancies were addressed in the creation of a
Native High Court.17

Other cases were much more manageable, such as the following September were the
constabulary of Ladysmith, also consisting of only one European and four Africans,
apprehended two individuals suspected of stealing a large amount of money from the home of
Captain Struben, Resident Magistrate of the Klip River. Johann Marinus Struben, a settler
from 1850 born in Holland, was a probable target of such an attack. Not only was he
particularly well known as a friend of Lord Byron, the former squadron commander and
husband to the daughter of a Scottish shipowner was feasibly in possession of some tangible
wealth.18 Struben’s position also possible contributed to the speed at which suspects were
apprehended in his case, though such speed did not work in the police’s favour. After a short
inquiry, the suspects were released, and though the police would continue to look for the
robbers, the case was left a “mystery.”19 Such was the case for many of the crimes within the
colony during this early period.

Though criminal statistics did not become a common component of the yearly
colonial reports until 1872, the number of prisoners placed in gaol was illustrative, at least to
some degree, of the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the police force. Interestingly, despite
the greater financial burden the colonial government placed on the police forces starting in
1850, the force was far more productive in the number of tried felony and misdemeanour
cases in that year than at any point until the 1870s. Eight Europeans and 50 Africans were
tried for felonies and 68 Europeans and 195 Africans tried for misdemeanours in 1850.
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Compared to the next ten years of data, only around eight Europeans and 24 Africans were
tried for felonies and only four Europeans and 19 Africans on average were tried for
misdemeanours (which were broken down between theft, assault, and other starting in
1855).20 The vast majority of these prisoners were men, with only four cases of European
women and only 50 one cases of African women being tried for any crimes between 1850
and 1870 (with 23 of these cases against African women taking place in 1850). Such data
does little to illustrate the effectiveness or even the true propensity of the police to apprehend
criminals, but they do illustrate that with a few exceptions, the criminal statistics for the
colony remained relatively stagnant following the initial surge of the police force in 1850,
due to the lessening of the number of the constabulary within the colony, and presumably the
disbanding of the Natal Native Police.

The declining numbers in the police force did not, however, produce an
overabundance of quality personnel in the remaining police positions, even for the chief
constable of Pietermaritzburg. In July 1852, a Mr. Hoffmann corresponded with Walter
Harding, the Resident Magistrate of Pietermaritzburg, on the conduct of his neighbour, Chief
Constable Johnstone, who was characterized as seeming “bent upon disturbances rather than
to keep the peace.”21 Evidently, the Saturday before, a confrontation had taken place which
involved Johnstone screaming “Hoffman” into the streets in what appeared to be an angered
state. What was the source of his frustration? Gardening. Evidently, Johnstone had
confronted a local gardener, Harman Bosle, about the state of Mr. Hoffmann’s hedges.
Johnstone had claimed to Bosle that Hoffman had somehow killed the chief constable’s ferns
and “[chased] his ducks away from his garden”.22 As recompense, Johnstone would demand
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as much as £10, which seemed like a staggering sum to Bosle. Johnstone was not finished,
and decried Mr. Hoffmann as “anything but a gentleman” who seemed inclined only to use
people for money. The chief constable concluded what must have appeared a rant by calling
Mr. Hoffmann a “common schoolboy” and a “smeerlap” (the Dutch word for “bastard” or
“scoundrel”). Mr. Bosle, who had no answer for Johnstone beyond noting the
inappropriateness of his comments, suggested that Johnstone bring up these issue to
Hoffmann himself. Johnstone responded that it was partially Bosle’s fault and that he “must
not be impudent or else take care of him”, implying that Johnstone wanted his problem
solved either through free labour or payment.23 The incident seemed to end there, with Mr.
Hoffmann making a complaint to the resident magistrate and doing what he called “a duty
toward myself and the public to represent such at the proper quarter.”24 Though almost
laughable, and indicative of the importance of personal property in early Natal and to an
extent the English garden in this frontier region, the incident does represent one major
challenge that was taking place in Natal during the early 1850s. Johnstone, with his use of the
term “smeerlap”, exemplified the influence of the Afrikaner population within the
community. This would make some sense as Johnstone had retained the position of chief
constable since August 1850, and retained some contact with the Afrikaner community in
Pietermaritzburg. Hoffmann, being called a “schoolboy”, conceivably represented the new
wave of British immigrants who were arriving in the colony during the early 1850s. As chief
constable, Johnstone saw the need to assert himself over the new arrivals while at the same
time voicing the frustration that existed in much of the older settler community over
encroaching immigrant influence and authority. In the end, Johnstone presumably weakened
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his own position in the colony and removed what little credibility he retained with the newer
immigrants.

The conduct of the chief constable of Pietermaritzburg likely led to his discharge and
the appointment of a new chief constable on September 3, 1852.25 Johnstone would return to
government work within the next three years, being appointed the interpreter for a resident
magistrate. Johnstone’s counterpart in Durban, Mr. Lee, was also accused of mistreatment
and conduct unbecoming of an officer in his handling of a prisoner in July 1853. Lee also was
replaced within the year by a Mr. Harrison, while Lee became the second tide master of the
customs house.26 Because Johnstone and Lee were settlers who predate British authority,
such actions are strongly indicative of the staying power of many of the early settlers of the
colony, but also the limited number of European human resources available for any sort of
proper administration in Natal. The misconduct of the chiefs of police within the two main
urban centres of the colony also precipitated a level of frustration in these towns that would
eventually lead to their separation from the police forces of the colonial government.

Local Control
Natal’s police institutions, though in their infancy, had already elicited debate and
concern within the colonial government and from local authority that saw their necessity for
colonial security. The town boroughs especially saw the need for some level of independence
from central control. By 1854, the parameters of police forces in the boroughs of Durban and
Pietermaritzburg were solidified under the “Ordinance for establishing Municipal
Corporations within the District of Natal”.27 Though these forces were granted a greater level
of independence within the growing cities, they were still part of the colonial government to a
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large degree. One half of the cost of maintaining the police was paid by the boroughs, with
the other half paid out of the public treasury of Natal. The police forces were under the
command of a “police board”, composing the mayor, one councillor, and the resident
magistrate, and retained considerable power for the colonial authority versus the municipal
governments. In Durban, Mr. William Harrison acted as Durban’s chief constable with the
assistance of six constables.28 The lieutenant-governor, however, still possessed the power to
appoint and remove constables and “make regulations touching their number, pay,
allowances, and duties”.29 Under such a system, the Natal central government maintained an
avid hold over local police forces, leaving the resident magistrates or justices of the peace
near full jurisdiction over the boroughs. Local town councils were generally unhappy with
this situation, especially when taking into consideration that as long as the police board
maintained control of the police forces, all fees for wine and spirit licenses, a considerable
source of revenue within the colony, were collected by the Natal government.30

By 1855, Pietermaritzburg held its first “Police Board” meeting. The members
included the Resident Magistrate Harding, Mayor Buchanan, and Councillor Maxwell of the
local board.31 Though the meeting focused on the purchase of uniforms and the overall cost
of the local police department, it was another indication of the greater autonomy of the police
forces exhibited by the local municipalities. At the meeting, Harding reported that the police
now consisted of six men, at salary of £4 each, one chief constable at £5 16s. 8d. per month,
and a gaoler at £40 per annum. However, the continually evolving links between local and
district continued to be a source of debate. Mayor Buchanan enquired whether the gaoler was
also to be included in the police establishment, as he thought the district gaol could hardly be
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brought under the control of the police board within the means of the 1854 Ordinance. The
next week the payment for uniforms was resolved, but nothing more. Following this meeting,
the police board met every two weeks reporting the business of the local police. In essence,
this police board acted as a bureaucratic go between for the Natal government and the local
government of Pietermaritzburg, and latter Durban assumedly since they followed similar
models.

Tension over these topics would continue to grow as the populations and revenue
from Pietermaritzburg and Durban continued to rise throughout the ensuing decade. By 1861,
the borough corporations had gained enough influence within the legislative council to alter
the power of the towns over the colonial government. Law No. 21, 1861 “For improving and
consolidating the Laws in regard to Municipal Corporations” shifted the role of the colonial
government in borough affairs, including the power of the town council. Under the law, the
police forces of the boroughs of Pietermaritzburg and Durban were taken over by the local
corporations, leaving county police under the magistrates and colonial government. The
town council could “appoint and maintain such number of city and borough Policemen,
Constables, and Watchmen, as to them may seem fit or necessary”.32 Perhaps more
importantly, rules and regulation in relation to pay rested solely with the boroughs. With
these changes, the total cost and importance of police within the colony would begin to take
two paths, municipal and rural.

Urbanization, Growth, and the Police
As Natal grew, so did the resources and infrastructures that were available to the
members of the colony’s police force, especially within the major urban centres which acted
as a crucial point of colonial urbanization. It must be emphasized that the major theme of
32
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colonial urbanization is about “space” and the ability to fill that space, whether with
monuments, infrastructure, or ways to show the narrative of colonial ambitions and
accomplishments.33 Natal’s overall expansion and urbanization during this formative period
was a key component of the growth of Natal as a colonial state. These growing urban centres
also acted as places that concentrated government functions as well as spaces of social and
political diversity during an era of growing unity and identity.34 Physical constructions within
colonial territories, such as railroads and lines of communication, were used to facilitate links
between colonial cities and the Empire. The incorporation of railways into police activity
within the colony was just one critical component of Natal’s state formation and the
development of urban centres within the colony. Though the railway system of Natal was
neither extensive, nor connected to all of Southern Africa, it did provide a clear indication of
the expansion of the colony during the 1860s. Railways in general have typically been seen as
a means to gauge colonial expansion, especially within the British Empire.35

The expansion of the railways did not fully commence until the 1870s, yet there were
discussions within Natal’s community of the need and the cost of such expansion throughout
the 1860s. As early as December 1860, suggestions began to appear in the colony of the
creation of a tramway and horse railways within Durban and the surrounding areas to expand
on the established tracks in the port town. Such innovations and public works were part of a
kind of global technological innovation taking part in the United States and Britain, and
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illustrated a growing desire for the slowly developing urban centres of Natal to emulate the
metropole.36 A public meeting in Pietermaritzburg town hall in 1864, led by the secretary of
the Natal Railway Company, focused on that very question of growth. Mr. Elliot argued that
the improvement of the line was “not only desirable, but an absolute necessity to the progress
and well-being of the colony.”37 The expanding of the railway from its seventy miles in 1864
was seen as not only a means to advance the financial standing of the colony, but also to
provide an effective method of transportation in the event of military conflict or invasion.
Elliot even went so far as to describe Natal as a “military colony” and “by rapid means of
locomotion” the colony would improve its military tenfold: a claim that illustrated “no small
advantage to be derived from railways.”38 The modern innovation of the railways was
perceived as part of an overall technological evolution taking place within the British Empire,
of which Natal was a small part.

Perhaps not with the idea of Natal being a “military colony” but instead a more
“modern colony”, by the late 1870s the police department of Durban were making extensive
use of the new railway system as a major boon to their own defensive institution. By March
1877, the mayor of Durban requested that the borough police constables of Durban be
allowed to travel on the railway lines free of charge. The impediment to cost, as well as the
ability to quickly board and leave the train without concert for fare, would validate such
measures and provide “the great assistance that will be rendered to the [Police] Force in
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carrying out their duties by such an arrangement being affected.”39 Mayor Arbuckle, in his
letter to the colonial government, alluded to a previous understanding that police constables
would ride the railways for free. Recent changes on the government railways called this
matter into question, prompting the mayor to confirm if precedent would be upheld,
specifically the distribution of “free passes”.

Though “Travel Expenses” had remained a critical component of colonial
government, the amount provided for local police was perceived to be unacceptable with the
changes in transportation within the colony. As late as 1869, constables traveling between
Pietermaritzburg and Durban would receive a per diem of five shillings, “a sum equal to the
fare by public conveyance to be allowed to and fro, and [for] personal expenses whilst
traveling or stationary at either place”.40 Constables traveling on foot would receive nearly
eight shillings and those on horseback one would be given 15 shillings. Comparatively, the
heads of departments would receive 15 shillings for traveling via public transport and 25
shillings for traveling via horse. Though these expenses were viable alternative to the “free
passes”, the overall cost of such expenditures would only be done in the case of “specially
authorised duty” and not when travel was a simple necessity for non-special occasions.41 It
should also be notes that the disparity in expense was even greater when taking the “native”
constables into consideration, who received only six pence when “traveling in charge of
prisoners, or for the purpose of attending Branch Courts”.42 The disparity in pay, however,
remained a typical feature of the African employed within the colonial government. But
despite this, the need to transition to a pass system for the local police was perceivably part of
a general expansion of the police institutions within the colony as it continued to grow in the
39
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1870s. It was also indicative of the growing strain between the local and colonial
governments, as the lines over jurisdiction began to blur and tensions grew over who
exhibited full authority in Natal’s growing urban centres.

Local and Colonial Government Tension
In April 1877, the mayor of Durban made another request to the colonial government.
In this case, the request involved a grant of reserve land for the establishment of a house for
the Durban superintendent of police placed “in as prominent a position as possible.”43 The
reason for this request rested on the need to build directly between the present police station
and the armoury stores near Market Square. Other property could not be made available
because other land near the square was “required for market purposes.”44 It was also
unfortunate for the Durban corporation that the police station rested directly on the border of
the corporation and government land, with the armoury, controller of excise, and court house
being within view, but not on the appropriate land that ran the length of West Street in the
heart of Durban.45 The town council of Durban was very eager to begin building, even
sending a follow up letter the following June indicating that council had already “accepted
tenders for the erection of the building, and were anxious to have a reply from the
Government”.46 Though illustrating the strong desire to have the building in a “central and
convenient position”, this restlessness from the town council “very desirous of setting the
contractors to work without delay” illustrates not only the importance of this station to the
Durban town council, but also acts as a prime example of the divisions of authority which
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existed in Natal at the close of the 1870s as the urban centres began to drastically increase in
size.

The colonial government’s delay in responding to this request informs their overall
opinion of the proposal. With the creation of the corporation system within Durban, the
colonial government had the ability to exert less and less pressure on the growing urban
centres. Though the practicality of proximity was a viable issue, it was rather dubious that the
town council had proposed the construction of this house on the government side of West
Street and not their own. This is evident in Surveyor General Peter Cormack Sutherland’s
recommendation that the land not be granted to the town council. In his report to the colonial
government, he outlined the reasons why the reserve land was established in the laying out of
the Town of Durban. One rested on Durban’s place as not only a township but also the capital
of the county. The other was simply the reserve of land for future purposes within the colony,
including lands for the Ordinance and War Department as well as harbour, customs, and port
departments. It was to the first point the surveyor general rested his apprehension with the
proposal by the town council.47 Though the colonial engineer was cited as given multiple
reasons “why this piece of ground should not be given up by the Government”, it was the
long history of gifting land to the town of Durban which gave Sutherland pause. Citing four
occasions in the past decade where land was gifted to the corporation of Durban, including
land for a jail in 1865, the Umgeni Railway line in 1864, the site of the local powder
magazine in 1868, and the site of a school in 1874. In all these cases, the construction
projects were for the improvement of the township as the capital of the county. By simple
semantics, the erection of a building for the local police department was not perceived as
beneficial to the colonial government or the county as a whole and therefor prompting the
request to be denied. Even if the land had not been set aside for later use by the colonial
47
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government, the local police of Durban were no longer connected to the interests of the areas
outside of the township, despite the land’s close proximity to the centre of town. Though the
superintendent’s house was presented by the mayor of Durban as “not only a great
convenience in having the house contagious to the Police Station but an improvement to our
most public thoroughfare”, it did not meet the wishes of the colonial government, and was
therefore denied.48

Despite the failure of the town of Durban to receive the land for improving their local
police force, the consistent attempts to improve the local police force of Durban presumably
influenced the thinking of the lieutenant-governor of the colony. In late April 1877,
Lieutenant-Governor Bulwer issued a proclamation related to the police and constabulary in
the colony. Bulwer’s concern rested in the belief that some divisions and districts in the
colony did “not adequately meet the police requirements of the districts.”49 This inadequacy
laid in the lack of any general organization for the local police, with each force being
essentially autonomous from the other in each magisterial division or district. Bulmer even
went so far as to call the local constabulary not a “force” at all, especially in regards to their
major functions of “serving summonses, in executing warrants, and in carrying out generally
any orders given by the Magistrate.”50 The lieutenant-governor even called into doubt the
ability of the police to maintain any semblance of peace within the colony. To counteract this
problem, Bulwer requested all resident magistrates to furnish a report on local police in their
districts. Such reports would include the number and pay of the constables (both European
and non-European), estimates of the population in the district, and the overall number of
offences and summons which were issued from within that district. In essence, the lieutenant-
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governor was attempting to compile the opinions of the resident magistrate’s in an attempt to
rectify the problems that had plagued the police forces in Natal for decades. Nonetheless, he
invited any recommendation related to “the strength, composition, and distribution of the
Police of [the Magistrate’s] district, and for its future organization, administration, and
management, with a view to promote the efficiency of the force, and to provide for the
prevention and detection of crime, or offences against the Laws.”51

Fifty copies of the message were sent out to the resident magistrates, with the
exception of the Durban and Pietermaritzburg boroughs, and the administrator of native law
with the markings of “Pressing”. The additional request for a speedy response from the
colonial secretary only emphasized the importance of this issue to the lieutenant-governor at
the time. Reports from the magistrates of each district (which began to be published in the
Natal Blue Books the previous year) offer an unclear summary of the matter of crime within
the colony as a whole. The reports, in fact, offered little more than what was available in the
yearly criminal statistics provided by the resident magistrates. Bulwer seemingly either
ignored the fact that criminal statistics and yearly reports on crime by the attorney general
had been available for several years, or he simply felt the information did not answer critical
questions or provide any solutions to the growing concern for crime and violence within the
colony. A special report was posted in the Natal Government Gazette in August of 1878, but
the information included in this report offered only a few more details on cases and
convictions before the resident magistrates. What the report did provide, however, was a
yearly comparison for each of the magistracies from 1874 to the first six months of 1878. The
discrepancies between trials and convictions remained relatively consistent throughout most
of this period despite the significant increase in the number of trials from 1874 to 1877. The
overall number of trials and convictions grew from 6012 to 8003 and 5223 to 6747
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respectively.52 No complete data on the number of constables in each of these districts were
provided, showing the limited extent this data was able to alleviate any concern Bulwer may
have had to the colony’s maintenance of law and order.

The activity of the local constabulary was, however, not chiefly composed of exciting
incidents or debates within the colonial government. Like most police work, the activities of
the local constabulary were keeping the peace and preventing petty crime, as was a
commonality within the colony. Whether the transportation or apprehension of escaped
prisoners, the locating of stolen goods, or even local vandalism, the constabulary of Natal
filled a need for the establishment of law and order within the colony. One such instance
involved the illegal chopping of wood on government reserve by Africans in August 1871.
Constable Thomas Green of the county of Durban witnessed multiple Africans chopping
down trees near the railway. Though unsuccessful in his initial attempts to confront the axe
caring men, the following day Green pursued one of the Africans to the house of a Mrs.
Pullock. Green confronted the assailant, named “Kettle”, and claimed that the sack he carried
was the same sack found by the fallen tree the previous day, hence making “Kettle” culpable
for destruction of government property.53 The court very quickly passed judgment on the
word of the officer, despite “Kettle’s” claim that he was making a fence for Mr. Pullock, and
fined “Kettle” 40 shillings or face imprisonment for one month. To make matters worse for
“Kettle” his axe was also confiscated by the Crown.54 If such an incident was fairly common,
it does illustrate several factors. The European constable had in most cases the authority to
make conclusions regarding the guilt or innocence of offenders and his testimony was
typically damning enough to lead to a quick prosecution and sentencing. The European
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constable also possessed considerable sway over the African population, especially in
regarding their ability to apprehend and interrogate effectively. Perhaps more importance
rested on the function the constabulary was beginning to fill by the beginning of the 1870s, as
this incident reveals. Unlike European institutions in the late 19th century, where the concept
of the “public” was something that was performed and that performance of political reason by
the public was central to the operations of power within the state, the constabulary was forced
to perform the actions of the public, instead of the population itself acting as surveillance on
the “public” in European cities at the time.55 This could ostensibly be because of the presence
of a scattered European population outside the urban centres of Natal, or simply due to the
amorphous nature of the government and the people during this period. Either way, the
presence of the constabulary fulfilled a distinct “public” need which ranged from stolen
saddles to illegal woodcutting.

The growing tension within the colony in the aftermath of the Transvaal annexation
and the impending Anglo-Zulu War presumably caused greater antagonism between the
much criticized police force and the growing military presence within the colony. One such
incident occurred in early 1878, involving a local constable and an officer of the 80th
Regiment stationed in Newcastle. The incident originally stemmed from the capture and
transport of a prisoner reported by Constable John Horne of the Newcastle magistracy, who
had held the position since 1875. According to Horne’s report, the constable was assisted in
some manner by Lieutenant Griffin of the 80th Regiment in the arrest of the prisoner Alfred
Grug. Since a reward was offered for the capture of Grug, an insulting letter from Horne to
Griffin revealed a dispute between the constable and the lieutenant. In this letter, Horne
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claimed “if the imperial government will not allow me my proper dues you can kindly keep
the balance”, implying Griffin was greedily demanding all parts of the reward.56

This was the interpretation of Griffin’s commanding officer, Brevet Major C. Tucker,
who forwarded the letter to the colonial secretary’s office and demanded recompense for the
“most insulting letter”. Tucker’s letter to the colonial government exhibits overwhelming
shock that the constable “being an educated man…must have been aware of the gross insult
he was offering to Lieut. Griffin”.57 This letter was also forwarded to the Colonel Pearson,
commander of Her Majesty’s troops in Natal and the Transvaal, who also condemned the
“impertinent” letter written by the constable. The colonel also casts full light on the level of
insult by explaining (if it was not yet clear) that “the letter implies that a money reward which
[Horne] claims has been unjustly withheld from him” and that “the constables conduct
deserves reproof”.58 Sadly for Constable Horne, no matter his intention, the letter to
Lieutenant Griffin was presented to the colonial government as a grave insult to the honour of
a member of Her Majesty’s Imperial Troops.

In Horne’s response to the resident magistrate explaining his actions, the constable
professed that in his mind the letter was not insulting or indented as such, but instead was
attempting to address the reward he felt entitled to. Horne believed he was the one chiefly
responsible for the apprehension of Grug, who was using an alias at the time which Horne
was able to detect. The constable also firmly attested that his “complaints” were also in
reference to not only the reward for capturing the prisoner, but also the per diem of 15
shillings for the horse used in finding and transporting the prisoner following his capture.59
Despite these claims, Horne was reprimanded by William Henry Beaumont, Resident
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Magistrate of Newcastle. Ironically, Beaumont admitted that Horne did not intend to insult
the lieutenant, though the letter “undoubtedly was” insulting. Beyond the reprimand, Horne
was given caution “not to write any letter or have any communications which concerns his
potion or duties as a public servant except through the Magistrate”.60 Horne never recovered
from this letter, at least in the eyes of the colonial government. Though still listed as
constable at the conclusion 1878, by November of the following year the position of
European constable of Newcastle was now held by a Mr. G.W. Jones. Horne is not listed as
holding government office anywhere within the colony.61 Though his removal from public
life could not exclusively be attributed to his letter to Lieutenant Griffin, it presumably
contributed to his eventual departure from public service. Horne’s interaction with the
imperial troops at Newcastle highlight the growing tension that existed within Natal during
the build-up to the Anglo-Zulu War, but also clearly illustrate a hierarchy (whether official or
perceived) which perpetuated the colony during this period.62 Similar to the use of mounted
police as porters (see below), or the assignment of Africans from the police forces to the
military, the police institutions of Natal, though perceived to be part of the overall defensive
infrastructures of the colony as a whole, remained an underfunded, underappreciated pillar in
Natal’s growing identity. Though doubtlessly doing the best they could accomplish given the
circumstances, the local police forces were simply underfunded, undermanned, and in several
cases lacked the authority to move from one district to another or even have any mobility
whatsoever. These problems, however, were nothing new, and were seemingly the major
reason for other components of Natal’s police structure to come into greater focus during the
1870s, including the Police Law of 1874.
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One of the more important components of this Police Law, however, was the manner
in which it provided more options for the residents of the colony of Natal. The police were an
avenue for new employment, and the reform within Natal’s police institutions highlighted the
importance of such offices to those seeking employment, whether from within or outside the
colony. There were opportunities in the colonial constabulary, and there was no lack of
applicants for many of these positions. These applications would come to represent a unique
case study in the hopes and limitations that permeated the colonial lifestyle, and illustrate the
limitations both financially and socially that were present for many of the future and aspiring
members of Natal’s police institutions.

The Hope of Application
The appointment of constables, the questions of cost, and locating of effective
applicants was relatively problematic during the 1870s. Colonial costs collided with
individuals vying for appointments, in many cases leaving positions within the constabulary,
at least in the counties, vacant for extended periods. In the Ulundi Division, the position of
European constable was never filled after the creation of the division in 1875, despite the
appointment of a resident magistrate.63 The position of European constable was eventually
removed in 1877, with the division being exclusively under six African constables.64 Cost,
again, was a factor, as Ulundi could be paroled by six Africans for a total cost of £74 while a
European constable would have cost £84 alone. Nonetheless, these vacancies were avenues
through which members of the colonies white population saw opportunities to gain some
semblance of service within the colonial government. Fluery P. Lightfoot applied for the
position of European Constable for the Ulundi Division in 1875, with no clear example of his
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credentials, but only his willingness to take up the position or in “any other of the
Magistraces [sic] requiring such services.”65 Not surprisingly, Lightfoot did not receive an
appointment to any position within the colonial government. Others also applied, including
A.S. Woodgate, but with no success.66

Applications, however, were one of the many means through which the residents of
the colony were able to make their case in taking part in the police institutions of Natal. The
individuals who applied to such positions and the application process in general illustrates
that the colony of Natal was becoming a viable location for colonial prosperity, allowing it to
achieve some semblance of parody with other settler colonies like Australia, New Zealand,
and Canada. The appeal of the colony seen in these applications is also illustrative of Natal’s
growing viability as a colonial entity. The hope that is exhibited in these applications
exemplifies a growing trust in the colonial state, as well as the perceived benefits of taking
part in the police institutions by members of Natal’s European community.

In 1876, John West made his application to the position of constable for the newly
created Ixopo Division. West seemed an ideal candidate for the position. His application was
accompanied by letters from two previous employers, one being the Durban borough police.67
West, a 26 year resident of the colony, touted himself someone with an intimate knowledge
of the area, and with many prominent associates within the town of Richmond, the largest in
the division just south of Pietermaritzburg. West also put Arthur Hawkins, Resident
Magistrate of the Upper Umkomanzi Division, as a reference and claimed him as an
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“acquaintance of a good number of years.”68 Both letters of previous employment illustrated
West’s own experience in Natal, but also provide a deeper insight into the perceived
expectations for the position. The letter from Horace Townsend, the Superintendent of Police
in Durban, was almost five years old, but acknowledged West’s service in the Durban police
for two and a half years with his conduct being deemed “extremely good.” No specific
reference to his accomplishments, or the reasons for his leaving the force in 1871, are made
clear, but West did not evidently go long without employment as his second letter of work
came from Umzinto Lodge. Mr. M. Campbell, the estate manager, included in his letter that
Mr. West had acted as a foreman for the estates for the past three years, with the letter dated
December 1875. West was praised as a hardworking man who “manages the labourers well”
while overseeing the field hands. Despite his hard work, West had been let go, ostensibly
because of a shortage of labour on the estate.69 West, unemployed and looking for a more
permanent position within the colony with the constabulary, applied less than two month
following his termination from the estate.

Whereas West appeared to be a quality candidate and presumably expected to receive
the post, he was one of at least four individuals who applied for the position of constable of
the Ixopo. One was William Rose, who included no references and was an unlikely candidate
for appointment.70 Another was G.W. Horden, another former law enforcement official.
Horden had more recently arrived in Natal, but was a former member of the mounted police
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in Melbourne, Australia. He also had the claim of being the only candidate to actual reside in
Ixopo at the time of his request.71

Despite the credentials of many of these candidates, the position would eventually be
filled by Mr. Frederick James Jones in July 1876. Jones posting was not the result of
extensive police experience, or even a previous posting within the colonial government, but
instead seemed to be simply a case of knowing the right people. Jones claimed to be “well
known throughout the Ixopo District” and provided at least two references to residents in that
division.72 In his application, Jones also indicated he was encouraged to apply by the future
Resident Magistrate of the Ixopo Division and acting Resident Magistrate of the Umgeni
Division, Henry Cooke Campbell. Such claims of a personal relationship should not be
overstated. When the colonial secretary asked is Campbell knew of this man who was
applying, his response was “Personally I know nothing of him.”73 Perhaps more striking is
that despite the number of applicants to the position, Campbell had yet to even establish an
office in the Ixopo and believed, at the moment, a constable was not required. By July, Jones
was appointed to the post. The title of the new position in Ixopo was perhaps the most
revealing component of this new position, as Jones was hired as the “European Constable and
Keeper of the Prison”.

The resident magistrates’ yearly summary of the Ixopo Division in its first year stated
that “very few criminal cases have come before me during my term of office.”74 Despite this
trend in Ixopo, the number of prisons in Natal had increased over the last decade, from eleven
to fourteen between 1868 and 1876. Ixopo was listed amongst the gaols beginning with the
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division’s creation in 1876, but it would not actually house any prisoners until 1878,
seemingly because a prison was not constructed until that time. Colonial planning, however,
did not allow for the appointment of a new member of the constabulary who was not prepared
for the eventual installation of the prison in the Ixopo Division. Frederick James Jones had
much more administrative experience than the other candidates, which would be required in
running a gaol. West had more practical experience in police matters, but Jones’ previous
employers and contacts included firms and commercial interests, including Gold Brothers and
Gates and John Leask, Ferryman of the Upper Umkomanzi.75 The decision to decline West’s
application was not necessarily an indictment on his previous police experience, but instead
could be an indication of the growing trend taking place in Natal’s constabulary toward the
conclusion of the 1870s: the rural police were becoming gaolers and administrators. This was
particularly telling when Campbell responded to Jones’ application by stating simply “He
will then have to act as Messenger also.”76

Applications were also telling of the goals of many members of the colonial
community, or the aspirations they held for themselves and their families. In 1876, Constable
T. Peel resigned his position at Richmond as the European constable of the Upper
Umkomanzi, a post he had held since 1861. John Johnson, Gaoler of the Ulundi, quickly
submitted his application for the post. Unlike many other applicants, Johnson’s reason for
applying rested on the education of his children.77 As the constable post was in Richmond,
Johnson believed that his children would have the opportunity to go to school and improve
their education, something that was not perceived as possible from his posting to Ulundi. So
important was this move, that Johnson expressed his willingness to return the £10 granted to
him for travelling expenses on his appointment to his current post. George Ayliff, Resident
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Magistrate of the Upper Umkomanzi Division, had known Johnson, in his own words, “for a
considerable period” and fully endorsed the move from one position to another within the
colony. Johnson was required to repay the sum of £5, with the remainder being used for his
transport to Richmond under his new position.78 This parallel movement in station within the
Natal was not typical for many of the members of the Natal constabulary. Most would attain
their post and remain there for decades (as was the case with Johnson’s predecessor,
Constable Peel), or leave the posting for opportunities typically outside the colonial
government. This does not imply that advancement was not a goal for some members of the
constabulary, especially as it continued to expand during the 1870s.

The constabulary was not always the final position most members of the police hoped
to attain within the colonial government. For many, it was the first step in more prominent
positions within the colony and in theory propagated further advancement in Natal’s growing
colonial society. This, of course, was also exacerbated by the low pay European constables
would receive.79 Such expectations were not unique to the colonial system in Natal, as similar
situations developed in other parts of the Empire, including India. As Arnold has argued “a
great many recruits, especially before the First World War, did not regard becoming a
constable as a particularly desirable or worthy prospect, merely a means (and that often only
temporary) of staving off unemployment, hunger, or even greater poverty.” 80 The hope for
advancement, however, was usually enough to encourage members of the constabulary to
apply for promotion of other positions as soon as they opened. One constable from Durban,
an H.M. Buchan, even attempted to apply to multiple positions in late 1877. Buchan, who had
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initially applied to the post of chief of water police, instead attempted to apply for the
position of secretary to the harbour board. Buchan’s reason for expanding his application was
word that “several gentleman had made their claims” to the lieutenant-governor, and Buchan
feared his “own application may therefore be unsuccessful.”81 Buchan acknowledges that he
had “some little experience in keeping minutes, and in the carrying out of Resolutions” which
would make him adequate for the task.82 There is, however, no evidence that Buchan
received either position, but his application is indicative of an attempt by members of the
constabulary to increase their station within the colony, typically through a higher paid
position which would instil a greater pay and prestige.

Even some newcomers to the colony with aspirations for police work were forced to
reconsider their positions on arrival. Such was the case with Edward Frank Gregory, recently
Captain of the 98th Foot, who arrived in Natal in the early 1870s seeking employment with
the Durban constabulary. His letters of reference were extensive, illustrating his broad
military experience in India, particularly the Punjab region.83 Unfortunately for Captain
Gregory, his experience in India, which ranged from his time as ensign in November 1855 to
at least the time of his appointment as captain in September 1862, did not favour his long
term appointment to positions outside of military service. He had applied for the position of
governor of the county prison of Perth, New Brunswick in 1869, which he failed to achieve.
He did, however, seem to have at least some experience with law enforcement, as his
application for chief constable of Durban included a letter from Major A.P. Miller, governor
of the military prison in Dublin. Major Miller had met Gregory at Aldershot Camp in
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Hampshire southwest of London while superintendent of the military prison, and was
impressed by Gregory’s knowledge required of an officer of law, claiming “I [Miller] had
many opportunities of testing your [Gregory’s] knowledge of the treatment of Prisoners and
your ideas of repressing crime in England thoroughly coincided with my own.”84

Gregory’s knowledge of military law was also touted by Colonel W. Fullerton,
Deputy Judge Advocate of the Bengal Staff Corps in Punjab. As with Major Miller’s
recommendation, this letter directly addressed Gregory’s application to chief constable in
1873. Fullerton cited Gregory as a chief source of knowledge for not only military law and
regulations, but also the criminal law of England, which was called upon on multiple civil
cases, including felonies, which were tried by the military tribunals.85 Despite the
qualification, Captain Gregory failed to attain the position of chief constable in Durban, and
by June 1876, he was requesting an appointment in the excise department of the Colony. His
only real qualifications for such an appointment rested on his claim that he had been “an
active partner in a distillery in England” which had failed due to “advancing loans to Public
Houses.”86 Whether or not Gregory received the position in the excise department is not as
important as the road through which he arrived in Durban. From his letters, he seemed to
have a fine, if not distinguished military career, and like many officers of the British Army,
attempted to find work within the Empire following the conclusion of his service. Though
having served only as an adjutant, his knowledge of the law was praised to at least some
degree by the officers he communicated with. Ideally, Gregory saw his time in the military as
his largest boon which would ensure his employment if not in England, somewhere within
the Empire. Failing at a business at home, he first made attempts for employment in Canada,
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and then Natal. The movement across the Empire that Gregory experienced was typical not
only to members of the military, but also those working as part of the administrative structure
of the Empire.87 Gregory, however, like so many others, met with failure after failure, despite
what he believed to be his own extensive experience. This is an important component in the
examination of the application process and the police institutions of the colony as a whole.
Some saw their work in the police constabulary as stepping stone for greater things, others
aspired to do what was best for themselves and their families, and even more looked at the
constabulary as an opportunity to be a part of the colonial defence institutions, but fell short
of achieving a place within the colonial government.

These applications, along with the aspirations and goals of the members of the
constabulary, are indicative of perceived importance of the constabulary to the formation of a
colonial state during this early period of Natal’s history. The hope that is exhibited in these
applications illustrates a growing trust in the colonial state, as well as its perceived viability
for the members of Natal’s European community. The belief that a role in the police
institutions would change one’s life in any shape or form shows the willingness of Natal’s
colonial community to take part in the defensive structures of the colony as a whole, without
necessarily joining a social club for volunteers, or even a proto-militarized institution that
would eventually come to replace many components of Natal’s police institutions: the Natal
Mounted Police.

An Attempt at a Mounted Police Force
By the 1860s, some within the colonial government came to believe that the
constabulary police force that had existed in the colony since its inception was becoming
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incapable of responding to growing needs of the colony. A simple constabulary was simply
not enough for the proper administration of justice in Natal. In response to these concerns,
some in the legislative council called for the creation of a mounted police force to act within
the entirety of Natal. The law for the “organization and regulation of an Armed and Mounted
Police Force” was seen by some as a measure to improve the law enforcement system of the
colony as a whole. Enacted in August 1861, the law was established with the express purpose
of creating a force to “act as police within or without the colony, for the preservation of
peace, and preventing robberies and other crimes, and apprehending offenders against the
peace.”88 Unlike the constabulary, this mounted police force was a quasi-military
organization which in theory used its mobility and military discipline to act not only as a
force in keeping the peace, but also as a stop-gap for possible breaches in the police and
defensive structures of the colony as a whole. The mounted force would not be limited to
districts, counties, or divisions, but instead be fully capable of patrolling all segments of the
colony when needed. More importantly, unlike the rural constabulary that was under the
control of the resident magistrate of each district, the lieutenant-governor was the de facto
head of this mounted force, able to make changes regarding enlistment, regulations, terms of
service, uniforms, and the appointment of a commandant and officers.89 What the mounted
police also represent is the willingness to try new forms of defensive institutions within the
colony. Because of the demands for such a unit, as with the demands for other forms of
security throughout the formative period, the mounted police’s quasi-militaristic nature is
another representation of the hybrid system created for Natal’s defensive institutions,
especially in regards to the police. Despite the extreme limitations and problems with the
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unit, even shortly after its founding, the mounted police were still illustrative of the ever
shifting concerns over security in the making of Natal.

In May 1863, Captain Albert Allison (later major in the Natal Carbineers during the
Langalibalele incident) was given command of the unit, and would remain so until its
eventual disbanding. These “mounted police” would have the ability to act as law
enforcement officers throughout the colony, at the same time demonstrating a breadth of
jurisdiction that was limited by other constabularies within the colony. Their goal was to
“suppress all tumults, riots, affrays, or breaches of the peace, in any part where they may be
on duty”.90

The organization and militaristic nature of the organization illustrates their perceived
importance to the colony as a whole. Strict regulations were imposed on the mounted police
in an attempt to create a more rigorous police institution. Those who took part in bribes,
desertion, neglecting to execute warrants, or dereliction of duties would be harshly punished,
in some cases receiving fines of £20 or facing six months imprisonment and hard labour.
Taverns, pubs, or any “dealers in wines and spirits” were forbidden to harbour or entertain
policemen of the force. Again, these officers were not above the law, and the formation of the
force gave clear guidelines for how to bring about charges against members of the mounted
force if they were to move outside the law in their duties. Of course, one would have to
produce a written account of the events as well as proof within four months, and be able to
convince the court of the wrongdoings of officers. Though typical, such regulation created
strong limitations for any African wishing to submit complaints or charges against their
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captors, especially when the mounted police were intended to work on the frontier where
there were few witnesses to the contrary.91

A key point of inspiration for the mounted police system came in Natal from the
Cape’s Frontier Armed and Mounted Police under the command of Walter Currie in the Cape
Colony. Formed in in June 1852 as the “Albany Mounted Police”, the Frontier Armed and
Mounted Police initially formed under a commando system of around 300 men, until they
were reorganized under the sole command of Currie in 1855. Currie acted as sole
commandant of the forces, with officers taking the title of inspector and sub-inspector. The
mounted police’s role was simple: to patrol and protect the districts in which they were
stationed as well as the “clearing of ‘thieves and marauders’ from those districts.”92 Far
removed from the Royal Irish Constabulary model of other parts of the British Empire, the
Frontier Armed and Mounted Police represented a unique model that would come to its own
by the latter half of the nineteenth century.93

By the 1860s, Currie’s mounted police had gained wide recognition as the main
model for a mounted police force within Southern Africa. Since the 1850s, the Frontier

91

Though the use and abuse of power was not exclusively limited to white police, but instead was characteristic
of the power dynamics imposed within the colonial setting. This has been more thoroughly examined in other
parts of the Empire, especially Australia. See Mary Mackay, “Captors or Captives? The Australian Native
Mounted Police,” in Body Trade: Captivity, Cannibalism, and Colonialism in the Pacific (New York:
Routledge, 2001), 47–65; Jonathan Richards, The Secret War: A History of Queensland’s Native Police (St.
Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 2008).
92

Edward Wilson, Reminiscences of a Frontier Armed & Mounted Police Officer in South Africa
(Grahamstown: C.T. Campbell, 1866), 186–188.
93

The origins of the links between mounted police institutions and the Royal Irish Constabulary remains a
heated debate within the historiography. Traditionally viewed as an evolution of the RIC model by historians
such as William Morris, Richard Hawkins has called for a reassessment of the value of applying most non-civil
police models with the manicure of decedents of the RIC, especially in regards to the mounted police across the
Empire (based on the simple assessment that the RIC had no mounted forces of their own). Ironically, the
Canadian Mounted Police postdate Currie’s Mounted Police, though there are strong similarities between these
“semi-military” forces during their early years, especially with the commissioned ranks of colonel, major, etc.
See William R. Morrison’s “Imposing the British way: the Canadian Mounted Police and the Klondike gold
rush” and Richard Hawkins’ “The ‘Irish model’ and the empire: a case for reassessment” in David Anderson
and David Killingray, eds., Policing the Empire: Government, Authority, and Control, 1830-1940 (Manchester,
UK; New York; New York: Manchester University Press, 1991), 18, 94.

156
Armed and Mounted Police had acted as a major pillar of the Cape Frontier’s security, as
well as an instrumental force in the Pondoland. Currie had been particularly influential in the
acquisition of the northern half of the Mpondo leader Faku’s territory and its eventual
distribution to Adam Kok’s Griqua.94 It could, however, be argued that Currie’s success
against Faku with a small groups of armed Europeans was strikingly similar to the successes
of Henry Francis Fynn or Commandant Pretorius of Natalia.95 Despite these caveats, to the
colonial officials of Natal, the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police had over the ensuing
decades been a consistent example of a positive, efficient police force in the Cape Colony and
Southern Africa as a whole, with a reputation that attracted men far and wide.

The reputation of the unit by the 1860s was so entrenched that they were able to
attract member of the London Metropolitan Police, advertising in Bell’s Life for “a few smart,
steady, active Young Men.”96 The unit advertised itself as a rough and adventure filled
organization that promoted from within and had opportunities for advancement within South
Africa. Walter Currie (who had attained a knighthood by 1860) was presented by recruiters as
one of the “more straightforward” men in the Cape of Good Hope, with the colony itself
offering “considerable advantages to steady, energetic men, and that after three years service
in the Frontier Armed Mounted Police, [one] might with profit…engage in some kind of
business.”97 With such enticements, the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police not only
represented a model of defence and protection within the colony, but also embodied a key
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principle of imperial expansion: the incentivisation of emigration from the Metropole.98 In so
doing, the Cape Colony created a model that would not only influence the mounted police
created in Natal during the 1860s, but would intrinsically form the character of the Natal
Mounted Police when it was reformed under Major John George Dartnell in the aftermath of
the Langalibalele Incident of 1873.

If the legislative council of Natal believed in 1862 that “it is absolutely necessary that
immediate steps be taken to establish a Mounted Police”, Lieutenant-Governor Scott was less
inclined to see a need for such a force: “I am not aware there is any urgent necessity for the
establishment of such a force”.99 Though Scott saw benefits of the framework of the Natal
force working along the Cape model of mounted police forces, he expressed major doubts of
its true necessity within the colony as a whole. Though he deferred to the legislative council
in the eventual implementation of the law, his immediate concern rested on the benefit of
such a force versus its cost. To fully implement the wishes of the council a unit numbering
around 100 men would be formed. Scott immediately considered this infeasible considering
the estimated cost of £12,000 this force would annually drain from colonial revenues. This
number, according to Scott, was a “large sum for a young Colony now, for the first
time…felling itself in a position to undertake public works of any magnitude”.100 The only
sensible reason for Scott’s tentative approval of the law in his communication to the secretary
of the colonies was in the inclusion of “an Armed Colonial Engineer Force of Sappers and
Miners” in the law.101 This group, though technically attached to the mounted police and
considered part of that force, would be required to serve under the government engineer in
98
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making roads, bridges, and on the construction of other public works when not performing
the duty of police offices. In a colony that was just beginning to “undertake public works of
any magnitude”, Scott would be inclined to approve of these mobile engineering assistants.102
The size and cost of the force, however, would not meet the final approval of the lieutenantgovernor, and he forwarded his recommendations to Downing Street that the government
should only purchase arms and equipment for about 25 men, “to be increased in number as
the future finances of the Colony may allow.”103 As head of the mounted force under the law,
it was the lieutenant-governor’s prerogative to the change the size and composition of the
force in question. Downing Street approved, and a small mounted force would begin
patrolling the colony by 1863, at a more reasonable cost of £3065. Interestingly, despite this
period being characteristic of a boom in the overall cost of police during the early 1860s, the
overall size and cost of the mounted police did not increase with colonial expenditures and
revenues. Along with the mounted police, which reached its maximum cost of £3,500 in
1864, Pietermaritzburg and Durban both experienced a massive increase in police costs,
beginning with £900 and £1,200 respectively in 1863 and growing to £1,100 and £2,600 in
1865.104 Scott’s apprehension on the cost of these mounted police in comparison to the rest of
the colony would be largely unfounded, as the unit rapidly declined in funding following
1865 until disappearing from colonial expenditures by 1870. Ironically, the total cost for the
mounted police in 1865 (£3322), exceeded the total cost of both the gaols and constabularies
of all colonial counties that same year (£3212). This is even more glaring when one takes into
consideration the county police and gaols employed 29 Europeans and 88 Africans, with the
mounted police employing less than 50. Though the initial formation of the mounted force
did demonstrate a failure within Natal’s police institutions, their early formation in the 1860s
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illustrate a growing concern in the mind of the elected officials in the colony over the
problems of security and the force of law within the colony. Though somewhat unnecessary
(at least in the mind of some government officials like Scott), there would continue to be a
narrative within the colony that such a mounted force was imperative to the safety and
security of the colony as a whole, despite the evidence to the contrary of the units overall
benefit to the colony. Even by the conclusion of the decade, it would become quickly evident
that problems of discipline, payment, and overall order were rampant within the unit, as
became obvious when a large segment of the troops were summarily dismissed in 1866.
Ironically, the case against the members of the mounted police in 1866 clearly shows the
manner in which the unit had already declined the later part of the 1860s.

Thomas Joyce, Formerly of the Mounted Police v. The Colonial Secretary of Natal
The mounted police represented more than a pillar of colonial security and the
enforcement of law and order. Its costs to the colony was highly evident, but it also became
an important component in the way Natal attempted to define itself during the colonial
period. The success or failures of the mounted police during the 1860s moved beyond
revenues and expenditures, but also relied heavily on its fundamental purpose of providing an
avenue for new immigrants to the colony. Much like the Frontier Mounted Police of the
Cape, the ability to attract men to the colony to become part of colonial society was a viable
goal for such a force, especially as the colonial state continued to define itself during the
formative period. By the mid-1860s, however, the mounted police were experiencing
considerable turmoil from within its ranks in regards to promises made to its members and
the opportunities it was intended to provide. This was only exacerbated in 1866 when at least
12 members of the unit were dismissed before their contracts were up, forcing these same
members to sue to government of Natal for breach of contract. One such plaintiff was
Thomas Joyce of England.

160
Thomas Joyce from all appearances embodied the ideal member of the mounted
police that the legislative council envisioned in the 1860s. Joyce had served as a member of
the metropolitan police in England for three years and three months until his arrival in
Durban in May 1863. Like many members of this mounted unit, before even beginning his
service, Joyce was already bound to the colonial secretary of the colony of Natal for £50 to
“serve as a Policeman in the ‘armed and mounted Police force’ of the Colony of Natal.”105
Like most contracts of the kind, this bond of obligation ensured Joyce’s service (and
employment) for a period of five years under the Law No. 15, 1861, and required Joyce to
repay all sums advanced to him for the purchase of “House Saddlery, Uniform,
Accoutrements, and other necessaries” during said five year service. Like Wilson of its Cape
Colony counterpart, the Frontier Mounted Police, Joyce probably saw the opportunity for
financial gain as well as the chance to start fresh in Africa. Joyce was personally recruited by
Captain Allison in England and signed his contract in May 1863. He was soon posted to the
“Olivier’s Hoek” station along the Drakensberg range. Less than three years later, Joyce was
out of the unit and suing the government of Natal for wrongful termination.

On the March 20, 1866, Joyce and 11other members of the mounted police were
reported absent from their duties without leave until the 27th of March. According to the
charges brought before the court by Sergeant John Knowlson, on the morning of the 20th, 12
men stationed at Olivier’s Hoek led by Corporal Joyce left the station and moved toward the
direction of Pietermaritzburg. According to Knowlson, there was great disaffection in the
camp and the troops had talked of leaving as a body because of their grievances. Knowlson
claimed to take no notice as he was “pretty well used to such talk”, but he was surprised
when the next morning they had “according to their word all left except myself and Sergt.
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Robinson and took their troop horse in direction of P.M.s [Pietermaritzburg].”106The event
may have had relatively little notice if it hadn’t been for the arrival of Theophilus Shepstone,
who was seemingly surprised the station was manned by only two troopers. Shepstone’s
presence not only accelerated the troop’s dismissal, but also provided greater exposure of the
case to the colonial government. The troops’ trip to Pietermaritzburg, however, was not
permanent desertion, as all members of the troop returned on the 28th. So the question
remained: why did they leave?

For all the men involved, once interviewed, they had left over a strikingly typical
reason: money. On being interviewed following their return, all men involved claimed that
they had left for Pietermaritzburg to “get paid”, specifically to collect three months’ worth of
pay they had not yet received as well as their share of the police fund. Only Corporal Joyce
offered any additional reason: pay and at the same time discharge, if possible, from the
mounted police.

If would be particularly difficult to hypothesize the exact series of events which led to
these 12 men disserting their posts for a week, seeking pay they viewed due to them. Joyce,
along with Frederick Albert Abrahams, was the only non-commissioned officer amongst the
group. At least four of the men (likely more) were from England and joined the mounted
police at the same juncture in May 1863.107 In his statement to the court, Joyce claimed to
have been granted the permission of Sgt. Knowlson to take ten men to Pietermaritzburg to
submit a formal complaint to the colonial office that the troops had not been paid for three
months and 20 days and had not received their percentage of the fines for the capture of
criminals for their near three years of service. The men left in the morning, leaving their
firearms at the camp as was custom when on leave, and returned a week later after visiting
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town. On arriving at the post and after a brief inquiry in April, Captain Allison summarily
dismissed all 12 men from the force, citing the mounted police law in which “it shall be
lawful for the commandant…to suspend, or dismiss from his employment, any such
policeman, whom he shall think remiss or negligent in the execution of his duty”.108
Equipment was returned and most of the men returned to either Pietermaritzburg or Durban.
The matter, which on the surface appeared to be a simple case of reckless action and
responsible discipline, seemed to be closed.

On May 16, 1863, proceedings of claims and demand were filed against the Colonial
Secretary of Natal, David Erskine, by Thomas Joyce and his fellow former members of the
mounted police.109 David Buchanan was appointed Joyce’s attorney, and claims for recovery
were put forward.110 The claims demanded three items: £8 14 s. for pay for the month of
April in which the members served, £25 for the share of fines that were due, £25 19 s. in
return for sums paid for horse and accoutrements, and finally, £250 for “damages
accruing…for unjust dismissal from said Natal Mounted Police Force.”111

It was this percentage of the fines that create perhaps the most interesting component
of this case. Joyce argued that an agreement was made between Captain Allison and the rest
of the unit with the understanding that they would receive their due percentage of the fines
procured by the mounted police for capturing criminals. Under the law for the “organization
and regulation of an Armed and Mounted Police Force” it was inferred that “all fines or
penalties which may be recovered by virtue of this Law shall be given and paid, one-third to
108
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the informer or prosecutor, if demanded, and the residue…for the public use of the colony”
and that “any policeman belonging to said force shall be entitled to the whole, or a proportion
of any forfeiture, penalty, or seizure, under this Law”.112 Such a component of the law creates
a much more nuanced motivation for joining, or commanding, this mounted force during the
1860s. Because the laws of the colony allowed for economic gain, the motivation of financial
advantage could have easily influence the actions of the members of the mounted police and
those who had sway over them.

Once charges were brought upon the colony, it soon became clear that this trial would
call into question critical elements of the mounted police institution. Joyce’s statements at the
trial exhibited the frustration and disappointment he felt in leaving his position in the
metropolitan police, and lamented that he “should not have left England if I had not thought
that I should be returned at the Government expense.”113 Such grounds were indicative of the
“damages” that Joyce felt he had been given due to his early dismissal from the unit. Joyce’s
criticism of his commanding officer, however, cast greater light on his frustration with the
unit.

According to Joyce, Captain Allison had previously told the unit that fines to the
amount of £100 had been accumulated for the unit from the magistrate at Richmond, and that
said funds would be available to the troops under the law for the mounted police.114 This was
on top of the fines that had been collected by the unit in 1863 through 1865, again all moneys
that should have been distributed to the men. Though these fines generated by the local
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magistrates would not entirely go to the mounted police, it would still appear to a member of
the mounted police, especially when informed so by his commanding officer, that some
amount would come to them in the near future. According to Joyce, those payments never
came.

Joyce summarily argued that he had permission to leave the camp with his fellows
and that the only reason Sergeant Knowlson had not accompanied them was because of
Captain Allison’s absence (placing the sergeant in command of the station). Such statements
were corroborated by witnesses for the plaintiff, including Albert Thomas Stent, a private in
the mounded force who joined the police at the same time as Joyce from England. Stent
testified that it was justified for the men to go to Pietermaritzburg because of their overall
lack of pay, and that the dismissal was unjust. Stent also gives a clear example of the type of
individuals who came from England to join the mounted police. A former army man of three
years, Stent’s testimony was outright critical of the captain and sergeant, calling Knowlson a
liar and implying that this incident would not have occurred if Allison had simply brought
their pay. Stent’s argued that this remained unusual to him as he had “never known Capt.
Allison come back without bringing some money when he had been in town.”115

For the defence, their main witnesses were these two individuals whose veracity had
been challenged by Stent. Knowlson denied giving Joyce and the men permission to leave,
claiming to “have no power to give them leave that I was aware of.”116 It was Knowlson who
initially interviewed the unit after their return, and was the key witness in the evidence given
for the dismissal, as none of the men explained themselves directly to Captain Allison on his
return to the camp. Captain Allison’s statements at the trail were also quite straight forward.
He claimed that the men had not defended themselves when inquiries were initially made and
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that, in his opinion, the defence of permission granted by Knowlson was insufficient to any
effect. Allison also testified that he wrote and delivered the dismissal on April 25, 1866 and,
quite simply, appeared to have no sympathy over the action.

In regards to the percentage of fines that had not been paid, Allison appeared to be
more allusive. Allison argued that he did discuss with his men fines that would come out of
Richmond but that only “certain fines” which had been levied along the Upper Umkomanzi
would be obtained from the court, measuring only about £80. Allison argued that even if such
money had been paid out to the mounted police, it would not have reached the £25 per man
which was being requested. Allison retained his stance that “all fines awarded by Magistrates
to the Force have been [moved] to [an] account in the Police Fund and divided amongst the
men.”117

Despite the best efforts of the defence, Joyce was able to present a convincing enough
case to have the jury reach a verdict on his behalf. The jury ruled for Joyce and ordered £200
in damages to be awarded to Joyce, as well as reimbursement for the cost of the trail. The
Joyce verdict gave credence to many of the charges being filled by his fellow commands, and
resulted in a new series of trials for each member. Eleven trials were scheduled between
November 9th and 30th. Joyce was the most successful in his case, with some, including that
of Charles Edward Graves resulting in a hung jury (five to two) and no verdict. Perhaps Joyce
was simply lucky with his jury selection, or he was able to make the most convincing case
due to his own experience in the Metropolitan Police. Either way, Joyce’s victory is a
representative of the fluid nature of law and order within the colony of Natal as well as the
internal disputes that existed within the law enforcement system of the colony. Captain
Allison would eventually move on from the mounted police to border patrol within the
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colony and was not considered a candidate when the mounted police re-established itself in
the 1870s.

It should be noted that this mass dismissal of members of the mounted police could
have acted as a key component in the eventual decline in the units viability as a whole in the
1860s. By the end of 1866, the expenditures for the mounted police had dropped from over
£3300 to £1,800. That number would be halved by the end of 1867 (though Captain Allison
still received £192 pounds in “travel expenses), and would be only £100 by 1868.118 Losing a
dozen men of an already small force and obliging the government to pay £200 to one of its
former members presumably crippled the institution for the next half decade.

Shift after Langalibalele
As with the volunteer organizations of Natal, the Langalibalele Rebellion acted as a
major catalyst for the concerns over security within the colony of Natal.119 The failings of the
established defensive systems to fully response to these perceived breaches of security
prompted the colony to seek a clear alternative. Some within the colony had made their own
recommendations to the defensive institutions through alternations to the volunteers.120 A
popular idea, however, was the creation of a viable mounted police force within the colony.
An editorial in the Natal Mercury outlined the perceived need:

Let us have a thoroughly efficient Mounted Police Force…The experience we have
gained during this late rebellion [Langalibalele’s] has proved that the Volunteer
Corps, be it ever so efficient, is not an arm that we ought to count upon expect in a
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great emergency and for a short period of service. It is ruinous to men in business or
on farms to be kept in the field for months together.121

With Natal’s limited white population, the creation of a mounted police force as a
recruitment force as well as a major source of colonial security emboldened the legislative
council to act following the Langalibalele incident of 1873. To facilitate this need, a call for a
new police commander was made, and answered by a John George Dartnell. A veteran of the
Indian Rebellion, former Brevet Major of the 86th Regiment who had served at the fortress of
Jhansi in 1857, Dartnell had arrived in Natal in 1869 with the notion of becoming a farmer.
Shortly after Dartnell’s application was received, Lieutenant-Governor Pine personally
requested Dartnell to raise a new mounted police force, saying “You probably know as much
as any of the other applicants…and should at all events know something about discipline,
having been in Her Majesty’s Service.”122 Dartnell was a viable choice due to his reputation
in India and his emphasis on proper discipline, a component that would serve in both his
work with the police and the volunteers. The influence of the Cape system was also evident
in this new police force. Dartnell would travel to King William’s Town in the Cape Colony to
familiarize himself with the organization and structure of the Frontier Armed and Mounted
Police, apparently to initiate a more viable and accurate reproduction of the force than had
previously been attempted in Natal.123 On his return, a call for members was posted to
encourage able bodied men within the colony to act as its new defenders.
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By the start of 1874, in the shadow of the Langalibalele Incident, it became apparent
to the colonial government that there was some necessity for reform within the colonial
police system. 1874 saw the passage of the “Police Law”, which centred on the establishment
of “an organized Police Force.”124 This law was not an overarching reform bill of the police
system, but instead the creation of a “special police force” for “the purpose of preserving
order and repressing crime throughout the several Counties and Divisions of the Colony.”125
This group, which would eventually be formalized as the Natal Mounted Police, was only an
extension on the established police institutions within the colony. The formation and
organization of the mounted police, and this laws impact on the African police in Natal will
be examined later, but it is indicative of the growing concern within the colony defining the
expansion and use of police power in Natal and define their role in greater detail for the
future.

The mounted police were included as the main focus of the 1874 police law and were
provided their own set of clarified regulations outside of the normal police law. A collection
of rules and regulations for “the guidance of the Mounted branch of the Police Force” was
made available within the first six months of the new law taking effect.126 Though the vast
majority of these regulations involved a clarification of the equipment and horses the police
were responsible for, it is made perfectly clear that the “pay of the Officers and men will be
made monthly” and that two shillings a month would be paid to the “Remount Fund”, a type
of insurance fund that would absorb the cost of lost horses and time lost for sickness or
accidental injury. To ensure continuing service, men who quit the corps would “forfeit all
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claim to share in any Corps Fund.”127 Additional rules and regulations were published the
following August, again creating greater clarification to the matter of pay and equipment.
Further clarifications on the conduct of the officers and the overall importance of their role in
the colonial government were also made more emphatically. Incidences of “drunkenness,
riotous conduct, disobedience of orders, or other misconduct” would be punished under the
same standards of the Police Law of 1874.128 And to clarify that a position in the mounted
police was not one of a volunteer or temporary service, the regulations stipulated that “No
men of the Force to be employed on any other than public duty.”129 The necessity for such
amendments was the by-product of initial problems with the mounted police, which
experience considerable public criticism in its opening year.

Following such problems in establishing the mounted police the previous decade, the
legislative council attempted to help redefine the parameters through which the unit was
established in 1874 with the passage of the Law No. 5 in 1876 “To establish a European
Mounted Police Force”.130 The law was, in essence, a re-enactment of the previous law, with
a few exceptions. A major change, fuelled by the apprehension over the number of African
versus Europeans in the force, ensured that the force would consist of “not less than one
hundred and fifty men of European descent…and of Natives of Africa and India not
exceeding one hundred in number”.131 Stipulations on the equipment of these two groups
were also changed in which Europeans would be “armed and mounted” while Africans and
Indians “may be armed and mounted as occasion may arise”.132 Such changes were
seemingly the residual effect of the Langalibalele incident only three years earlier, as well as
127

Ibid.

128

“Government Notice No. 254, 1874: Rules and Regulations for the guidance of the Mounted Branch of the
Police Force,” The Natal Government Gazette, August 4, 1874.
129

Ibid.

130

Law No. 5, “To establish a European Mounted Police Force”, GH 1022, 1876.

131

Ibid.

132

Ibid.

170
the long term residual impact of the Indian Mutiny. Though the Indian Mutiny and the
Morant Bay Rebellion had lessened British enthusiasm for indigenous troops, the
Langalibalele incident doubtlessly solidified these notions within Natal, continuing a legacy
of fear toward the indigenous population as a whole.133
In 1875, there were 94 members of European decent versus 150 “natives”.134 On a
matter of cost, such a system had great benefit for the colony. The 75 white privates in the
unit were paid a total of £5157 while the 150 non-whites were paid a total of £296 15 s, 11 d.
For the colonists of Natal, however, cost did not necessarily trumps security and there
remained apprehension in such a disparity of numbers between whites and non-whites in the
most well-funded police institution within the colony. Still, the Natal Mounted Police offered
another opportunity for the men of the colony of Natal to join a militaristic institution that
was, in many ways, much more organized and to an extent disciplined than the volunteer
institutions of the colony. This is largely evident in the rapid increase in European
membership over its first few years of existence: 57 enrolled in 1874, 49 in 1875 and 1876,
and 79 in 1877.135 This continued recruiting and cost saving measures allowed the mounted
police to maintain their viability through this initial period of criticism.

With the establishment of the Natal Mounted Police, there was a sense of a greater
formalization of the use of police within Natal, as had been previously seen with the
regulation of the volunteers in the 1870s. No longer would the colony tolerate a less formal
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and perceivably inefficient force in the enforcement of law and order in the colony as a
whole. Following the Langalibalele incident, the position of constable became more in line
with maintaining the prisoner population and public order while traditional police work, or at
least the focus on the criminal elements of the colony in its rural areas, were eventually left to
the Natal Mounted Police as the organization continued to grow. In the end, the final
outcome remained the same: local police forces were overridden or pushed out by a more
centralized institution.136 With this in mind, Dartnell began to focus on the similar concern he
had for the volunteer units of the colony: the proper maintenance of discipline.

Discipline and Outcry
Whereas the volunteers of Natal were not compulsorily required to attend or even
submit to greater military discipline, at least in practice rather than principle, Dartnell was at
an advantage when it came to membership in the Natal Mounted Police. This was the men’s
livelihood in the colony. If rules and regulations were not followed, they would be out of
employment. It is no surprise than that disciplinary action in the mounted police significantly
increased following the formation of the new unit in 1874, despite Dartnell describing years
later the initial force being “amongst the flotsam and jetsam of the colony, and a very rough
lot they proved to be, being principally old soldiers and sailors, transport riders, and social
failures from home”.137 Dartnell fondly remembering this initial group as “a very fine, hardy
lot of men, ready to go anywhere and do anything, and very willing and cheerful if a little
troublesome in town; but in the country, away from temptation, they were excellent men,
who grumbles occasionally, of course, but were more inclined to laugh at and make light of
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discomfort and hardship.”138 Despite this overall positive memory, Dartnell’s reminiscence
does reveal initial hardships and problems with discipline that would have existed in any law
enforcement group on the frontier. Dartnell strongly attempted to rectify these lapses in his
first year of command.

Perhaps in response to the difficulties created in the late 1860s, Dartnell, as early as
January 1874, was certain to make clear with the auditor of the colony the method fines and
punishments would be dispensed within his unit. In a response to the Minutes of the previous
December on the infliction of fines by the resident magistrate of Weenen on members of the
Police Force, Dartnell reaffirmed the authority of the commandant in instilling discipline,
claiming that his position “has power to fine men, but it is occasionally necessary to inflict a
heavier punishment upon a man in which case he is brought before the Res. Magistrate and
imprisoned by him in addition to the fine” and in the absence of the commandant a noncommissioned officer could act in his stead in presenting the accused to the resident
magistrate.139 Such gaps in the chain of command would not suffice in Dartnell’s mind and
repetitions of the Thomas Joyce incident of 1866 would be steadfastly avoided.

For Dartnell, this situation was not a hypothetical construction but instead a response
to questions magistrates had over the new police force. In early January, a member of the
force attempted to desert, was captured and sentenced by the Weenen magistrate to three
months imprisonment and fine of £5. These sentences, though each listed as possible under
the police law of 1874, were immediately questioned by Dartnell, who informed the colonial
secretary that “the crime of desertion for which this man was tried is only punishable by fine
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or imprisonment.”140 A warrant was eventually issued which dismissed the double
punishment. This early incident is indicative of Dartnell’s awareness of the law, but also his
attempts not to become overzealous in the discipline he was attempting to maintain for his
“very fine, hardy lot of men.”

Not all of these “fine men” were keen to the new parameters put forward by the
commandant. In June, three members of the mounted police were reported to have stolen
three horses and deserted to the Orange Free State. A warrant was issued for their arrest, but
there is little evidence that they were ever captured.141 The reason for this desertion is
unclear, but possible opportunities and closeness to the border was likely too tempting for
any man who was not fully committed to police force.142 According to the unit’s official
history, there was “constant desertions, and nearly every month one or two were dismissed
for misconduct, or as being physically unfit.”143

Dartnell undoubtedly questioned the viability of the mounted police during this early
period, as he had previously questioned the viability of the volunteer drills which were
largely unsuccessful during his initial tenure as commandant.144 Some could perceive
Dartnell’s actions as one seeking to form a combined defence force within the colony, but
instead, Dartnell’s ideal defensive situation within the colony involved the combined efforts
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of his two responsibilities. Again, the perceived hybridization of Natal’s defensive
institutions continued. Though the police force would ostensibly serve in the capacity of a
police force, Dartnell wished to have “sufficient men in hand to nip an outbreak in the bud, or
make a stand until the Volunteers could be called out” as Dartnell had full confidence the two
forces could “work harmoniously together.”145 The Langalibalele incident still fresh in his
mind, Dartnell’s concern for a viable military force would be his focus for most of the
remainder of this formative period. The commandant, however, faced a battle with not only
supplies, men, and possible opponents, but also within the public sphere.

Though Dartnell in the early days of the mounted police attempted to instil a greater
degree of discipline and military precision, criticism of the police seemed to be mounting
even before any viable changes could have been made, especially from the city of
Pietermaritzburg. In May 1874, the Natal Witness described a “feeling of antipathy” that was
growing in the city toward the mounted police, specifically calling attention to “late
disturbances…attributed to them.”146 The editors claimed that Pietermaritzburg “was quite
before they [the members of the mounted police] were enlisted, and has been much disturbed
since”.147 Though the no specific members of the mounted police, or even the institution
itself, was charged, it was inferred by the paper’s editors that “blame should rest upon that
body.”148 The editorial license taken with these comments could easily be dismissed, but they
do indicate at least some element of resentment within the press and in turn some elements of
Natal’s society. Such editorials were not outright negative toward the mounted police, but
instead characterized a vane disappointment in the viability of the force during its first years.
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The lack of quality men was not damning evidence of the force’s failures, but instead
criticism that, whether true or simply exaggerated, influenced public opinion on the issue.

It was such instances which resulted in a perception of the mounted police as a group
of unsavoury characters. In September 1874, reports surfaced that a group of police were
acting in an unacceptable manner, including the stealing of oxen from the African population
and “carousing at all the canteens along the road” in Alexandra County. 149 So much of a
scandal was caused by these actions that it was officially commented upon by the legislative
council. Dartnell unequivocally denied such actions, provided letters from John Shepstone
and his sub-inspectors to address the claims of ox theft, with Shepstone, then Acting
Secretary of Native Affairs, issuing a statement claiming that the African reported that “a
young ox had been voluntarily sold to the Police for the sum of forty shillings” and while the
police had not the money at the time, they had made the payment before leaving the
neighbourhood.150 As for the charge of public disorder, Dartnell demanded from SubInspector George Mansel of the police make full account of the accusations. In his report,
Mansel claimed that the troops had stayed at a local store waiting for a supply cart to arrive.
During that time, the troops did take part in the liquor that was available, but unlike the
claims in the Witness, the police did settle their bill, and did not “demand” the liquor without
payment. According the Mr. Chapman, the partner at the local store, there was “no
drunkenness or carousing of any sort”.151 In response to accusation about stealing food from a
woman in Alexander County, Mansel did acknowledge talking to the woman, but claimed
that she not only offered he and two of his men dinner, but also provided a ham and some
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fruit to the troops, claiming she said she “was very sorry you are all suffering so, but I have
nothing more to give you.”152 Such claims of ill treatment, were just one a few examples of
the many instances of police misconduct which appeared in the Witness. From the killing of
ox, to the stealing of goats, the mounted police were presented in the media not a lovable
“rough and tumble lot” but instead a group of drunk bandits raiding the countryside.

The criticism in the Natal Witness was conceivably either exaggeration, or completely
unfounded. As stated before, Dartnell expressed apprehension related to the quality of men he
would be able to bring into the mounted police. The Witness was also acutely aware of this,
describing it supremely difficult to “organize a Police Force with so little choice of men”
especially in regards to the wages which were attribute to be “less than is earned by a kafir
who can put a wagon on the road, and…no more than is given to steady kafir drivers and
kafir skilled labourers.”153 In truth, by the end of 1874, non-officers in the mounted police
earned less than £60 a year. In comparison, a district European constable earned £84 a year,
an usher for the legislative council earned £75 a year, and even a hospital matron or Indian
constable earned £60. To compare the wages earned by the mounted police to African labour
was an extreme, as most positions in both medical, legal, and police fields paid Africans an
average of £12.154 If the criticism of pay was not unfounded, the exaggeration of the press
was most probably a point of contention within the command structure of the mounted police.
William Clark in his account of the early years of the police outright declared a “prejudice
displayed by a portion of the press…a prejudice that has been revived from time to time,
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sometimes for political reasons.”155 Even two decades after its founding, the “good name of
the Force” was perceived to have been “blackened by the press.”156

All of this criticism took at least some level of toll of the mounted police and Dartnell.
The criticism was exacerbated when in July of 1874 the mounted police were involved in an
incident connected to Chief Umkwavuma who had challenged the local Magistrate’s
authority. With the temporal proximity to the Langalibalele incident, the colonial government
dispatched 30 members of the mounted police, along with the commandant and secretary of
native affairs. They were instructed to intimidate the chief into compliance with the colonial
government. Whereas such an episode could have been a pivotal turning point to the
facilitation of a positive attitude toward the mounted police, directly after leaving the
Umzinto, the troop were accused of stealing meat from the Africans by a local missionary
under the guise of “commandeering supplies”.157 An official inquiry was established by the
legislative council shortly after the incident. This resulted in the commandant’s temporary
resignation in December of 1874, which was quickly withdrawn.

Though this incident does exemplify both the difficulties and limitations of the
mounted police, especially in regards to supplies, it also illustrates that the position of the
police within the colony was increasing as early as late 1874. On hearing of Dartnell’s
resignation, the local press immediately lamented is impending departure, claiming to
“honour making his acquaintance…[and] entertained the highest opinion of his fitness for the
important offices he filled”.158 In truth, the indictment of the mounted police in this instance
was less of an attack on the institute itself and more of an attack on the government’s lack of
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proper organization and maintenance, to the point when hearing of the Major’s withdrawn
resignation, the Witness praised Dartnell for showing he did not “intend to be kicked from
pillar to post as is the practice under the present administration.”159 Since the charges against
the mounted police were eventually dropped, this incident possibly increased the positive
image of the mounted police within the colony, especially when taken into account their
overall success against Chief Umkwavuma before the incident of possible theft. The unit was
even praised for succeeding where the resident magistrate had failed, emphasizing the fact
“that the mere presence of 30 armed Mounted Police sufficed in an hour or two to enforce the
neglected mandate, and without a blow being struck, to secure his [Umkwavuma’s]
punishment, speaks no less forcibly in favour of the value of the body that had been so
heedlessly traduced.”160 Despite the “negative press” following the accusation of theft, the
attempted resignation of Dartnell and the actions of the mounted police in the security of the
colony perhaps led to gradual acceptance toward the latter part of the decade, both in the
press and from elements of the colonial government. It would not occur instantaneously, but
would gradual build up until the Anglo-Zulu War, where, like most of the defensive
institutions of the colony, it would be popularized and immortalized in myth and legend.

Even as late at 1877, the respectability of the Natal Mounted Police as a force was not
assured. Despite some growth and success, the men of the mounted police were not always
perceived as exclusive to their task of policing the colony. When a detachment of British
troops were relocated to Newcastle, in response to impending annexation of the Transvaal by
Theophilus Shepstone, they moved into the sphere of influence of a segment of the mounted
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police.161 Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery, in need of additional men, requested from his
superior the retention of three men of the 25 mounted police stationed in at Newcastle. The
labour they performed was “principally collecting supplies for the troops and…employed
collecting bushels.”162 These three men, included two privates and a non-commissioned
officer, would be at the disposal of the troops in Newcastle for as long as the mounted police
were stationed there. No objections were raised by Major Dartnell as long as the men were
permitted to return to their police duties when necessary. It is unclear if these three men were
Africans, though it was unlikely that the non-commissioned officer was African, as there was
typically only one African non-commissioned officer for the mounted police as a whole.163
Because the men of the police force acted as orderlies for Lt. Colonel Montgomery, it was
probable these men were white. Whatever their race, the use of these men was indicative of
the versatile and nebulous tasks that were sometimes performed by the members of the
mounted police. Perhaps these men were necessary as a stopgap to the British military buildup that began in 1877 and would continue until well beyond the Anglo-Zulu War. More
likely the members of the mounted police offered themselves as “warm bodies” in which the
menial duties of the military presence in Newcastle did not have the manpower to spare. This
incident does illustrate a cooperative element between these two pillars of colonial defence.
Yet, the use of these men in a servile capacity could complicated the mounted police’s the
perceived placement in the defensive hierarchy. Despite the Natal Mounted Police’s role as
one of the few mobile defensive structures within the colony, they remained below Her
Majesty’s troops stationed at Fort Napier.
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Implementation and Use
Even with these problems during its initial years, the Natal Mounted Police did
remain an important component in the defence of the colony as a whole. Improvements were
gradually made to the unit as funding would increase during the first years of its existence.
This did not mean that there were not considerable issues that remained. There were,
however, a number of incidents throughout the 1870s building up to the Anglo-Zulu War that
illustrate the mounted police’s implementation and growing importance to Natal’s defensive
institutions. The Transvaal expedition, though the most well-known, was just one example of
the mounted police’s attempts to come to grips with the ever shifting colonial landscape
during Natal’s formative period.

Regardless of this seemingly positive trajectory, even by the start of 1875, many units
still lacked any permanent station outside of the headquarters that was constructed in
Pietermaritzburg. During the especially cold and wet winters, this would cause considerable
difficulty for the viability of the unit. Such was the observation of Dr. G.L. Bonnar, District
Surgeon of the Umvoti when he communicated his concern in January 1875. Two members
of the mounted police stationed in Greytown were under his treatment, one suffering from a
fever, the other with a chest cold and diarrhoea. Dr. Bonnar believed the cause of these
maladies rested on the poor conditions the troopers slept, spending “the night in a dripping
tent, wrapped in wet blankets,” as the troopers described to the doctor.164 The doctor’s
solution to this hardship was rather simple: put a roof over their heads. Bonnar suggested that
any type of room would be a major benefit to the force as a whole, not only for their health
but for the viability of the mounted police as a whole. Bonnar advised a room should be
rented or constructed to allow these men and others like them to recover. The only other
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alternative would be to transport them to a hospital in Pietermaritzburg. The doctor admitted
that such poor conditions would perhaps “sow the seeds of disease in their constitutions,
which may ultimately prove very serious.”165

Bonnar’s apprehensions were forwarded to Major Dartnell, who moved to
recommend the sick men stationed in Greytown immediately be bordered in a room for the
next few months of the rainy season.166 Dartnell did not believe, however, that a construction
project should take place, but instead the room should be rented only for those few month of
the wet season. As for moving the men to Pietermaritzburg, Dartnell saw no need to have
men sent to the city “for every trifling complication” but instead felt they were better “treated
on the spot by the District Surgeon”.167 Dartnell showed little sympathy for the other men,
presumably a response to his own military training, stating: “The tents the men are now
occupying in Greytown are good worth. All tents must be damp and uncomfortable…in wet
weather. There is no hardship in men in strong health remaining under canvas.”168 Dartnell
words provide a strong counterpoint to the sympathy and concern shown by Dr. Bonnar.
Dartnell’s concern for the sick troopers is relevant in his quick action, but his focus remained
on the practicality of the situation. The Natal Mounted Police simply did not have the funds
available for the construction of new building projects. Dartnell’s total budget for the
headquarters in Pietermaritzburg and the stations in Greytown, Estcourt, and Harding totalled
£1117 11s. 6d., an amount insufficient for the construction of permanent structures.169 Rent
was a more practical alternative as the mounted police attempted to solidify themselves
against possible threats to colonial security.
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Even when an actual threat did not appear, the mounted police would continue to be
perceived by some members of the colony as a possible deterrent to crime. Such was the case
in July 1875 when the resident magistrate of Alfred County requested the service of the
“European Mounted Police” force, in response to possible smuggling in the district. Resident
Magistrate J. Gilles, though confident that theft of stock was a rare occurrence in the district,
had been privately informed that “guns and powder have been run or are being expected in
Pondoland.”170 Gilles believed that the mounted police would perhaps be more capable of
searching wagons that were possible smuggling articles to “be taken or reaching our
Griqualand border and passed through at night by Kaffir runners.”171 Such a task would fall
upon local law enforcement, but because of Alfred County’s limited police resources, the
Natal Mounted Police were a viable alternative.172 Gilles also had reservations about the use
of “Kaffir detectives” because “as a rule Kaffirs are not to be depended on for night work”
and in his opinion “the work would be better done by the European Mounted Police.”173 With
such praise, any reservation and debates that dominated the early existence of the Natal
Mounted Police did not eliminate their growing perceived benefit to the colony as a whole.

In April of the same year, Resident Magistrate Osborn of Newcastle also requested
the presence of the mounted police, however for perhaps more dangerous reasons.
Sheepherders from the Orange Free State and the Transvaal had been moving across the
border to winter their flocks in the Newcastle Division. Though not threatening on the
surface, these same individuals were “often guilty of surreptitiously setting the grass on fire
on private farms as well as on crown land in order to secure a supply of young herbage for
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their flocks to winter.”174 Not only did this involve the destruction of land and property, but
the dangers of the fires were exacerbated by their sometimes being set at night, seemingly to
“enable the offender more easily to escape detection.”175 Osborn also lamented that he had
limited numbers of police at his disposal.176 Again, however, his request illustrates the racial
component of police action during this period by pointing out “these offences being
perpetrated by white men, the difficulty of dealing with them by means of Native Police will
be apparent to Government [sic.].”177 Osborn’s solution to these problems was the stationing
of a contingent of mounted police in the division. Not only would stationing these men in the
area curtail these sheep farmers, but would also be “of material aid in patrolling…especially
along the extensive border of this Division, part of which lies along the Zulu Country.”178
Osborn, in essence, was making a case for the role the mounted police could play in his
division: that of a protective force for both domestic and foreign concerns within the colony;
essentially, a border patrol. This was the purpose which the Natal Mounted Police force was
envisioned by members of the legislative council and leaders within the colonial community
as early as the initial attempts to create such a force in the 1860s. Despite the emphasis on the
division’s importance to colonial security, Dartnell’s response was more practical in nature,
requesting that, because of the likelihood of horsesickness in the winter months in the
northern sections of the colony, the resident magistrate should first provide accommodations
for the half dozen man force he would send to the area. Though not the force envisioned by
Osborn, these requests by resident magistrates for assistance does clearly illustrate the
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perceived need for the mounted police force within the colony and its approval in principle
by some colonial officials.

A small caveat of both of these requests should not be overlooked. Gilles and Osborn
were both ignoring the many Africans who were part of the mounted police; though the
colonial secretary saw no issue in using African police as supplemental forces in
apprehending the sheep farmers when responding to Osborn’s request. In the colonial
secretary’s mind, the African police could just as easily identify who was responsible and
report back to other officers. He did acknowledge, nonetheless, that African’s ability to
successfully apprehend white men was indeed an unlikely scenario. This contradiction in
perception in relation to law and the racial divisions of the colony created a far more complex
understanding of the manner in which police forces, both white and black, performed their
duties within the colony. This racialized view of the police forces that many members of the
Natal community experienced during the formative period will be more deeply analysed later
in the next chapter.

As alluded to earlier, perhaps one of the more memorable, and somewhat acclaimed
incident of the Natal Mounted Rifles before the Anglo-Zulu War was their expedition to the
Transvaal. In September 1876, Theophilus Shepstone was appointed Special Commissioner
of the Transvaal and was given instruction to mediate the disputes that were taking place
between the South African Republic and the Zulu kingdom, though he was also given secret
authority to annex the republic to Britain if it was perceived as feasible and favourable to the
Afrikaners who lived in the Transvaal.179 Shepstone returned from London in December, and
began formulating his contingent that would travel to the Transvaal. Before Shepstone’s
departure in late December, the executive council received a series of requests from
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Shepstone which included “that a detachment of the N.M.P. [Natal Mounted Police] be
placed at your [Shepstone’s] disposal to as an agent during your mission to the Transvaal.”180

The choice of the mounted police is an intriguing one, but on further examination, the
best in regards to the situation. Shepstone was not leading an invasion of the Transvaal
(though his actions would eventually led to its annexation), so an official military escort
would be unacceptable. The mounted police offered a quasi-military institution that could
offer the same functions of a military escort. A mounted police force, however, would not
cause the same level of concern amongst the Afrikaner population, though Afrikaner
interaction with the mounted police in the border of Natal could instil at least some modicum
of respect on their arrival. With this in mind, the Natal Mounted Police were fulfilling their
ideal role envisioned on their formation: “act as police within or without the colony, for the
preservation of peace”.181 Of course, simple proximity could also have been a contributing
factor. A detachment of mounted police under the command of Sub-Inspector Phillips was
already stationed in Newcastle and would be available for the foreseeable future. Their
proximity to the border, as well as their experience with the Afrikaners who they sometimes
confronted, would be an adequate tool for the expedition. Whether out of outright need or
convenience, the mounted police’s inclusion in arguably one of the most important (if not
infamous) diplomatic exhibitions of the 1870s was a massive boon to the institutions
exposure to the colony as a whole.182

180

Minute Paper: The Commandant of Mounted Police- Report on his instructions, December 7, 1876, CSO
572, No. 1310, 1876.

181

Law No. 15, 1861, “For the organization and regulation of an Armed and Mounted Police Force, and of an
Armed Colonial Engineer Force of Sappers and Miners within the Colony of Natal”, CO 180/2, 1861.

182

The Transvaal Annexation, in the context of Natal’s emergence as a colonial state, is particularly important
not only to the development of the mounted police’s role within Natal’s defensive structures, but also an attempt
to solidify Natal’s borders, security, and, to an extent, identity. Natal, embodied in the persona of Shepstone,
was emboldened to extend British influence into the Transvaal as an active benefit the Natal’s role in the region.
While the expedition resulted in eventual failure with the First South African War, the annexation remains an
important point in Natal’s emergence as colonial state. Though the mounted police were just one representation

186
Major Dartnell was amicable in his instructions to provide troops for the expedition,
but also possessed some apprehensions. Additional pay was the first point Dartnell confirmed
with the executive council, as well an additional one pound per diem for wagons that would
be necessary in the transportation of supplies.183 The wagons would be useful as well
because, according to Dartnell, the Transvaal “is astonishingly unhealthy for horses,
especially during the summer season, so it is possible that many of the horses belonging to
men of the Escort will die.”184 The commandant also requested additional funds for this
expected loss.185 When selected men for this expedition, the major had supreme confidence in
the officers and men that would be stationed at Newcastle, claiming to be “careful in in
selecting the men for this duty”.186 Of the list of men selected, there was one officer
(Phillips), one sergeant, two corporals, and twenty two privates, with the contingent of troops
moving to the Transvaal consisting of nearly a quarter of the 108 white members of the
mounted police.187 Dartnell assured the colonial government that he had “detached a steady
Sergeant and other non-commissioned officers” and “had no reason to fear that these men
will behave themselves in anyway bring discredit upon the Corps or the Colony.”188 Dartnell
believed he could assure this result because none in the police force sent on the expedition
appeared to be Africans, despite the force still containing 25 “native” members in 1876.

of this state, their presence shows the colony’s willingness to become a viable player in the geopolitical conflicts
of Southern Africa in the late nineteenth century. Such actions possibly even emboldened Natal to take a harsher
stance on the Zulu which would directly contribute to the Anglo-Zulu War. These connections, though part of
the general historiography, require perhaps further examination.
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The reason for this exclusion can be easily found in the commandant’s assurances.
This expedition represented a major diplomatic mission from the colony of Natal outside of
the Zululand. The colony, in essence, was on display during this mission, and colonial leaders
like Dartnell believed the enduring image of the Natal Mounted Police should not include an
African face. This was even more relevant when considering the racial viewpoints of the
largely Afrikaner population of the Transvaal. Again, apprehension about Afrikaner reactions
to black troopers, as was the case in the border arsons, was a subtle component in Natal’s
perception of power and authority within the region.

Ironically, following the annexation of the Transvaal, the mounted police were still
not seen as a forceful enough representation of the British Empire. They were hurriedly
replaced by the 13th Regiment which had been stationed in Pietermaritzburg, prompting the
unit to return in April of 1877. The mounted police did, however, create a positive impression
on Shepstone, who forwarded a message from the newly established government house of
Pretoria on the mounted police’s departure. The office praised the police’s efforts, thanked
them for their “ready cheerfulness”, and conveyed in “the highest sense…the manner in
which [the police] discharged the duties of the officer commanding his escort.”189 Shepstone,
as the new administrator of the government in Pretoria, requested that Phillips to express “the
pleasure it has given him to observe their orderly and praiseworthy conduct, which has won
them the good opinions of the inhabitants.”190 Evidently Dartnell’s assurance of proper
behaviour was not unfounded.

The impression the mounted police made on Her Majesty’s forces must have been a
positive one, as another contingent of mounted police was requested in April 1877 to escort
the troops from Newcastle to Pretoria. Shepstone was quick to point out to Major Dartnell
189
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that such an escort was unnecessary, presumably due to his belief that the situation in the
Transvaal was stable.191 Dartnell did accompany the troops to the border, but returned to
Natal with a smaller contingent as there appeared no need for the additional troops on the
journey. Despite their rapid replacement when the situation in the Transvaal acceleration, the
choice of bringing the Natal Mounted Police on the exhibition provided another example of
their growing importance to colonial security, or at least the perception of that security,
within Natal.

Despite their growing prestige and perceived importance to the Colony, even by the
beginning of 1878 the colonial government still seemed unsure of the mounted police’s
purpose within Natal. One proposal put forward in January of 1878 would have the mounted
police act as a currier express between Hancock’s Drift on the Umzimkulu River and
Pietermaritzburg. The purpose of such a proposal rested on the creation of a quick
communication route with the border, especially as tensions heightened in the Transvaal and
the Zulu Kingdom. Immediately, Major Dartnell questioned the practicality of such a
proposal. Of the 12 men needed for such a system, all but the two stationed near
Pietermaritzburg would be force to live at roadside public houses along the route, which
would incur an unnecessary expense on the unit. Dartnell feared that the men stationed in
public houses “would be subject to a poor many temptations…without proper supervision and
[Dartnell was] afraid discipline would be relaxed.”192 Dartnell only saw such a system
working if it modelled itself off of the Cape Mounted Rifles, in which men were stationed in
parties of ten or twelve under non-commissioned officers some 20 miles apart. The major,
however, still remembered that even in those cases “discipline was found to be lax.”193 It was
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even suggested that Africans could be employed in service of the express under contract to
perform the task the mounted police were not willing to take up.194 Such a premise was not
entirely beyond Dartnell’s suggestions, since the Cape Mounted Rifles had at one point a
significant African contingent, but the task was eventually given to Her Majesty’s troops,
who were a continually growing presence in the colony during the build-up to the Anglo-Zulu
War.

Part of Dartnell’s apprehension rested in the number of men in the mounted police
needed for such a task on top of their typical duties. Such men were not readily available by
the close of 1877. The mounted police, as it continue to be a more important component of
colonial defence during the build-up to the Anglo-Zulu War, numbered only 153 men, 25 of
which were Africans. Dartnell, as has been previously stated, was never entirely satisfied
with the state of his troops, and would make requests for additional recruiting from Britain (a
tactic used extensively by the mounted police’s Cape Colony counterpart). A call for 40
recruits in March 1877 had increased the unit’s number, but more were required for the
growing needs of the call. A call for 25 more recruits was made and approved by the
Immigrations Department of Natal in January of 1878.195 Mr. Rolls, Emigration Agent for the
Colony in London, was given clear instructions on the procedures of acquiring these men.
The parameters put forward are indicative of the expectations that would shift the mounted
police from a less regulated police unit to a full-fledged component of the defensive systems
of the Colony of Natal. Speed was a critical factor in the orders given to Mr. Rolls, as well as
the contractual obligations they would be forced to fall under upon joining the unit, which
remained three years under the Police Law No. 5, 1876. Interestingly, health was also a major
component of the recruitment process, were “recruits must be medically examined as to their
194
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fitness for service…particular care must be taken with regard to this examination”.196
Evidently the diligence to health was the result of previous experience in which “a recruit of
defective mental capacity was accepted on the former occasion and also a man who had lost a
thumb.”197 The physical and mental quality of the men was not unusual in the recruitment of
colonial officials. The fact, however, that the agents could be selective with their recruitment
was indicative of the growing professionalism of the unit, and, perhaps, to the growing
perceived threats in the colony as a whole.198

Conclusion
Many of these incidents are indicative of an attempt by the reformed police force,
both mounted and constabulary, to maintain and conceivably expand their influence over the
ensuing decade. By the conclusion of the Anglo-Zulu War, the police force was a viable
source of colonial security and was more or less capable of facing the many problems within
the colony over the later part of the nineteenth century. This is in no way an attempt to create
some kind of hero worship for these men, but instead a means to better understand their place
in the formation of the colony of Natal. Though Dartnell remembered these men fondly
decades later, it is evident that units like the mounted police were far from perfect, and faced
their own issues of corruption, discipline, and scandal. However, because the force had both
legal and financial backing, as well as the eventual support of the colonial government and
population, it would foster itself as a critical pillar of the colony’s development. The mounted
police, both in the 1860s and after their reestablishment in the 1870s, were representative of
the apprehension and concerns for security which defined this period. The European
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constabulary, whether urban or rural, though less inclined to receive the attention of colonial
society, still acted as an important component in Natal’s emerging defensive structures.
Perhaps most importantly, the reliance on this two part system of policing demonstrates the
need for a hybrid system of law and order. Without such a system, Natal’s white police
institutions would have conceivably followed a different route in the preservation of law and
order within the colony.

Nevertheless, the white police institutions of the colony of Natal were only one, even
a minor, component to the overall security of the colony. Though legislative action and public
opinion drove the creation and reform of these European police forces, the primary source of
colonial order was not the white European, but instead the African working under colonial
authority. It is this group that shall now be discussed extensively, if only because of their
critical role as key pillars of colonial security and in the formation of Natal as a colonial state.
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Chapter Five: African Police
Introduction
The European pillars of defence, with some exceptions, have been presented to this
point as the primary defensive structures which defined Natal as in the early years as a
colonial state in the nineteenth century. It was, however, the African who provided perhaps
the most striking and vital element of colonial security during the formative period of the
colony. These African institutions would take the form of the police and the military
establishments that were directed by colonial administrators. Much like the white police and
volunteer institutions of the colony, the African population was a component of colonial
defence that elicited much debate, apprehension, and a sense of fear which permeated the
colony in its early years.1 This chapter will address the importance of the African police to
the creation of Natal’s defensive institutions during the formative period, paying particular
attention to the disparity that existed between the African and their European counterparts.
Whether this included the issues of pay, their treatment by other members of Natal’s
community, or even their role in the preservation of law and order, the African police were
representative of a unique form of colonial defence. By delving into the formation,
organization, and responses to colonial violence the African experienced as a figure of
authority within Natal, a deeper understanding of African agency in the formation of Natal as
a colonial state will be revealed, indicative of a fluid state system of control that was
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characteristic of Natal. This will remain essential to understanding the imperial structures of
defence that permeated the British Empire in the nineteenth century.

To accomplish this, the role of the African population must be examined in a more
nuanced way. It must be remembered that without African participation, the formation of the
British Empire in Africa would have been impossible. What remains more important,
however, is addressing the question of why Africans participated in such institutions.2 The
participation of Africans in police institutions has always been a complicated issue. Just like
the interpretation of colonial police discussed in the previous chapter, there was no single
system which permeated the Empire during this period, though generalities have been made.
Since the traditional, European police model relied on a public consensus and general norms
of behaviour, which did not necessarily initially exist in the colonial setting, modifications
would need to be made which addressed the “lower levels of political and social
development” and which spoke to the unique situations and cultures on the ground of colonial
rule that did not exist in the City of London.3

The use of Africans as colonial police moved beyond simple convenience, and instead
addressed a deeper physiological response to Empire by the British. For the African police
and military institutions within the colony, the view of the African (particularly those
associated with the Zulu) as a “martial race” was testament to both the optimism and
apprehension that surrounded the establishment of police institutions during this formative
period of the colony. On one hand, the British believed that the natural abilities of the
2
This is the fundamental question that has begun to dominate the historiography, becoming the main subject of
Parson and others work on black collaboration in Empire. See Timothy Parsons, “African Participation in the
British Empire,” in Black Experience and the Empire, ed. Philip D. Morgan and Sean Hawkins, The Oxford
History of the British Empire Companion Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 257-285.
3
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5.

194
indigenous people made them suited to frontier defence, combined with the reputation of the
“native forces” for being “fearless and determined fighters”.4 Nonetheless, the arming of
these “native police” and their acting independently would frustrate and terrify some
members of the colonial population especially when confronted with colonial violence in
their own homes and communities.5 Since the progression of the Natal police followed the
general outlines suggested by Jeffries, the early phases of the colonial police depended on
these African troops while at the same time retaining European officers and noncommissioned officers to keep such African forces “in line”.6

It would not be until long after the scope of this dissertation that Africans would attain
any official position of authority within Natal’s police institutions. Nevertheless, even
Africans who submitted themselves completely as subordinates still retained some sense of
agency and authority within the colonial government, even to some degree challenging the
racial divisions that existed within the colony. Under such conditions, it would be more
relevant to look at Africans and race as Kathleen Wilson sees it: “like gender and ethnicity,
[race] was a historically contingent construction that did not describe empirical, static or
absolute conditions in societies, but positional relationships made and unmade in historical
circumstances and manipulated in the pursuit of power.”7 Though such an interpretation
would be dismissive of the massive work done on racial theory in Africa, it is helpful in the
4
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understanding of the African police as a component of colonial authority as well as an
instrument of colonial oppression. Africans would never stop being Africans in the eyes of
most European colonists, but providing them with positions of some authority made them a
component of the growing colonial state. Perhaps it was this unseemly combination that
caused such great concern from within some segments of the colonial population. It remains
clear, however, that despite these misgivings, the African police in Natal remained a key
component in the development of Natal during this formative period, despite debate,
reservations, and even eliminations of segments of the force.

The level of overall success of these institutions in Natal was somewhat remarkable,
considering these security forces were taken entirely from voluntary recruitment or
encouragement from colonial officials, largely due to the fear of a potential African rebellion
amongst the European population. This was not the case with all African defensive
instructions in Natal, as some African military units were part of existing systems in which
military service to the chiefs was compulsory. There is little evidence, however, that Africans
in the police forces were pressed into service by colonial officials. Interestingly, these
institutions were seen by some Africans as a benefit to the African people, perceived to some
extent as part of a greater Westernization process.8 This hits at the heart of why African’s
took part in the police force and the greater security systems within the colony as a whole, but
also provides a clear avenue to understanding the relationships between collaboration and
resistance in the colony.

The manner in which African’s resisted this colonial conquest has been a highly
contentious issue within African history and the historiography of the topic as a whole. Like
8
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the rest of Africa, in Natal the police institutions were able to act as an avenue for
collaboration, but to simply dismiss the Africans who took part in these institutions as
colonial stooges would be to minimize their role in Natal’s history.9 This has continued to be
the case in Natal. As the apartheid era begins to fade in the historical memory of the Republic
of South Africa, a more nuanced examinations of the role of early collaborators is paving the
way for important research in the field of African history.10

The police model created in colonial Africa including in Natal, relied on a public
consensus and general norms of behaviour, which did not initially exist in the colonial
setting. Therefore modifications were made to the traditional British police model in the
implementation of law and order within the colonial state. The imposition of a new and
strange culture on the colonial population “would require the constabulary concept to
strengthen, in particular, its capacity to contain unrest and keep order; the forces, therefore,
would need to make provision for occasional deployments in gendarmerie and frontier
military roles.”11 Alterations would also include forces falling under central authority instead
of different local authorities. 12 In Natal, the development of police institutions followed the
basic model formulated by Charles Jefferies, moving from an “improvised arrangement” that
included the Natal Native Police working under the direct authority of the Diplomatic Agent
9
Perhaps the greatest contribution to recent historiography has been the acknowledgement that the resisters and
collaborators were not that distinct from one another during the colonial conquest. See Ranger, “African
Reaction to the Imposition of Colonial Rule in East and Central Africa”; Anthony G. Hopkins, An Economic
History of West Africa (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973); Edward I. Steinhart, Conflict and
Collaboration: The Kingdoms of Western Uganda, 1890-1907 (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press,
1977).
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for the Natives, Theophilus Shepstone, to a semi-military constabulary force, which would
include the Natal Mounted Police, and finally a more civilian based force after the AngloZulu War.13 Within the towns and rural areas of the colony, however, the constabulary
remained an amorphous force, working within the resident magistracy while also attaining
some level of autonomy. The constabulary would consistently struggle with funding, man
power, and criticism from both the colonial government and population. Therefore, as David
Arnold would argue in his examination of Madras, the constabulary acted as a metaphor for
the colonial regime as a whole, with the institutionalization enacting “the priorities and
principles of colonial administration” as a whole.14 From their earliest creation by Shepstone
in the later part of the 1840s, these African police thoroughly enacted those same priorities
and principles.

The Natal Native Police
After the establishment of an initial colonial government following the ceding of
Natal from the Afrikaners in 1845, there remained considerable concern for security within
early British Natal. While a contingent of the 45th Regiment remained at Fort Napier and
several Europeans began forming their own precursors to the volunteer corps, the issue of
manpower was overwhelming. In the rural segments of Natal, the European population was
incapable of regulating law and order, much less act in the case of an emergency. Yet, there
remained an extensive African population that was beginning to fall under the sway of the
emerging British administrative system. In early 1848, to address the concerns for colonial
security within the rural sections of the colony, a corps of African police was formed by
Theophilus Shepstone under the recommendation of Governor Harry Smith of the Cape
Colony in his proclamation of February 1848. As was the case with the European volunteers,
13
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security remained the great source of concern for these early colonial officials. Since
Shepstone had the greatest access to manpower as diplomatic agent to the African population,
it was only reasonable that he would be placed in charge of such a force. His personal
relationship with the local chiefs, as well as his place as one of the few administrators to
consistently interact with the African population, gave him the greatest chance for the
formation of such a police force.

Under Government Notice No. 32, Shepstone was named captain and James Melville
and John Wesley Shepstone (Theophilus’ brother) were named lieutenants of the Natal
Native Police, formed “in prudence to the Proclamation of His Excellency Sir H.G.W. Smith,
dated 10th February 1848”.15 Supplies were quickly requisitioned and notices were printed in
the local press. Tenders for supplies on March 27 include 100 Woollen blankets, great coats,
forage caps, and “good strong shirts—blue”.16 According to John Shepstone, however, the
uniform was white canvas suits, and they were not supplied with caps, though Shepstone
recalled no particular difficulties to contend with in the formation of the corps.17 The corps
would number 200 men, with only two white officers (Melville and John Shepstone).
Strikingly, this early force was armed with the “Brown Bess” muzzle-loaders with bayonets,
a remarkable deviation from later African corps.18

By May, the corps was being sent out across the colony in what would amount to
typical police matters. John Shepstone marched from Pietermaritzburg on May 26th “with 31

15
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The size of the force presumably quickly increased from one hundred to two hundred men, since it unlikely
Shepstone would allow his men to outnumber his supplies. The Natal Witness, March 27, 1848.
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men of the Native Police” to the houses of Ladsberg and Plessis at Doornkop which were
found “broken open”.19 This was part of a general tour of the colony from May to June, in
which John Shepstone came into contact with both settlers and African kraals. No mention is
made of the Native Police beyond their accompaniment of Shepstone, but was assumed they
assisted in Shepstone fulfilment of his duties throughout this trip. Most of the crimes or
disturbances reported were regarding the presence of Africans on land as squatters. By
September, John Shepstone was stationed at the seat of the newly surveyed magistracy of the
Klip River Division “with a party of Native Police”.20
It should be noted at this point in Natal’s history, there was only the 45th Infantry and
a small selection of the Cape Mounted Rifles which were involved in the protection of Natal
from outside attacks.21 This was doubtlessly why the African corps were publically drilled
every day by Sergeant Doyle of the 45th, not only because Doyle represented one of the few
formal military institutions in the region, but also to alleviate concerns for the lack of
discipline in this force from within the colonial population.22 As will be illustrated later, there
were a number of scares that pervaded Natal which would eventually led to the formation of
more institutions of colonial defence, including the volunteer corps and the mounted police. It
remains telling, however, that this one company of African were ostensibly the only rural
police institution for the first years of the colony’s existence and on multiple occasions
illustrated their prowess in the prevention and showing of imperial force. The unit, however,
was not praised for their contributions, but instead the source of considerable debate. This
was largely because it was assumed that that the funding for this police corps would come
from the military, instead of the colony’s budget. In essence, the troop was seen as a nearly
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cost free addition to the colony’s defence.23 This assumption, largely unfounded, would
eventually lead to the Native Police’s eventual abolition.

As always, the issue of cost would continue to be a major imperative with the African
police institutions. Though the Native Police was a relatively successful force, they were not
a low cost expense for the colony. In 1850, the Native Police cost £2417, with £1254 for pay
and allowances to officers and another £1122 for provisions, clothing, etc. The remainder
encompassed wagon hires, arms and ammunition, which was minimal, and medical
expenses.24 Interestingly, there appeared to be a discrepancy in the public presentation of cost
and what actually expenses was incurred. The Witness reported in 1853 that the cost of the
police force in 1850 was £622.12s.2d and the cost in 1851 (the year it disbanded) was
£59.18s.3d. Total expense of the force after its disbanding was estimated at by the Witness at
£3076.25 Why does this discrepancy matter? This complaint about cost is continually cited in
financial reports and legislative councils for years to come, and the disbanding of the Native
Police is seen as a major cost saving initiative (with a reported cost of around £3,000 per
annum). The perceived frivolous spending on the police remained a rallying cry against
frugal spending for years to come within the colonial government.

This is presumably why there was little criticism, except from Shepstone, when the
Natal Native Police were disbanded in April 1851 by Lieutenant-Governor Benjamin Pine.
Pine saw the removal of the Native Police as simply a cost saving measure. Even within the
legislative council there was a sense of relief that the Native Police would no longer be an
issue. Walter Harding, Crown Prosecutor and Attorney General, even went as far as to say it
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ought to have been abolished three years prior, only a week after its establishment. Again,
Harding’s concerns seemed to be that of cost, as he objected to a percentage of taxes being
used for a government officer that was not necessary, though Harding “quite appreciated Mr.
Shepstone’s services.”26 Interestingly, despite these reservations on continuing colonial cost,
the officers of the Native Police would receive pensions at half-pay, which James Melville
would continue to collect well into the 1860s.27 The supplies and equipment of the Native
Police were sold off piecemeal, including lockup houses and four pairs of handcuffs for each
location. Ironically, Harding requested two guineas for use by the Pietermaritzburg local
police, which was approved.

The reasons for the dismantling of the Native Police are not overtly complicated. The
perceived cost savings that was initially proposed in its creation did not materialize, and the
need for such a force, despite its successes, was considered widely unnecessary within the
colony government. Also, the arrival of a new lieutenant-governor in Benjamin Pine led to
extensive challenges to many of the systems that had been established by Shepstone, and the
Native Police were just one component of these striking changes and tensions that permeated
the relationship of these two key figures in Natal’s early formation.28 Pine believed that
greater discipline would be needed in the colony before Africans could be trusted with such
important places in the colony’s security. This could be seen in his later actions as governor
of the Gold Coast in 1857, when he argued that the maintenance of law and order required an
armed police force, “under strict military discipline”, and subject to local government control.
This was his response to the Gold Coast’s attempt in 1845 to raise a small police force of 30
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or 50 men to be drilled and disciplined in the same manner as the London Police.29 Though
no action was taken in the Gold Coast, dismissal of an African police system based on the
London model was seemingly related to Pine’s earlier experience in Natal and motivated his
decision to dissolve the Natal Native Police in 1851.

There were colonists who challenged the loss of the Native Police, including Dr.
Samuel Gower, District Surgeon for Pietermaritzburg, who, though reminding critical of the
Native Police, admitted that “After-hand wisdom possesses great advantages for display.”30
Gower argued that although the Native Police were seen at the time of their dismissal as
unpractical, he reminded colonists that “Sepoys [constituted] a large and efficient portion of
the military strength of India [as] the native have merged into soldiers.”31 Dr. Gower likely
altered his opinion after the Indian Rebellion of 1857, but the sentiment remains clear. Even
Thomas Phipson, who argued against arming Africans in levies for the Xhosa War, in a letter
to the editor of the Witness, lamented the many problems within the colony during the early
1850s, including unpaid surveyors, bad roads, and the ill safety of life and property. He even
included the disbanding of the Natal Native Police as a source of the colony’s troubles,
though it was said to be “the least loss certainly of the whole.”32

The termination of the Natal Native Police was an important point in the formation of
Natal’s defensive institutions. Though no evidence of being directly linked, the decline in the
formalized Native Police and the increase in the volunteer movement cannot be ignored.
While cost remained an important component of these decisions, the enthusiasm for white
systems over black presumably had strong relations to the fear of rebellion. But it took time
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for this fear of rebellion to be solidified, and such fear would continue to evolve during this
formative period. It is important to understand the abolishment of the Natal Native Police was
not the end of Africans acting as policemen within the colony of Natal; far from it. The
limitation on manpower and the extended countryside called for an African population that
would take an active role in the defence and maintenance of law and order within the colony.
The continuing criticisms of Africans acting as police and constables, however, would expose
a deeper apprehension and concern regarding Africans in positions of authority that moved
beyond simple costs. The concerns for African instead of European police authority would be
a continuing debate within the colony, and exposed the racialized concerns which saturated
Natal during this formative period. Despite these concerns, the “native policeman” would
remain an important pillar of colonial defence well after the Natal Native Police and continue
to provide avenues for African agency as Natal continued to establish itself as a colonial
state.

“I was Witboy, of the police.”
As has been previously emphasized, African authority within the colonial police was
an amorphous idea, related ostensibly to case by case instances that involved Africans
exerting their authority over the colonial population. Although the traditional image of the
African constable has been that of a subordinate to the white establishment, membership in
the police systems did create some sense of entitlement amongst the African constabulary.
Since the types of recruits typically seen within the Empire were a combination of former
service men and indigenous support, the expectations of the African to rise above their station
was somewhat marginalized. As Anderson and Killingray have emphasized, though
indigenous constables tended to work in areas where the white population would generally
police itself “it was a bold ‘native’ constable indeed who would, of his own initiative, have

204
sought to police a member of the white ruling class.”33 With Natal’s limited resources,
especially in urban areas, it was impossible to have exclusively white forms of police
authority, precluding the white population from “policing itself” in the context of the diverse
and competing interests pervading the developing urban centres of the colony.
Notwithstanding, the situation on the ground in Africa, and especially Natal, would always
call upon a unique approach to the problems of crime and defence within the colony. These
unique situations gave police greater power and authority than their London counterparts,
especially the manner in which race offered different views of the idea of “social morality”
and racial order within the colonial setting.34 Though notions of race and social morality,
especially in regards to clothing and weapons, would typically be used against the indigenous
population, when law was on the side of the African policeman, it was an effective weapon in
his arsenal in the maintenance of colonial authority.

In December of 1860, a case was brought before the court in Pietermaritzburg over
the possession of ten double-barrelled guns, near Fieldeu’s Farm, in Pietermaritzburg. The
defendant was a Joseph Harcourt, charged with the illegal selling of firearms in the colony
without a proper permit. Such cases were typical in Natal for much of this period as the
firearms legislation continued to be changed and altered by the colonial government.35 What
made this case particularly unique, however, was the primary witness against Harcourt: the
African constable Budaza, also known as “Witboy”.36 The incident in question took place on
November 16th at Umkeyi’s kraal outside of Richmond (near the hinterland of the Mlazi
33
This is a larger generalization for the Empire as a whole, but gives credence to the expectation that were held
by many colonial communities. See David Anderson and David Killingray’s “Consent, coercion and colonial
control: policing the empire, 1830-1940” in Anderson and Killingray, Policing the Empire, 7.
34
Anderson and Killingray link these ideas of “social morality” in the Cape Colony to the distribution and
enforcement of liquor laws in the colony, but such morality could also apply to the righteousness of law in any
colonial setting. See Ibid., 10–11.
35

See below.
The trial was reported in the Witness in a series of reports every two days over the last week of December,
1860. Budaza’s account and cross examination take up the majority of the testimony. The Natal Witness,
December 28, 1860.
36

205
location). Budaza arrived at the kraal with the local European constable, William Watson, to
check on the local chief, with Watson leaving shortly thereafter. Budaza, with four other
African constables, heard the sound of dogs barking outside the kraal and upon investigating
the noise, discovered two Africans with bundles in the shape of long sticks. Budaza felt the
bundles and discerned they were guns. When asked by the Africans with the bundles what
authority the constable had, Budaza responded: “The Magistrate’s”. This response did not
seem enough for the Africans, who gained more confidence in the arrival of Harcourt who
had been in another part of the kraal. Harcourt contended that only the magistrate had the
authority to untie the parcels and not some African who claimed to be a constable. In his
report to the court, Budaza stated “he [Harcourt] told me to go and bring the Magistrate to
untie them. I asked him if he did not know that I was Witboy, of the police.”37

This brash statement of authority was a testament to not only Budaza’s confidence in
his position, but also telling of the changes in relationship between race and authority that
existed within Budaza’s worldview. He was supremely confident in his authority as an officer
of the law and almost boastful of the position it supplied him in the colonial system. In his
deposition against Harcourt, Budaza defined himself as “the head of the native police at
Richmond” though such a title did not exist within the colonial system.38 Budaza, in turn, had
presented himself in a greater position than the colonial system would allow. Naturally, there
would be some form of hierarchy that would develop for African constables in the field,
especially in divisions that had no European constable, but Budaza’s actions are more clearly
evident of an attempt to gain greater authority within the colonial system. During cross
examination at the trial, Budaza claimed he “had not the badge [of the constabulary] on my
arm when I asked Mr. Harcourt whether he did not know that I was Witboy, the policeman”
37
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but insisted that Harcourt did know him from seeing him in Richmond and in the kraals
around the area. 39 Even without his official badge of office, Budaza was confident enough in
his position to assert himself against a white man who was well known in the region.

Following Harcourt’s demand, Budaza returned to the hut for “his sticks” (his assegai
and knobkerrie), during which time the assailants fled, including Harcourt. Budaza was able
to quickly catch Harcourt, who was now at the kraal with one of the bundles. Again, the
African constable confronted his suspect and insisted that Harcourt identify the men who
were with him as well as return with him to the European constable. Harcourt initially agreed
and the two made their way to Richmond, with Budaza on foot and Harcourt on horseback.
Harcourt, however, changed his mind and stated his intentions to return to his farm, resulting
in a heated argument between the two. Finally, after threatening to “stab him with my
[Budaza’s] assegai” if he ran away, Harcourt agreed to accompany Budaza to Constable
Watson and then the magistrate. There the bundles were untied, revealing ten guns,
presumably to be sold to the Africans in the regions. At the trail, Harcourt was found guilty
and forced to pay £5 for each of the ten guns in his possession.40 Perhaps most surprisingly,
the primary evidence against Harcourt came from Budaza’s testimony, which was
corroborated by Watson and the magistrate. Though such incidences involving the direct
arrest of a white man by a black man was somewhat uncommon within Natal during this
period, its exceptionalism does not diminish the importance of Budaza’s perceived role
within the colonial hierarchy. The badge (when he wore it) denoted a position of authority
that superseded race, to at least some degree, but more importantly, even without the badge
Budaza insisted on his ability to be known and respected within the region, even when not in
the direct presence of the European administrator who gave him his authority.
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Ironically, there is little notice of the exceptionalism of this particular case in the
press. Budaza was not presented as a unique case, or a “clever African”. This is a marked
difference between another incident in 1871, where an African constable, described
sarcastically as a “Detective”, fell for a piece of subterfuge by a horse thief and was mocked
in the news.41 Committed, intelligent, and successful African police were rarely a feature in
any public account. Budaza could be dismissed as simply a “bold native constable” who
challenged a white man, but it could easily be argued that he instead represents an emerging
sense of realization of authority that some African members of the colonial government
developed during this formative period of Natal, laying the groundwork for future entitlement
and perhaps entrenched collaboration.42 Budaza, while an exceptional case, was inherently
characteristic of the attempts to gain agency, or at the very least authority, within Natal
during its formative period. By emphasising and enforcing his perceived standing within the
colonial state, he better defines the place of some Africans within the making of Natal. The
boldness of this constable, however, especially his threat to stab Harcourt, presumably
triggered in some colonists’ minds the violent potential of armed African police within the
colony.

Violence, Police, and the African
As has already been shown, violence and crime were key features of the colony of
Natal during its formative period. Violence within the urban centres, particularly
Pietermaritzburg, was a constant concern for both European and African police. Particular
threats rested in the matter of armed Africans in the streets. Though possession of the assegai
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(an African spear) had been outlawed since the 1860s, there remained multiple avenues for
individuals to commit violence against one another. Perhaps the most common tool amongst
Africans, and some Europeans, was the knobkerrie, an African walking stick with an enlarged
end either of carved wood or some other material. Calling it a walking stick would perhaps be
misleading. The item was an efficient club that had been used by the Nguni and specifically
Zulu as not only symbols of status, but also as a practical weapon when others were not
available. So effective were these “kerries” that they were typically implemented as the
primary weapon available to “native police”, and were interchangeable with the truncheons
of the European constabulary. The possession of such weapons became so pervasive that in
1862, Lieutenant-Governor John Scott issued a proclamation prohibited the possession of
these “knob-kerries”, or “Amawisa” as they were known in Zulu, in the towns of Natal.43 This
proclamation was part of grander attempt to force Africans into presenting themselves in a
more “civilized manner”, including the requirements to wear trousers (“covering at least from
the waist to the knee”) while in Pietermaritzburg and Durban.44 Africans caught with such
weapons would be forced to pay a fine of up to five shillings and their weapons would be
confiscated. To ensure these weapons would not be found in the townships, Scott intended to
appoint an African or two within each borough “to act as Special Police to enforce obedience
to my [Scott’s] aforesaid order, and for the further purpose of causing the order requiring all
native resorting to, or dwelling in the towns, to wear proper clothing be observed.”45 Though
it remains unclear how independent these “special police” were, it illustrates the growing
concern within the colony of not just the appearance or “social morality” of the African
population within the colony, but also the means of violence they had at their disposal. Such
provisions did not extend beyond the townships, but Scott did recommend that the chiefs of
43
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local kraals, in exercising their own “salutary power”, ensure such recommendations were
followed. Despite Scott’s proclamation, this special police seemed to have little impact on the
presence of such weapons in the townships even into the following decade, as the kerrie
remained a key weapon in the enforcement of crimes by the African police.

On multiple occasions, Africans and Europeans would implement these weapons with
deft precision, sometimes to the detriment of their own success as constables. One such
incident, reported by the Natal Witness, occurred in Pietermaritzburg on September of 1873.
A European and African constable saw an African man in the streets carrying a strange
parcel. On seeing the policemen, the African threw away the parcel he was carrying and ran.
Both the constables gave chase and while the white policeman fell into a sloot, or ditch, at
some point in the pursuit, the African policeman (who remains unnamed in the report)
“courageously followed the runaway, and being fleeter of foot, or in better training, he
overtook his man” on a wooden bridge leading out of town.46 The African turned to the
policeman and stabbed at him with an assegai, which the policeman was able to wrench out
of his grasp. As the African policeman recovered from the struggle, the assailant ran away,
and neither policeman was able to find him along the riverbanks. According to the report in
the Natal Witness, the case was brought before Mr. Bird, the resident magistrate, and the
African constable reported he could have captured the assailant, but “in consequence of one
of his brother policeman having lately been sent three months to prison for using his
knobkerrie, he was afraid to strike with his.”47

The editor of the Witness immediately called into question such limitations, claiming
they impeded the fulfilment of the constabularies’ duties. The question rested on how to teach
the police when to use their deadly knobkerrie: “If the native policemen continued long
46
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enough in the service they would soon learn their duty, but they will not remain at work more
than a few months as we all know to our cost.”48 Such incidents and reservations, whether
they were felt by only the Africans, or the African and European police, illustrate the great
strain that rested on the police forces of Natal. To incentivize the longer service called upon
by the Witness, it was encouraged that the colonial government should approve an increase in
pay for the police from £7 to £8 a month and have an increase in pay for every year a
policeman was in service as well as the possibility for pension. Though this would seem
extraordinary, the Witness encouraged colonists to “look round at the reckless native
population that is being reared amongst us, and ask himself whether a thoroughly efficient
police force will not be required, and whether the employment will not be one of great risk”49
and these extended measures would seem small in comparison.

The brutal use of the knobkerrie was not completely unfounded, at least within
Pietermaritzburg. Earlier in 1873, Frederick Heely was charged with disturbing the peace
over a quarrel centred on the buying of a horse. Heely claimed to have been abused and
beaten by the African police who arrested him with their knobkerries. According to the court
report, though Heely’s complaints related to police brutality were found to be baseless, the
judge of the case suggested that an “inquiry into the conduct of the native police must be
made, as he was of opinion that the knobkerries they are armed with were weapons of a
nature too formidable for the purpose they were employed for.”50 Another example of the
brutality of these weapons was reported in a letter to the editor of the Witness in which the
writer, signing his letter “Viator” described how a group of “native constables” chased after
one of his servants, a young African boy. One constable “finding that he was losing ground,
threw his knobkerrie with such unerring aim as to shatter one of the boy’s ribs”, but was still
48
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unable to prevent the boy’s escape, as the boy was able to reach his master’s home. 51
“Viator” also questioned the use of this weapon by the African police, wondering why “such
men as these should be allowed to use such deadly instruments upon life and limps of people
who are really and truly British subjects?”52

The presence of an armed African with the assegai in the September 1873 incident
prompted even greater concern, and the Witness called for the corporation (the government
body of the town of Pietermaritzburg) to take steps to “check and suppress the evil”.53
Though the assegai and other weapons were outlawed in the townships, stories of violent
murders caused by the weapons remained in the minds of much of the colonial population.
This included a particularly brutal murder of one Zulu by another in Victoria Country in
1872, in which the murderer killed his victim with several strikes from an assegai during a
hunting trip, leaving the body to be found only a short distance away.54 Such instances of
brutality led some in the press to claim that unless more improvements were made “every
man will soon have to carry his revolver, and vigilance committees will have to be formed to
administer justice.”55 Even as late as the dawn of the Anglo-Zulu War, the mayor of
Pietermaritzburg complained to the colonial government about the undesirable nature of
Africans passing through the streets in violation of city bye laws with “any interference with
them by our Police Force would doubtless have resulted in a breach of the peace.”56 Of
course, no major funding increases would take place in the colony, and the only real concerns
for violence within the African population were easily summarized in the report by one
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resident magistrate: “As far as the Native population is concerned an increase of Crime is the
natural effect of continued contact with civilization.”57

Another episode illustrating the effective use of the “kerrie” occurred in June 1878.
An African named Salawani was “wanted” by Durban police for cattle-stealing from Mr.
Field of Pinetown. Near Pietermaritzburg, a group of African police came across him, and
Salawani bolted. Quick to respond, one constable, “in order to stop him, threw his Kerrie,
which, taking him at the back of the neck, knocked him senseless.”58 Though distance is not
revealed, the effectiveness of the African constable use of his primary weapon is on full
display in this account. The damage appeared great, since the constables took Salawani to the
hospital, fearing he was dying. Ironically, Salawani escaped again, but was later captured. No
warrant, however, was officially authorised for his arrest, prompting future inquiry on
whether such violent police action was truly necessary within the colony.

Incidents of “police brutality” would remain a contentious point within the colony for
much of the formative period. In April 1863, a letter to the editor of the Witness from Mr.
Baxter of Pietermaritzburg focused on an incident involving the murder of a neighbour’s
cow. Initial suspicion fell on an African servant of Mr. Baxter. Ultimately, an application for
arrest was drawn up by the borough inspector, resulting in a white constable with a number of
“native police” taking the suspected African into custody. It was eventually revealed that the
neighbour was the one responsible for the death of the cow and charges were dropped, but it
was the capture of the accused servant that was most telling of police treatment of prisoners.
The servant was mobbed by a host of African police officers on Baxter’s property, his clothes
torn, and, according to Baxter, without his intervention the servant “might have been
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strangled”.59 Baxter was particularly shocked at the lack of just cause for such a brutal arrest.
The only evidence rested on a leg of beef hanging in a tree near the African servant’s home,
which was seen as cause enough for his capture (despite later examination revealing that the
cow in question still had all of its legs). Again, the unjust treatment of the African servant and
the brutality of the police were the initial topic of conversation, but Baxter’s complaints
moved toward a criticism of the police institutions in general. His greatest concern was not
for the safety of his African servants, but instead of the overreach of the law in this particular
case: “For, at the will or caprice of any evil-disposed person, your or I might be dragged from
our home and family on any alleged crime to be locked up in a prison until innocence in
proved.”60 England, the source of most legal inspiration, was called upon to be an example,
were a warrant should be issued for the apprehension of any suspects. This letter is almost an
insightful examination of the working of law in the colony, but it quickly becomes a typical
angry letter to the editor. The final cause for such an instance was not a nefarious plan or a
complete disregard for legal practice. Instead, Baxter claims that all “was done to annoy
me.”61 Instead of challenging such order with radical change or reform, Baxter’s solution was
instead to make note of these “annoyances” and create a series of letters to the editor that
would continue as long as the paper gave him space in the columns. 62Again the “brutality of
the police” remained a catalyst for debate and conversation, even if that conversation was
only a vent for colonial frustration.

In another incident in December 1875, seven African police were brought before the
resident magistrate of Pietermaritzburg charged with ill-treatment of a “native prisoner.”63
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Four witnesses, at least two Europeans, reported seeing an African running across the field
during a horse race followed by several Africans of the borough police. After stumbling into
a ditch, the police caught up to him and beat him with their clubs “instead of lifting him
up.”64 Four of the African police were reported to have struck the suspect repeatedly upon the
head with their sticks. According to the report, there was no evidence that the man deserved
arrest, only that he ran away when the police attempted to take him. The magistrate gave the
police credit for continuing to perform a difficult duty, but stated that in cases such as this, “it
was obviously unnecessary for seven of them to take into custody one defenceless man and to
ill treat him when they had him in their charge.”65 The magistrate fined four constables, who
were perceived to be the principal offenders, 15 shillings each, half of the fines to go to the
ill-treated African. As such an incident would give fuel to critics of African police brutality, it
is telling that the report was countered by the Times the following week, reporting that the
assault was actually three on three and not seven on one and that the fault fell not with the
police but the magistrate, as he had not fully investigated the incident, or allowed for the
African police to properly state their case but instead rely on the European witnesses.66

It remains telling that the perception of police violence could also be a continuation of
racial views of the African population. In May 1875, a writer to the Mercury, identifying
himself as “A Victorian”, took exception to an expressed opinion in the Witness lauding the
peaceable demeanour of the African population. “A Victorian” reported that on a mission to
place a beacon near a native location, he and the African constable who accompanied him
were both threatened by Africans “armed with sticks and assegais” warning the two not to
return to that location again.67 Again, our only source for such an incident is an unnamed
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European, whose view of the actions could be called into question. The presence of the
African constable could have either exacerbated the situation, or acted as a deterrent from
further violent action. It was even possible that “A Victorian” could have simply
misinterpreted the armed Africans’ actions.

Though these incidents and figures are only small samples of the police incidents that
took place during this period, they illustrate the complexities and problems faced by the
constabulary organizations of the colony of Natal. In no way were such instances distinctly
the work of Africans. In 1854, a woman named Jane Meek Thompson, described as a
“dissolute character”, was brutally murdered in Pietermaritzburg. Though her body was
mutilated by some type of blade, the cause of death was a heavy stick, similar to the
knobkerrie in the possession of one of the suspects. Though the weapon was claimed to be
used to help defend against dog attacks, its viability as a murder weapon was confirmed by
the court medical expert.68

Though no conviction was made in the case, there was no suspected involvement of
an African, yet the kerrie was the likely tool for murder. When attempting to limit the use of
these weapons, the threat of violence is seen to come largely from the African population.
Even when police brutality is chastised, it was the African, and not the European officer who
received the most criticisms. Nevertheless, when called upon to prevent such violence, it was
68
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the African constable who was the first line of defence in the townships. Violence was a
consistent theme in the lives of the police, from the weaponry to the means of paying for the
constables on the street. There remained, however, a level of uncertainty and apprehension
within the colonial population over the role of the African constabulary in the peace and
safety of the colony. Though some constables knew something about murder, it was the
general violence they faced, and sometimes propagated, in the rural and urban centres of the
colony that truly defined their place in the development of Natal as a colonial state in the
British Empire during the nineteenth century.

Firearms, Regulation, and Weaponry
Armed violence, as has been illustrated, was not a constant feature of Natal during its
formative period, but remained an important component in the gradual evolution of the
colonial state. Despite the increase in armed white European organizations, such as the
volunteer and rifle associations previously discussed, the concept of an armed Africa was
both concerning and dangerous in the eyes of the European population. Refugees, and more
importantly the weapons they brought with them, had been a general concern for the colonies
since the 1850s. In 1857 one of the first large groups of refugees from the Zululand were
permitted to retain possession of their short spears, or assegais. This decision caused
considerable concert over an armed section of the African population present within the
colony, if not within the established locations. These concerns were heightened when reports
soon began to circulate that some of the Africans working for Europeans were fashioning
new weapons in the “kitchens of their employers or the huts where they sleep, at times when
they believe themselves unobserved.”69 Though such actions were apparently linked to
concern over an unfounded invasion of Mpande, these accounts led to the even larger
questions of why the Africans would need to construct such items and what other Africans in
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the locations were doing outside of the constant observation of the Europeans. Even by the
conclusion of the 1850s, this trend toward a greater availability of weaponry was part of a
shift in the economic development of Natal and South Africa as a whole. While items like the
assegai were presumably already in African possession, this economic development of Natal
as a whole allowed for greater access to weaponry on a much larger scale. It was no surprise
then that the most important debates by the 1850s and 1860s regarding security and the
African centred on ownership and control of firearms and the African polices role in
enforcing law associated with said firearms.70

Firearms remained an important component of the African’s perceived used of force
within the colony, and endured as a central point of debate for the majority of the colony’s
formative period.71 Though the limitations to such firearms were not uncommon to all
members of Natal’s community, including the white population, particular care was made to
avoid the mass arming of the African population. Though the “gunpowder bill” of 1857 made
no specific mention of the African population, except in the case of those taking part in the
illegal sale not sanctioned by the government, this omission was quickly rectified.72 By
November 1858, a bill was put forward by the legislative council that would formally prevent
the possession or sale of firearms to the African population of the colony. In essence, it was
completely unlawful for an African to own or possess any guns, pistols, or gunpowder in the
colony without the written permission of the lieutenant-governor.73 Anyone granted
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permission would have their firearms marked and registered by the resident magistrate, and a
record of all firearms in the colony would effectively provide the information necessary to
keep track of said firearms in Natal. Even if an Africa was found in possession of a registered
marked gun, if they themselves were not granted permission by the colonial government, the
firearms would be seized and they would be forced to pay a fine for possession which would
not exceed £50. A similar fine would be imposed to anyone caught selling firearms or
gunpowder either within Natal or to individuals of the colony in adjacent countries. In both
cases, such unlawful property would be seized and become the property of the government of
Natal.

By June 1859, the bill was signed into law by Lieutenant-Governor Scott, with one
minor alteration. To insure the clarity and legal basis for the law, the individuals who would
be primarily responsible for such seizures were outlined. Any member of the magistracy, or
policeman, could “stop any person of the native tribes of this colony, or any native of the
tribes residing in the countries adjacent thereto, who may have in his possession…any gun, or
pistol, or gunpowder, and seize the same, and forthwith carry the offender before the resident
magistrate, or Justice of the Peace, of the county.”74 This change to the bill was illustrative of
the major limitations to such legislation. Without a viable police force that could interact with
the Africans, it would be nearly impossible to successfully implement such laws. Constable
Budaza would have been incapable of easily discovering the firearms confiscated in his case
if he was not able to freely move amongst the African population. With this is mind, firearms
were only one aspect of the complicated nature of the African’s relationship with the law.

Though firearms and gunpowder laws addressed the transport and sale of such items
to the colony as the whole, only the African population was specifically cited as a source of
74
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greater and greater concern. The proliferation of firearms, in what has been called the
“breechloader revolution”, made the ownership of guns far more dangerous, with the shift in
British racial ideology and the mineral revolution all causing a greater call for gun control in
the 1870s.75 In this context, guns became a conduit for imperial control, but also showed the
more dramatic shift to a racialized view of the African from within Natal, and more
importantly, the Empire as a whole.

Race and Police Work
This fear of the “other” from the colonists was counterbalanced by concern for the
safety and stability of the indigenous population of Natal, all fuelled by the growing size of
the African population during this formative period. Many Europeans believed in the
necessity for changes within the colony for not only economic prosperity, but its overall
safety as well. In many ways, the inability to “keep an eye on” the African population in the
locations directly resulted in greater apprehension and an overlaying fear. Not surprisingly,
those threats of violence, or the overlaying of black authority over white, became an issue
with the increased interaction between African police and the European populace.
Consequently, tension over what Africans might do with this newfound authority and the
threats to white rule were a constant theme in the racial interactions within Natal during its
formative period. The power of the African police, as highlighted by Budaza, was evolving
quicker than most in the colonial government were willing to allow.

Such concerns persisted from the establishment of the first African police forces in
1848, yet there remained a continuing concern that African police would simply be
insufficient compared to their white counterparts. Even some members of the legislative
council as early as 1858 made attempts to limit the number of Africans in the constabulary
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and replace them with Europeans, startlingly at the cost of losing a number of resident
magistrates within the colony. One member of the legislative council even contended that the
money “might be laid out to more advantage…and if £800 were expended in payment of a
few white police men, the colony would thereby derive much more benefit from that
arrangement than they now did through the magistracy”.76

The member’s major qualm with the current system, however, did not rest in the lack
of success from the magistracy, but instead on his personal concerns over the use of African
police. He argued that “no white man could see, without pain, a man of his own color
dragged off by native policemen”, leading to an even greater need for more white officers.77
The council member was not alone in his objections. The Colonial Secretary of Natal, David
Erskine, while correcting the council member on his figures (£800 was £700 short of a proper
estimate), agreed that it was inconceivable for an African to be responsible for the
apprehension and arrest of any white colonists. According to Erskine: “white men were
averse to being given in charge of native policemen” and “white people should not deserve to
fall into such hands”.78 The colonial secretary also expressed his disapproval of the principle
of employing Africans as policemen, but could not deny that the employment of Africans to
the police force was an overall benefit to the economy of the colony.

Such debates did not end quickly. The following year, the question of African police
was once again on the agenda, though only on the periphery of a debate regarding extra pay
for the magistracy of Durban, the clerk of the peace, and the constabulary of the colony as a
whole. Again, the economy of cost remained the surface issue underpinned by the racial
apprehension which existed within the legislative council. The members of the council,
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including Theophilus Shepstone, praised the magistrate of Durban for his hard work, alluding
that his salary should be doubled. This originated from the revelation that the “gentleman
actually kept up a valuable corps of native police at his own private expense and had hitherto
only received pay for a clerk.”79 Whereas Shepstone claimed the magistracy of Durban
“expended five times more than he received from government” it such cases, there appeared
to be a discrepancy in these numbers.80

Outside of the county of Pietermaritzburg, the county of Durban received more
funding for police than any other in the colony. Not only did the county have a chief
constable as well as six European constables, but it also included eight “native constables”,
three for the borough and five for the district, at a total cost of £502.81 No doubt an “efficient
officer” as described by Shepstone, it is unclear if these additional African police, alluded to
be at the personal expense of the magistrate, were simply included in the colonial figures, or
if, like Shepstone’s own Mtintandaba, were an additional force at the disposal of the colonial
government not listed on the expenses.82 Whatever the source of these expenses, as the
African police were praised by Shepstone, they were once again made a point of disdain from
other members of the council.

In the same council meeting, the constable at Weenen was also appointed. Such action
was praised as a “most judicious appointment” by the council representative of Weenen and
Speaker for the Legislative Council, Walter Macfarlane.83 Macfarlane also used the
opportunity to express his strong opposition to the employment of Africans exclusively in
constabulary offices, repeating the sentiment of the previous year that there was considerable
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apprehension within the council and the colony as a whole over the “deplorable consequences
which would inevitably ensue through the continuance of the practice of permitting
apprehension of Europeans offenders by Kafirs.”84 The source of this apprehension, though
masked in concerns for proper security, had obvious racial connotations. As representatives
of the people, the opinions of the legislative council are telling to the sentiments of the
colonists as a whole. Though acknowledging their importance and cost saving measures for
the colony, there was an undertone of disdain and complete lack of respect for the African
police. Such enmity was clearly evident in several interacts between the African police and
the white population of the colony during the formative period.

In 1876, Mr. James Manning, a farmer of Berea was fined two shillings and six pence
by the resident magistrate for “interfering with the native police in the execution of their
duty.”85 The incident involved one of Mr. Manning’s African workers, a boy, and an African
constable, who claimed the boy was “insufficiently clad” in conjunction with the town
ordinances of 1862. As soon as the boy saw the constable, he ran away toward his master’s
house, with the constable giving chase. Outside Mr. Manning’s house, the constable overtook
the boy, but was preventing from taking him into custody when Manning pushed the
constable to one side, allowing the boy to get on his master’s private grounds, where
jurisdictional rules prevented the constable from pursuing the boy further. Manning, in his
defence, denied striking the policeman until he came upon Manning’s private property.
Despite the fine, the blatant disregard for the African police authority in this matter, while not
completely unique to the police during the period, does illustrate the strikingly racial divide
which permeated the police work during this period. Such attacks were not limited to the
urban areas as well. In August the same year, Edward Brewer and his brother Henry were

84

Ibid.

85

“Interfering with the Native Police”, The Natal Witness, February 25, 1876.

223
charged with assaulting one of the African police of the Umgeni Division. Again, evidence
was given for the assault and Edward Brewer was fined five shillings.86 These incidents were
not isolated, but did occurred when the African constable was alone and without the support
of his European counterpart. Yet, even when accompanied by European constables, the
African police did not receive universal respect in the colony.

In Durban during March 1876, an African constable attempted to stop a wagon on the
open space at Gardniner Street, as a local ordinance had been passed which forbid such
wagon trains moving through the street. Mr. Benningfield, the head of the convoy, “got on to
the wagon and called out to the constable to ‘suka’ [likely sukkel, or Afrikaans for “plod
along”], saying it was no business of his.”87 He was then informed by Mr. Forester, a
European constable, that it was against the bylaws to have wagons cross the grounds.
Benningfield responded that he saw no notice and immediately ordered his wagons to turn
around, dismissing the constables. Forester took the driver, a boy, into custody as a witness
and reported the event to his Sergeant. Only when the Sergeant arrived did Benningfield
respond “Mr. Sergeant, what is it I can do for you? What is your business?”88 After speaking
to the Sergeant for a half hour, he eventually came to the police station. Though the resident
magistrate did not approve of the method of his arrest, he did fine Benningfield two shillings
six pence for offending against the law. While Benningfield, possible a Afrikaner, was
presumably more dismissive than others of any colonial authority, much less African
authority, the fact that he did not consider stopping his wagons until a European constable
took away his driver and eventually brought in his sergeant is indicative of the manner in
which some colonists dismissed African authority.
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Whatever the personal opinions of Benningfield, there was a clear concession
amongst many colonists that the African police, while a necessary component to some degree
of colonial security, were not completely necessary for the proliferation of law and order
amongst the white population of the colony. Nonetheless, the racial component of these
opinions cannot be ignored. The need for effective police was called upon almost universally,
but the use of African police against the white population was perceived as a slippery slope to
utter anarchy. Similar concerns would present themselves in the use of Africans within the
military organization of the colony as well. When concerning the use of Africans against
other Africans, however, there was no more viable candidate than the African policeman for
the duty of law and order during the formative period of Natal. This became even more viable
as the colony continued to wrestle with the concerns over law, order, and labour.

“Natal Policemen would be very vigilant…”: Labour, Change, and Reform
Before the Langalibalele Incident of 1873, the primary concern of the colonial
population was not necessary an African revolt, but instead creating an answer to the influx
of African labourers in 1872. The usual European reaction to the growing number of
“refugees” for much of Natal’s history was to transform the newly arrived African population
into a labour force. Though new regulations in the late 1850s allowed for the limited use of
refugee labour, but Shepstone’s policy was still seen by some as frustrating a “golden
opportunity.”89 These refugees from the Zululand were perceived to be escaping certain
slaughter in their original homeland, and under the parameters set by the charter of Natal,
would be placed under the authority of the supreme chief, or lieutenant-governor.
Disapproval of the handling of the labour issue resulted in scathing criticism in the press,
particularly the loss of a key opportunity to incorporate the Africans into apprenticeships.
Under the refugee system still in place in 1872, any labourers who did seek employment after
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the one month grace period were not tied exclusively to their employers. Even with the
creation of a service period of three years amongst these refugees, there were limited
regulations to keep Africans within their employment. Employers complained of African
labourers leaving or even “running away” from their place of work, leading to the classic
impression of the lazy African worker, fleeing to his kraal without any “gratitude” for the
opportunities provided by their European employers.90 Ostensibly, this criticism focused on
the locations system for their improper regulation and incapability of limiting the travels of
Africans within the colony.91

The debate over this issue of refugee labour also clearly illustrates some of the
differences between the major newspapers of Natal, specifically the Natal Witness and the
Natal Mercury. The editors of the Natal Witness called such practices of three year
apprenticeship labour contracts by the European population “slavery”, while the editors of the
Mercury declared this simply a product of ignorance.92 Even within the European population,
the proper implementation of indigenous labour was widely debated in the public sphere.
Clear evidence of this exists in the letters to the editor of both the Natal Mercury and the
Natal Witness. Both editors, however, seemed largely concerned with the issue of safety and
security within the colony, which the refugee problem continued to exacerbate.

Ironically, while such debates on labour were a regular refrain for much of the
formative period of Natal, it was the African police who provided a key platform in this
debate. Many in the colony were particularly critical of the African population’s lack of
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enthusiasm for work, whether in the farms or urban centres of the colony. Others, like the
editors of the Witness, disputed such claims as late as 1868. In a response to a letter to the
editor from “Ethiop” claiming that African labourers cannot be relied on, the editor argued
that this was only true in a limited sense. The only limiting factor for African labour was not
the abilities of such workers, but their availability within the colony, harkening back to the
debates over labour in the previous decade. The editor instead argued that the African was the
most reliable and obedient group of men: “Whoever hears of a strike among them, or of a
complaint from their overseers?”93 So great was the African reliability in Natal that the editor
made direct reference to their role in the colony’s police establishments:

Upon whom, except in the towns, do the magistrates rely for the prompt enforcement
of their orders, and the punctual conveyance of their messages to the uttermost ends
of their jurisdiction? Upon whom could they rely more implicitly, or more safety, than
on their natives? Whoever hears of a breach of trust, or want of fidelity, or want of
attention, or miscarriage of any matter entrusted to a native constable or messenger?94

The editors even went as far as to question whether any such complaints had been
found in print or amongst the colonists for the past two decades. Though the use of labour
could be called into question, it was the African police’s role in the preservation of the state
that allowed for the African to exhibit his capacity “to be thoroughly reliable.”95 Though
thoroughly exaggerated and forgetful of many of the incidents reported in their own paper
about “police brutality” in the previous decades, the editors of the Witness’s praise of the
African police force is telling. It illustrates the police’s role as a compliment to the key
components of labour within the colony and provides evidence of the perceptions of the
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African police within Natal’s European community. Such perceived good will was not
universal, or enduring, and would still lead to increased reform as the 1870s approached.

By 1872, concerns over the issue of labour were addressed indirectly by the colonial
government in proposed reform within the police institutions of the colony, particularly the
African police. Such reform came with the passage of Law No.4, “To establish and organized
Police Force” in 1874, but preliminary discussions over these reforms were in a direct
attempt to address this same issue of African labour.96 The influx of new labour within the
colony, largely fuelled by railway and road building projects, led the legislative council to
once again attempt a greater reorganization of the forces of law and order. Because these
projects would result in greater interaction between the whites and blacks of the colony, the
council recommended that certain precautions be made to address “the untrustworthy
conditions the natives of Natal have already reached.”97

These “untrustworthy conditions” could only be rectified by an increase in the police
force within the colony. Because the cost of such a force would only exacerbate the colonial
budget, it was instead advised for a gradual increase in the African police force of the colony
as required. Though not addressing the distrust felt toward the African population, it could
alleviate some concerns for security. The anxiety caused, however, by the African police
institutions had not been alleviated since the late 1850s. The council believed that the
colonial population, particularly the European colonists, had “almost entirely lost their
confidence in the integrity of the Native Policemen, in cases involving danger to any
members of their own tribe, or of any other tribe with which they may have friendly
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relations.”98 The praise from the Witness five years before was gone. It its place was the
worry that African police, when dealt with other Africans, would provide preferential
treatment. Such treatment could conceivably overwhelm the police’s responsibility to fulfil
their duty.

Though some evident of these practices did exist, the council’s alternative was even
more illuminating. The council suggested that when “adding to the number of the Native
Police, it would therefore be well to incorporate a considerable number of men from tribes
beyond the frontier, who have not tribal or sympathies with the natives within the Colony.”99
According to the council’s logic, African policemen from beyond Natal’s borders would be
more vigilant of “foreign” Africans, or at least ones that were not directly know to them. To
make the system more effective, the justice of the peace should be conferred limited
magisterial functions and the “Police should be instructed to obey the orders of these
gentlemen, and to apply to them for advice and assistance.”100 A general increase in the
number of police would be enacted, as “two or three policemen might be permanently
stationed at each residence of each of these gentlemen, and have defined districts over which
their supervisor might extend.”101 By December, there was tentative approval from the
colonial secretary for the increase in funds, beginning with a half-dozen police in
Pietermaritzburg alone. A larger increase, however, would not take place until after the
passage of the Police Law in 1874.102

The legislative council was not the only colonial institution that was making
recommendations for the Native Police Force during November 1872. The Times was also
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promoting reform, but instead of within the current system, the editors advocated the
establishment of a separate Native Police Force with its superintendent and subordinate
officers, costing “thousands a-year”.103 The system appeared to rest on bringing Africans
from the north down to near the coastal area to act as this new police force under the direct
supervision Shepstone, similar to the police force first established in the colony in 1848. The
editors of the Witness, however, attacked such a scheme as “costly and dangerous” for the
colony.104 Instead, the editors of the Witness contended that the system imposed by
Shepstone in the early years of the colony was no longer practical to the changing landscape
of Natal, stating:

Mr. Shepstone believes in his Kafir policemen, and we are not surprised at it. They in
former years, before they had been corrupted with the knowledge how easy and safe it
is to deceive the magistrate and rob the white men, were faithful servants, and obeyed
implicitly whatever instruction they received, and Mr. Shepstone is unwilling to
believe they have changed. That day of Kafir honesty is past.105

The editors suggested a plan similar to that proposed by the legislative council, in which
foreign Africans would be selected as policemen and most effectively stop the “depredation
of Natal’s” Africans and “disclose and combination of plots which may be formed” by the
indigenous population of the colony.106 In essence, they believed foreign Africans would act
as better policemen. In light of this, the editors argued that to discharge one-half of the
African policemen and replacing them with Africans from the north would be all that should
be needed to avoid incurring additional expense of establishing an independent force. Even
such a measure was seen as a stopgap, as it was argued that eventually the foreign Africans
would learn the lessons of Natal’s African population, resulting in another larger police force
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yet again, but such need was presented as many years off. Again, the major criticism of such
a venture involves the overall cost of “£3,500 for a force which would be more expensive,
and quite as unnecessary as were the mounted police.”107 The real threat, as was the case with
the African police of the 1840s, seemed to lie in giving Shepstone too much power within the
colony, implicating that Shepstone would hold “our prosperity in the hollow of his hand, and
can ruin us if he likes” if such a system was implement.108

Ironically, Shepstone had little involvement with such a plan proposed by The Times,
especially when he had his own solutions to the problems with day labourers in
Pietermaritzburg in the summer of 1873. Shepstone’s solutions rested on the greater
organization of labour, including specific job allocation, license fees, and the use of badges.
To aid in enforcing these rules and to insure order in the towns, more funds should be
allocated to the police, with Shepstone recommending as a start that “in each borough there
should be at least ten additional police and an intelligent white constable in special charge of
their particular department, who should, if possible, speak the language.”109 No major shifts
in the location or placement of Africans was suggested, or even the greater consolidation of
power. It is, however, possible that this debate between the Times of Natal and the Witness
stemmed from personal conflict between the papers and not simply an attack on Shepstone.110

Much like the topic of labour, property also continued to influence the debate over
police reform. Even the editors of the Witness were asking in April 1873 “Have we, or have
we not, security for life and property in Natal?” The account of an African attacking a white
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constable appeared to be catalyst for a call for change. The fact that the African was acquitted
for such actions raising the simple question: “How can we expect to get men to serve in a
police force—an office necessary from its very nature attended with more or less of danger—
if the Law, or the administrators of it, refuse to protect them?”111 Multiple instances of such
assault were outlined, including one by an African attacking an “unoffending” soldier of the
75th Regiment and another involved and African being found in the streets at 11:30pm, and
when challenged by the police, “struck the policeman with a violent blow, and ran
away…The police followed him into his master’s kitchen, and there arrested him after a
desperate resistance.”112 Perhaps the most egregious component of this latter case, according
to the editor, is that when brought before the magistrate, the offender was only charged five
shillings for vagrancy. Though the charges were balked at, the source of such a minor charge
was the lack of strong evidence or proper charges against the suspect, combined with a police
force who “found it necessary in self-defence to use freely, in all cases, their truncheons,
since the Law failed to protect them in the discharge of their duty.”113

Interestingly, the editorial moved beyond the simple question of protection of life and
property and more to an overall criticism of the police institutions of the colony as a whole.
Shifting to the county, similar questions were asked by the editor, including why it was the
norm to have around half a dozen African constables per district with “perhaps” a white
constable at their head. With so few men covering such a large territory “teeming with a
savage population, which is daily learning the vices though not virtues of the European”, the
situation of the police force was a recipe for inevitable disaster.114 A main problem rests in
the issue of jurisdiction, in which the police outside the borough cannot compare to those
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within. This reveals one of the major discrepancies that existed within the colony during this
formative period. There remained little communication or collaboration between the urban
and rural members of the police force, as if they were divided by “the invisible boundaries of
the town lands.”115 The editors of the Witness, however, were not content with this divide
between the urban and rural, despite precedence within the rest of the Empire. This continued
the paradox of rural policing within the British Empire for much of the colonial period, in
which the primary area of police responsibility was characterised by a weak police
presence.116

The suggested remedy for these problems for the editors was the creation of a
“detective police” force, not of a military character. This force with a speedy and secret
method of detection could more easily apprehend offenders in a country “not bounded on all
sides by the sea”.117 A quasi-military force like the Irish constabulary would be useless, since
such a system was “very useful in a country where petty thefts are almost unknown while
agrarian outrages are frequent”.118 This regularly-established detective police should
compose of at least 100 men, half black and half white. The lead officer of this force should
report to only the lieutenant-governor, for speed of communication and rapid response, and
be selected for merit and capacity. For this same convenience of communication and to better
consolidate the police force in the colony as a whole, the editors also outlined that the
borough police would also be under this main officer’s management, “which means much
expense would be saved to the Corporation, and we venture to think, adequate protection
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afforded to the inhabitants of the city and the colony generally.”119 The venture would also,
surprisingly, be a cost saving venture for the colony as a whole, as the editors suggested that
the £7,000 annually paid to the volunteers would be used for this new detective force, doing
“more for the country than any military body ever could”.120 The logic was that if such a
detective force existed in the colony, the volunteers would be an unnecessary component to
colonial defence. Since such a plan would be considerably unpopular to the volunteers, the
editors comments on this topic is most revealing to the perceived role of the volunteers versus
police in the colony: “We fear those who have recently purchased their new [Volunteer]
uniforms will find some fault with these remarks, but it is the duty of a journalist to be guided
by the dictates of conscience, and to speak ‘without fear, favour, or prejudice’ when he
considers to be for the good of the country.”121

Though such a plan had no support from the colonial government and was never
pushed beyond the pages of the Witness, the editorial does present a revealing attitude toward
the use of Africans in Natal’s police force. Again, the people of Natal called for hybrid
system in the establishment of defensive institutions within the emerging colonial state. Not
only were Africans encouraged or even assumed to be part of such a dramatically reformed
force, but the fact that they would be included as a “detective force” reveals the perceived
potential of Africans within the police force as a whole. The feasibility of the volunteer
systems being completely removed was implausible at best, and consolidating the borough
police under a single, colony-wide force would be counterintuitive to the greater
independence achieved by the corporations in the 1850s. The scheme, unlike many others
within the colony which called for a larger, more militaristic force, called for greater
precision and preventative measures for future problems within the colony, instead of a force
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of intimidation to the indigenous population of Natal. Nonetheless, the consolidation of
police forces was a growing component of Natal’s perceptions of colonial defence and the
call for reform would be answered by 1874.

One final push for reform was made for the African police before the passage of the
Police Law in 1874. Though the bill for the establishment of an organized police force was
put forward in November 1873, which included provisions related to the African police, other
recommendations were put forward in December legislative council meeting.122 At the
meeting, Charles Barter, council member from Pietermaritzburg, suggested a greater
formalization of the role of the African police officers, especially as it pertained to a new
“Native Police Force”. According Barter, there should be an appointed resident constable
over a certain number of kraals, and that “that such officer should wear a badge, and be paid
for the duties he performs; that he should be armed with assegais and Kerrie only, and be
dressed in a cheap uniform”.123 Such a constable would be required to report to the nearest
police station on every occurrence of local problems, as well as the arrival and departure of
any Africans from within his district. This constable would be held responsible for the
general order of the kraals within his care, as well as act as the catalyst for the introduction of
“Tribal Responsibility”. The proposal seems to have general support and it was calculated
that “180 men would be required. The officers appointed would be required to visit the kraals
more than once or twice a month so that the requisite inspection could easily be carried out
with this number… estimated it would cost about £2,000 a year.”124

Shepstone was not present at this meeting, and there seems to be some reservations
about moving forward without his input. Elements of these proposals, however, were clearly
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seen in the new police law of 1874. The total number of non-white police (“Natives of Africa
or India”) would be 150. Under the law, the lieutenant-governor had the authority to “appoint
such number of resident detective native constable as he may deem necessary, and may
assign to each such stable a certain number of native kraals for supervision.”125 This special
constable would also be required to report to not only the nearest police station, but also to
the resident magistrate, “all occurrences, as well as all arrival in and departures of Natives
from his district” as well as enforce orderly behaviour amongst the Africans under his
supervision.126 Though not an independent police force, this semiautonomous status was a
general boon to the advocates of a more direct hand in the African community and law. The
new organization did not fundamentally alter the relationship between Shepstone and his
magistrates, as well as the administration of law within the colony, but did lay the
groundwork for future changes and codification of African law, culminating in the 1878 Code
of Native Law which fundamentally changed the power structure of Natal’s legal and
political order which had existed for decade before. Again, the African becomes a
representative of the shifting political and legal landscape within the colony of Natal, and the
police’s role in that shift was fundamentally impacted by the Africans who attempted to
maintain such changes within Natal’s evolving landscape. Consolidation and reform would
be the theme for the continuing decades, and in July 1894, the Natal Mounted Police, Native
Magisterial Police, Railway and Water Police, European constables, messengers at
magistracies, gaolers, warders and convict guards were all amalgamated into one force under
the title “Natal Police”. Complete consolidation of the police forces, however, would remain
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elusive, as Pietermaritzburg, Durban, Newcastle, and Ladysmith retained separate police
forces for the remainder of the decade.127

Pay, Compensation, and Organization
Even with the call for reform from many elements of Natal, the African police
remained the most viable option for the colonial government. Despite the attempts and
criticisms of reform in the urban areas of the colony, the rural segments of the police force,
those not under the direct control of Shepstone, were under the prime jurisdiction of the local
resident magistrates.128 It was their responsibility to insure payment and proper
implementation of law and order within their particular districts. However, in further
examination of these districts and divisions, there are glaring disparities in the pay,
composition, and organization of the African police. Once again, the makeup of the African
police illustrated the limitations imposed on the colonial defensive structures.

As has been previous alluded to, in most cases rural districts contained only a handful
of constables and were typically almost complete composed of African constables, usually
with only one European constable. In the case of the Tugela Division in Victoria County,
from the district’s creation in 1855 to 1863, there were only “native constables” responsible
for the maintenance of law and order. The number fluctuated from four in 1855 to seven in
1861, until the appointment of one European constable along with eight African constables in
1863.129 This is perhaps most shocking, considering the Tugela District’s population in 1859
was 14,304 with 354 of that number Europeans.130 A ratio of over 2,000 people per constable
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in that district alone only begins to illustrate the staggering odds that were against this
constabulary force.131

It would be no surprise that by 1875, several districts were demanding more African
police to assist in the massive disparity between the police and the growing population. In
many cases, applications were ignored or simply not given the amount requested. In April
1875, Captain Allison, the Administrator of Native Law at Oliver’s Hoek, applied for extra
funding for 14 “native police”.132 In Victoria County, Oliver’s Hoek remained an important
throughway for the Drakensberg Mountains and the key point of security for the Tugela
Division. Between 1861 and 1876, Victoria County’s population (which included Tugela)
ballooned from 18,762 to 56,117. The vast majority of this increase was within the African
population.133 With that in mind, it seemed obvious that six police which had been provided
were simply not enough for the area. Although additional funding had previous been
provided under “special payments”, Captain Allison insisted that a more permanent fixture to
the district’s police force would be required “until such time as the force is reduced.”134 No
timetable for such reduction was provided, and the division would continue to have fourteen
African constables well after the Anglo-Zulu War.

With such a high demand of African police during the 1870s, it was no surprise that
retention and compensation quickly became relevant topics for the magistracies who
administered these constables. Because of the financial constraints of the colony, salary was
not always easily increased. In the Inanda Division, also in Victoria County, the resident
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magistrate saw the necessity for a re-examination of payment in the African constabulary.
Arguing that at one time the African police were once paid £15 without rations, the
magistrate reasoned that their pay should not be increased to 20 pounds, including their
rations, as he claimed had been done the year before.135 Instead, the magistrate argued that
such a system should only be implemented for the Indian, or “Coolie” constables within the
district, who were described to be “dissatisfied considering they are less liberally treated”.136
Interestingly, the magistrates estimates and those in the government Blue Books simply do
not align. The magistrate argued that Indian constables receive £40 without rations, versus
the £24 in the government estimates. Even more striking, African pay is only £12, and at no
point before 1875 reached the £20 alluded to by the magistrate.137 Only £129 11s. 2d. were
allocated to clothing and rations for the police force, which could be part of the included
“with rations” compensation. Again the magistrate for Inanda was not even considering
raising the pay of the African police, but instead was concerned for how such pay methods
would contend with the Indian constables, who were a considerable minority to their African
counterparts in most of the districts of the colony.

Even by 1878, when the members of the mounted police received a pay raise, Major
Dartnell requested from the colonial government clarification of the issue of raising African
pay, assumedly in the mounted police but presumably related to the African constabulary as a
whole.138 Dartnell pointed out that though the scale of pay had been approved by the
lieutenant-governor at the first formation of the force, “the rates have never been specified in
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the Estimates”.139 Dartnell was making specific reference to the Africans within the Mounted
Police force, whose numbers were continuing to decline by the conclusion of the 1870s. The
arguments for such pay changes were considerably revealing to the view of African police
pay in the colony as a whole. Dartnell once again made reference to the £20 per diem, but
there was a general confusion about who was largely responsible for such decisions. One
magistrate argued to the colonial secretary that while the increase to mounted police pay had
been approved in June 1877 by the legislative council, it was only under the approval of the
executive and legislative authority that “Native compensation” could be increased. This
perpetual round robin of responsible for the African police force is indicative of a system
reliant on the African police, but without proper oversight or direction. Even when clarified
by the colonial government, the auditor was still left unsure of who had the proper authority
and what actions would follow in such a case. Despite all of this debate, it does not appear
that African police pay, rations, or tender were significantly increased.

No surprise, the colonial government was always seeking the lowest tender possible,
and would consistently look for the cheapest option when supplying their African police. In
most cases, however, the cost would be transferred to the police and be taken out of their
related per diem to assist in absorbing the colonial government’s cost.140 This explains why
throughout the 1870s, African police pay would remain stagnant at £12 for the majority of the
rural constabulary. Ironically, it was the Inunda division which first made a major increase in
pay, from £12 to £24, in 1880. Even with the outbreak of the Anglo-Zulu War, pay for
African constables would remain at £12 for the majority of the colony, the two exceptions
being Inunda and Durban County, who paid some of their constables £14.141 Again, this lack
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of proper compensation or increase in pay was indicative of a racialized system of control,
which the African willingly participate in, ostensibly due to the opportunities in being part of
the colonial government, as opposed to a labourer or servant for the rest of the colonial
population. While disparities in pay are a commonalty in the use of indigenous troops, the
glaring omissions for the improvement of the African police in the rural regions remain
indicative of Natal’s continued attempts to grasp with the issues of cost and control during
the formative period.

“A Guard, not a Constable”
The use of the African police in the safety and security of the colony of Natal was the
product of cost saving measures. This was even more evident in the versatility the African
police show within Natal’s defensive institions. Despite their importance to the maintenance
of law and order within the colony of Natal, for many in the colony the African police were
seen as little more than a glorified guard for the colonial gaol systems. The evolution of the
gaol system within the colony of Natal has already been partially discussed, yet for the
majority of the rural regions of the colony of Natal, few districts or counties had any officials
working for the prison beyond one gaoler. This meant that the apprehension and guarding of
these prisoners within each district fell to the constabulary, particularly the African
constabulary. As early as 1852, African police were responsible for the apprehension and
guarding of prisoners within Natal penal system. Two particular cases from Ladysmith and
Weenen are most revealing to this duel role encompassed by the African police.

In August 1852, the resident magistrate of the Klip River Division at Ladysmith,
Captain Johan Herman Marinas Struben, expressed his growing concerns to the colonial
government of the number of prisoners that were building up in his district. Because of the
lack of a gaol, the necessity was increasing “daily” since a number of white and black
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prisoners were already in the custody of the police “who require proper supervision.”142 This
proper supervision, in Struben’s mind, was ostensibly due to the Klip River only having two
European constables and eight African constables. Struben’s primary concern was not the
lack of proper guards or facilities, but instead a lack of direction from the colonial
government. Though Struben was well versed traveller of the world, and a native of Holland,
he had no experience in South Africa, and had only been magistrate since 1850.143 Struben
was forwarded a copy of the Pietermaritzburg prison rules by the colonial government, but
the apprehensions Struben exhibits in his letter was not alleviated by the African constables at
his disposal, despite their success in apprehending 36 prisoners over the course of the year in
1852. The police were only able to hold six prisoners in their single makeshift cell and only
held 12 prisoners at one time during the course of the year.144 Without a proper gaol,
however, escapes were not unheard of. The same month Struben extended his concerns to the
colonial government, a person of interest named “Umbelekela” escaped custody as the
African police attempted to capture another suspect, “Induvaan”.145 Since “Umbelekela” had
already provided a statement in April related to a murder taking place beyond the colony, his
escape was not seen as a major catastrophe, but instead the failure of the African constabulary
to capture “Induvaan” was emphasized. The lack of a gaol, however, remained a glaring issue
for Ladysmith.

Not all magistrates were content with their situation regarding prisoners and gaols. In
Weenen, the magistracy also lacked a gaol, meaning alternatives to prisons needed to be
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considered. By 1852, Weenen, which had no capacity or records for prisoners, was a newly
declared district and did not have its own constabulary until 1854. In light of this, when a
white prisoner was being held for selling guns to the African population, Arthur Hawkins,
Assistant Resident Magistrate at Weenen, having “no white constable and no place of
confinement” saw it necessary to send the prisoner to Pietermaritzburg in the “charge of
[Hawkin’s] native policeman.”146 Again, the lack of manpower and resources forced the
African police to perform the service of transporting prisoners throughout the colony. Not
surprisingly, even as the colonial government and police institutions improved over the next
decade, it remained more and more difficult to differentiate these functions of the African
constabulary with those of the prison system.

Prisoner escapes did not decline over the ensuing decades. Despite an increase in the
number of gaols, the overall number of constables did not significantly increase and new
districts were slow to establish new gaols. Though there was a greater sense of responsibility
for such actions from within the colony, prisoner escapes, especially by Africans, were
looked on as a combined problem with the constabulary and the prison institutions. Such was
the case in the Newcastle Division. Established in 1864, the Newcastle Division was one of
the northern most districts in the colony. Isolated and with a large Afrikaner population, it
was the source of contention for parts of the colonial period.147 It was no surprise than that
the division experience problems with prisoner escapes during its early years in the 1860s. In
June 1867, an African prisoner escaped while in the custody of two African police. The
police, instead of holding the prisoner at the magistrates office, decided to rest in a local kraal
five miles from the office with the intention of arriving the next day. During the evening the
prisoner somehow removed his handcuffs, successfully knocked out one of the police “with
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an iron bar” in the scuffle, and made his escape.148 The magistrate reported that he had a
number of police still looking for the escapee, but was doubtful of the prisoner’s recapture.
Interestingly, the magistrate’s first comment on the cause was not the failures of the African
police but instead a reminder that he had a “total absence of all means of securing
criminals.”149 Had there been a gaol, the magistrate believed that in all probability the
prisoner would not have escaped “as the constables in charge would have lodged [the
prisoner] safely instead of remain in at the huts.”150 Until a gaol was constructed, the
magistrate believed that escapes would continue to occur, especially for those of “very bad
character”.151 The fault did not lie with the African police, as it was seen as “improbable to
watch prisoners night and day for a length of time.”152 This was not only the case for African
prisoners. Even with white prisoners, the difficulty of holding them was even greater. But this
was, in the magistrate’s opinion, because he possessed only one white constable “who had
numerous duties to perform.”153

Despite the main complaint being the lack of a gaol from the magistrate, the response
from the colonial office was not a promise of more funding, a new gaol, or even another
European constable. Instead, the lieutenant-governor, after being informed of the escape,
asked for more details on the two African constables responsible for the escape and “whether
the constables have been dismissed or otherwise punished.”154 Whereas promises for
additional funding would be unexpected, the government’s response to immediately blame
the African constables is telling to the role of Africans within the police hierarchy. The
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magistrate at Newcastle believed the problem of escaping prisoners to be linked to the lack of
gaols, yet he admitted only using his white constable to escort white constables. The
Newcastle Division had six African constables to the one European constable. With a
population of 8,929, this illustrated a lack of proper resource implementation, considering the
police to population disparity was less extreme compared to the Inunda Division as discussed
above.155 In the end, the tactic was not unique to the colony as a whole, as specific reference
was usually made to the attorney general of the escort of European prisoners by European
constables.156 But as late as 1872, Newcastle remained gaol-less, and the African constables
presumably continued to either hold prisoners themselves, or transport them to the county
gaol in the Klip River division. In larger districts like Durban and Pietermaritzburg, which
had gaols with sizable staffs, there were clear distinctions between guard and constable. In a
telegraph the same year as the Newcastle incident, the clerk of peace for Durban corrected the
attorney general at Pietermaritzburg, informing him that a Mr. Johnson was “only one of the
guards appointed over the convicts and not a constable.”157 Such distinctions were rarely
necessary in the more rural regions of Natal.

The constabulary, especially in districts without an abundant source of manpower,
were used for actions beyond the simple guarding of prisoners. Tax collection, though largely
in the purview of the resident magistrate, could and would be transferred to the African
constabulary when necessary. Even by 1876, the colonial government clarified that in the
case of transporting the “Specie” or hard money from the magistrate’s office to the Treasurer
of the Colony, it must be brought by “European or Native Constables…by public
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conveyance, special vehicle, or pack horse.”158 There remained some apprehension about the
transport of such sums by the African police from those within the colonial government. In
the debate over the workings of the language of the referendum the Treasurer’s concern was
that in cases of the sum exceeding £200, the package should be taken by two African
policemen, seemingly due to anxieties over the temptation of such a large sum.159 In the final
document, however, there was no special mention of the sum or number of Africans
necessary for the transport of the “specie”. It was seen as unnecessary by the colonial
secretary. This does not reveal an overabundance of trust for the African population, but
instead perhaps a view of necessity in the colonial documents, or perhaps even outright
languor. When facts and information could be perceived as critical, as with the escape of a
convict, the opinion or the reporting of the African police or guards were almost insignificant.
Such was the case in 1872 when the resident magistrate of Durban saw it unnecessary to take
the deposition of a “native guard” who had secured the prisoner.160 While the reasoning
behind such an omission rested on the fact that the prisoner had already admitted to the
escape, even the clerk to the resident magistrate felt that it might be necessary to conduct the
interview, though he “did not push the point.”161 The word of the African was not dismissed,
but simply seen as unnecessary.

This lack of inquiry was not always the case, as more in depth investigations into
prison escapes did exist in the latter formative period of the colony of Natal. One particular
case in the Upper Tugela Division even made a more balanced attempt to cast blame on either
the European or African constables. In July 1876, 12 men were arrested and sentenced to two
months imprisonment for living amongst the AmaNgwani (Swazi or Ngwani) without passes
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or having property reported themselves the chief or local magistrate.162 On August 21st, the
prisoners broke out of the gaol hut, seized a number of knobkerries and sticks and fled from
the district, with nine of the prisoners successfully escaping. Though such escapes were
typical within the colony, even in the case of magistracies with access to a gaol, the colonial
government and magistrate’s response to the incident is perhaps most telling to the internal
dynamics of the police institutions within the colony.

All three African police, the European constable and gaoler William Wardell, and the
resident magistrate gave depositions to the incident. The most descriptive statements were
provided by the three African constables, who described the escape taking place shortly after
supper was served, with the prisoners going directly for the hut that housed the weapons,
under the false claim they were look for “dukku” (described as “native tobacco”). Two of the
constables gave pursuit, while another constable attempted to block their path. Interestingly,
though armed with assegais, Mahmpo, one of the African constables, initially tried to hold
the escaping prisoners off with his knobkerrie, until it was taken from him and he was forced
to use his assegai as he was surrounded and “fought for [his] life.”163 Mahmpo wounded one
prisoner, but was lucky to survive the encounter with the now armed escapees. Constable
Wardell did not take part in the scuffle, but did claim to raise the initial alarm that the
prisoners were attempting to escape. Oddly, it was the resident magistrate who gave the order
for one of the police, Bambini, to “alarm the people of the kraals” of the escape and seek
assistance in recapturing the prisoners. Wardell contended that he only remained behind to
look after the five remaining prisoners.164 Another prisoner was captured shortly after the
escape, but the remaining nine were not immediately found. At the time of the magistrates
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report, there was full confidence they would be captured closer to Ladysmith with the
assistance of the secretary of native affairs (likely part of Shepstone’s African units who were
called upon for such occasions). Though the situation was more violent than many other
prison breaks, the questions from the colonial government quickly turned to blame. The
government wanted clear answers from Allison on whether the European or African
constables were to blame and why such a failure of security took place.

Allison and the constables’ response were remarkably reserved. Allison
acknowledged that only three of six African constables were present the night of the escape.
One had been granted permission to take a leave of absence to his kraal, but the other two
were on duty, one in pursuit of a cattle thief and the other on “border work” delivering a
message to a local chief requiring him to report to the magistrate. Since he considered the
gaol well secure with the four remaining constables, Allison doubted that the escape was due
to “any lack of vigilance on the part of either the white constable or the native police.”165
Even Constable Wardell stated that he “didn’t think the Native Police were to blame.”166
Constable Baunlu, who pursued one of the prisoners to a nearby kraal and struck him with his
knobkerrie, casts no blame at all, and only systematically reported his part in the prison
break, telling that though he left the man he struck prostrate on the ground, he “did not see
this man again.”167 The fact that none of the individuals involved, either white or black, were
willing to cast blame on their fellow constables is revealing to the deeper dynamics that
existed in rural regions of the colony. There appears a greater sense of comradery within
these rural constabularies, possibly due to the level of isolation experienced by the European
members of the police. When there was only one European constable in a county, they
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became more reliant on their African colleagues, creating a possibly less racialized working
dynamic. Though the colonial government sought blame, and requested further information
on why the white constable did not take part in the pursuit, the matter was eventually put to
rest by both the lieutenant-governor’s office and the attorney general. Much like the
Newcastle escape of 1867, the seeking of blame seemed to be largely a formality, as there
was every indication that the escapees would eventually be recaptured, and serve the
remainder of their sentence. Though the incident was dramatic, it was the outcome of an
overstretched police force dealing with a major influx of prisoners. Even Allison contended
in his initial report that the gaol typically housed only six to eight prisoners versus the 18 at
the time of the escape and that it was this influx and not “the insufficient [number of] guards
[which] led to this most impudent and defiant act.”168

What these incidents and regulations indicate is that the role of the African
constabulary, though important, was largely amorphous in many parts of the colony of Natal
during the formative period. Limitation to resources and the police force as a whole
contributed to escapes and concerns over the transport of money, supplies, and prisoners.
Because they were typically the only manpower available, the African police were forced to
perform actions that were beyond their purview. But because they acted as an important and
competent component in Natal’s colonial defence, they continued to be called upon to
perform such services, whether appreciated by the colonial government or not. The issue of
blame for escapes and concerns for theft were present, yet it is perhaps most impressive that
those who worked closest with the African police were usually the ones to defend their
positions in the colony and deflect blame when instances of disrepute took place.
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A Model for the Future
With the changes in policy and formation of the police in the 1870s, the African
constabulary and police forces solidified their role within Natal’s defensive structures.
Though organized African police forces in Natal did not take an active role in the battles of
the Anglo-Zulu War, it is very possible that members of the constabulary were recruited into
the Natal Native Contingent or other levy organizations during the war.169 Though their
contribution to colonial defence during the war was marginal, the African police did provide
the groundwork for later inspiration within and beyond the colony of Natal.

Perhaps because of the success of the African police forces in the colony, the good
showing of the mounted police, or the recent influences created by Shepstone during
annexation, the Transvaal sought assistance in the formation of their own “native police
force” in the summer of 1878. Lieutenant Lleweleyn H. Lloyd of the Transvaal Native Police
contacted the colonial secretary of Natal in June about the possibility of “obtaining
permission to recruit men from this Colony [Natal] for the Transvaal Native Police.”170
Presumably the success of the Natal African police institutions was a factor in Lieutenant
Lloyd’s request, but he was also limited in his available resources and viewed the Africans
who had lived under British rule for several decades to be more probable candidates for
police work than those who had lived under Afrikaner rule.

The point of contention for the executive council, however, was the concern that such
a corps would be raised as “an armed military force to be used in cooperation with European
troops, or otherwise in active service.”171 Because of the military concerns within the
Transvaal and the possible impending conflict between the Afrikaner, Zulu, and British, this
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was a probable conclusion. The lieutenant-governor had not objections to the Africans being
“engaged in purely police purposes”, but quested the viability of an armed African force
within the Transvaal.172 Though it remained unlikely that Africans were recruited for the
Transvaal Native Police, considering the outbreak of war was only two years off and the
growing tension over the Transvaal border and the Zululand continued to be a growing
concern, the fact that Natal was requested to provide Africans for the police force was
particularly telling. Though the racial tension created by Africans arresting Europeans would
be even greater in the Transvaal, the fact that the indigenous Africans of Natal were
considered a viable source of police labour illustrates the growing or at least existing
reputation of African service.173

African participation in the Natal police institutions did not dissipate following the
Anglo-Zulu War. In fact, by August of 1882, there was a greater formalization of the African
police after the formation of the “Select Committee appointed to report upon the question of
the Formation of a Native Police Force”. The committee concluded that it would be
beneficial for the colony as a whole to form a “Native Police Force of 200 men…To act as a
Police within the Colony, for patrolling the country, visiting farms, estates, and Native
locations…preserving the peace…prevention and detection of crime, and of apprehending
criminals and offenders and suspected persons.”174 The force would be raised from volunteers
and “not by the exercise of direct or indirect pressure upon Native chiefs to obtain men.”175 In
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light of this, no more than four or five men from each “tribe” were permitted to enlist. In turn,
the Native Police would have only white officers, who were primarily responsible for the
discipline and application of law within the African forces. The officers were also
recommended not to use their horses when drilling the police and were given free rein to
search all kraals within the colony. A strong departure from previous precedence, the
dwindling influence of Shepstone and his system of influence over the chiefs of the colony
was finally having an impact on policy, Africans were sought who had only one loyalty; to
the colonial government. An emphasis on a station system, similar to some extent to the
traditional European police posts, was established, in which a station would consist of two
huts for the men, one hut for the Europeans, one hut for horse and stores each, and all
surrounded by a wall. It was made clear that in not case would station be left without at least
one man, despite the demand for police and officers to travel extensively throughout the
country.

Even with these numerous changes and reforms which had been called upon by the
colonial government and European population, many of the fundamental flaws within the
African police systems would endure. There remained a divide between the urban and rural
segments of the colony, as the police force was expressly “not raised for service in
towns…[and] no station ought to be place in or within seven miles of a town or village; and if
any member of the Force resorts to a town or a village, he should report is reason for doing
so.”176 Again, the “the invisible boundaries of the town lands” persisted, preventing the full
implementation of the police force in the colony as a whole and demonstrated the continued
express purpose of the Native Police in the administration of law in the predominantly
African rural population.177 The continued division between rural and urban was fuelled by
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the growth of the white population, but also the racial division of the colony as a whole. The
attempt to “whiten” the police force in the towns was a continuing response to European fears
of the African within Natal. This continued racial view was perhaps the most striking when
examining the continued discrepancies in pay that existed in this new police.

Despite the colonial government investment of £6,500 to this new police force, the
annual pay for the African police remained only £12. Though rations and uniforms were
included in addition to this pay, there remained a massive discrepancy between the pay of
Africans and their white counterparts. To make these matters even worse, five officers of this
force earned an average of £266, with the captain earning £400 alone.178 Though not
mentioned in the yearly defence report for 1883, it is telling that one of the major concerns
for defence committee was that the mounted police force’s pay was “much below the pay and
allowances to officers and men of the following Corps: the Royal Irish Constabulary, the
New South Wales Police Force, the New Zealand Armed Constabulary, and the South
Australian Police.”179 This concern for the police force presumably only encompassed the
white members, as the police still retained some Africans in their ranks by 1883. In the grand
scheme of colonial defence, the nearly unchanged pay for the African police over a decade
and a half remains telling of the perception of African versus European police in the safety
and security of Natal.

Conclusion
Despite these contradictions, reforms, and ignorance of past problems, the African
police institutions within the colony of Natal retained an important place in the development
of Natal’s structures of colonial defence during its formative period. The organization,
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implementation, and response to violence which permeated the African constabulary acted as
an important pillar in understanding the fluid development of colonial Natal. Sadly, though
many examples of African agency can be found during this period, there remain too few
examples of the African voice in the development of Natal’s police institutions. Though the
role of Africans in police institutions remains a growing area of research, developing a deeper
understanding of African viewpoints and perceptions continues to elude us.180

Practically, there were many reasons for using African police. Given the racial
hierarchy in Natal, they were cheaper in terms of salary and uniforms. Also, they knew the
local Nguni languages and could easily move amongst the African community. This was
difficult for most Europeans as they were in a minority and thus could never completely
dominate the rural police. The use of Africans as colonial police, nevertheless, moved beyond
simple convenience, to instead address a deeper psychological response to Empire by the
British. Yet their place within Natal’s colonial structures remains somewhat amorphous.
Though not part of Shepstone’s direct military systems (see next chapter), and presented as
peripheral to the support of the white constabulary, or dismissed outright in the formation of
new systems like the Natal Mounted Police, the African constabulary remained a consistent,
enduring, and overall successful element of the defensive structures of Natal’s formative
period.
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Chapter Six: African Military Units
Introduction
In October 1855, there was a panic within the colony of Natal over the possible
invasion of the Zulu King Mpande. Like previous panics, an invasion from Mpande never
materialized, despite considerable apprehension from within the colonial population. Even
without any real threat, the population of Natal, both white and black, remained fearful of
impending invasions. As has already been discussed, such apprehension and fear was nothing
new, but a typical feature of the formative period of the colony. Advocates for changes to the
military system, including contributors to the Natal Mercury like “One of the People”,
envisioned the creation of guerrilla or volunteer corps composed of men who understood the
territory of the colony, as well as the tactics and traditions of the indigenous African groups,
without being “tied down by precedent or the rules of inapplicable English military tactics.”1
The writers of such editorials, however, touted the necessity of such white, European
organizations in light of a growing fear of the African population. As has been previously
illustrated, the colony focused on the creation of volunteer corps and European mounted
police as a response to several of these concerns. In many cases, these advocates largely
neglected or marginalized the presence of the indigenous population and their role in the
defence of the colony. Much like the previous chapter on African police, this chapter will
address the impact of indigenous military units on the security and organization of the British
colony of Natal during its formative period. The importance of these indigenous military
units on the safety and security of the colony is undeniable in the broader examination of
Natal’s history, yet questions remain on how these units where organized within the colonial
system, what were their origins in the formation of the colony, how were they perceived by
1
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European colonists, and in what manner did these military institutions change during this
period.

Indigenous involvement in the security of the colony, as was the case of the volunteer
corps, advances the theory of a type of militarization of society that took place in Natal
during this period. More importantly, it also provides a viable platform for incorporating
African agency into the administration and creation of Natal as a colonial state. The use of
African military units, however, would continue to inspire the same debates, reforms, and
missteps as their counterparts in the other defensive institutions of Natal. Yet, it can be
argued that these African military units were possibly the most successful, enduring element
of colonial security during Natal’s formative period.

Although the African police institutions of the Natal were important to the scope of
colonial defence, it was the African military institutions that were established within the
colony that facilitated the overall security and peace that was praised by Shepstone in his
later years.2 By the conclusion of Natal’s formative period, African military institutions were
nothing new in the British Empire. Even V.G. Kiernan made the astute observation that the
“prize of empire has always been a supply of colonial soldiery” which would typically be
cheaper and, in the British mind, drawn upon the warlike elements of some indigenous
societies.3 Nevertheless, this dissertation’s analysis of the role of colonial troops within the
formation of empire must challenge existing perceptions of colonial troops that have
entrenched themselves within some aspects of the historiography. Though some would argue
“the African soldier was proud to serve” within the Empire, this willingness to serve by the
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colonized people has been somewhat exaggerated.4 Many of these perceptions were
formulated from the observations and writings of former British officers that has permeated
the early historiography of the colonial troops. This includes one British Army officer’s
observation that: “For drilling and parade the native mind shows great keenness and
aptitude…Smart and well-disciplined they are most punctilious in any military service.”5
These arguments also espoused the benefits of colonial rule, especially when some
maintained that army service would possibly have a “detribalising influence” and the tactics
of divide and rule “might be practised between army and people, as well as between soldier
and soldier” with examples including the West African Regiments in Freetown, Berbers
against Arabs in Morocco, or Fula tribesmen against rebels in Guinea.6

These observations, however, do nothing to assist in creating a greater understanding
of the role of Africans within colonial rule. Broadly speaking, the first institutions to be
established in a colonial territory were usually a “uniformed, armed, and disciplined force of
soldiers”, with Africa and particularly Natal being no exception.7 This is predominantly why
the concerns for security were so important to the early colonial settlers of Natal. A military
presence was critical to the creation of this sense of security in the colony. Imperial troops,
though stationed at Ft. Napier and a legitimate representation of colonial authority, were only
a final measure in the prevention of the colony from being taken over by an outside,
aggressive force, whether the Zulu Kingdom, the Orange Free State or South African
Republic, the Xhosa forces in Kaffraria, or, less likely, the encroachment of imperial rivals.
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Despite all this, Britain needed African troops in some form to defend its territory, as was the
case within much of the Empire.

As Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper observed, colonial control “depends on
soldiers who were simultaneously coerced and coercing, who enforced the will of the elite yet
made demands themselves.”8 This was true in the colonial police and formalized military
institutions that existed across the Empire. But more important, as was the case in Natal,
colonial military service, to be properly understood, must be examined beyond a simple
enthusiasm to serve, but instead take into account the diverse social context of the African
experience.9 Parsons rightly argues that much of the research dealing with British colonial
Africa has been unconsciously influenced by the bias of mistaking the discipline of African
troops for either loyalty or collaboration. Instead, African troops should be examined in the
same complexity as their white counterparts, who were divided by ethnicity, education,
military specialization, and territorial origin. Though Kiernan’s argument that “Native forces”
could also be used for tasks that Europeans “might feel squeamish about”, the use of Africans
in segments of Natal’s military system was largely out of necessity and not convenience. The
white manpower within the Colony was simply incapable of providing the adequate forces
necessary to oversee the massive colonial population, both white and black.10

Unfortunately, unlike Parsons’ account of the KAR or Stapleton’s examination of the
Rhodesian African soldiers, the nineteenth century does not provide nearly enough context
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for the African soldier.11 The African military units of Natal only exist in the periphery of
government documents, and are either ignored, or the product of criticism within the press.
When suggestions for greater formalization were put forward, they were denied, ignored, or
outright dismissed. This is particularly why this history does not fall within the main
categories of military histories in Africa outlined by Killingray.12 Because of this, it is hard to
define the Africans within Natal’s defensive institutions as part of the “labor aristocracy” that
emerged within colonial society during the period of European rule.13 Because the military
organizations were a part of the already formalized African military systems, they were not
required to be a “Europeanized” component of Natal’s system of colonial defence.

It should be remembered that African perceptions of military service throughout the
Empire were determined largely by the degree to which military institutions transformed and
reordered their daily lives.14 In Natal, there was no formalized military army or unit
composed of Africans until after the Anglo-Zulu War. Plans were put forward, as this chapter
will illustrate, but nothing took place resembling the uniformed African defending the Empire
that became part of the popular imagination during the twentieth century. Nevertheless,
Africans did serve as an important component in colonial rule, especially in the form of
military actions taken during this formative period of the colony. The contributions of
Africans, however, were not consistent and changed within the debates over defence in the
colonial government and within the press during this period. Even the identification of the
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“Zulu” as a “martial race” would be altered in relation to changes in the economic and ethnic
makeup of the colony during this period.15 To better understand this focus on “martial race”,
it is first critical to understand the makeup of the most influential military institution which
existed in the Natal region prior the British colonial rule.

An African Political Revolution
Well before the organization of indigenous military forces under the British, there was
already a military and political revolution that took place in the early nineteenth century in
the Natal region, centred around the ideas of specific loyalties to chiefs based on the Zulu
system of rule. The cause of this change can be linked directly to the rise of the Zulu nation
under Shaka, and the military expansion and forced migration that resulted from said rise.
Shaka, and his predecessor Dingiswayo, were the key implementers of a revolution in policy
and used it to great advantage in territorial expansion during the mfecane.16 It was the manner
in which military settlements, or “heads”, were used by the Shaka regime that led to greater
organization, categorization, and order within the Zulu kingdom and the greater Zululand
region. The indunas, as both a commoner appointed by Shaka and the leader of each “head”,
were given considerable power and influence within Zulu society. Because the army and its
impi regiments were the central unit of administration within Shaka’s kingdom, it also acted
as means to develop and solidify power within the central government. The military acted not
only as the conduit for territorial expansion, but also as system of loyalty that rested with the
indunas and ultimately Shaka.

The organization of the army, and the manner in which conquered peoples were
incorporated into this system, provided a primary means of assimilation within Zulu society.
Because the indunas were held in the traditional positions occupied by territorial chiefs, there
15
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is a clear transition from the bureaucracy of “royals” to a more effective administrative
system with power in the hands of the commoners.17 The typical composition of African
groups within Natal and Zululand was organized according to a patriarchal system of society,
beginning with the head of the family, moving to the head of a kraal or small village, to the
head of several kraals led by one induna, eventually to a Chief of the group or inkosi.18 The
power of the chiefs was nearly absolute, and was quelled only by the limitations to their own
military, and access to cattle as payment. Only strong, charismatic leaders such as Shaka, and
later Cetshwayo, seemed capable of maintaining order and expanding Zulu power. Within
Natal, estimates suggest that around ninety four different indigenous groups, or “tribes” as
described by the British, existed within the territory of the colony before the arrival of the
Afrikaner and even before the wars of Shaka.19 The claims made by the Afrikaner that Natal
was essentially an abandoned land dismissed this history and attempted to remove any
African claim that existed over what would become the colony of Natal. Such policies came
to an end to a large extent following the British annexation of Natal in 1844, though there
remained considerable tension between the British and Afrikaner over land claims for
decades to come.

It is important to make clear that though these diverse indigenous groups were
commonly identified as “Zulu” by Europeans, their ethnic diversity is unquestionable. All
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were part of an Nguni tradition which characterized the region, but to vacuously describe all
Africans in Natal as “Zulu” would be an insult to the cultural and ethnic traditions of the
people there. That is why for this chapter (and for much of this dissertation), the indigenous
people of Natal are referred to as “Africans” or their specific ethnic designation. One can see
a commonality in the military traditions of the people of Natal with those under the control of
the Zulu during the mid-nineteenth century. Similar comparisons could be made between the
Ndebele or Sotho of the region as well. This is why the military revolution of the Zulu
matters. Far from espousing the “martial race” theory, this military revolution’s influence,
spurred by the mfecane, created a martial system which solidified a military tradition in Natal
which remained an important component of African contribution to Natal’s defence for
decades to come.

With such a military tradition in the area of Natal, it is understandable the concerns
expressed by “One of the People” in the Natal Mercury. If “One of the People” was not a
universal example of the European attitude toward the indigenous population and their belief
in the need for a new kind of military presence within the colony, he illustrates the inherent
popular fear within the colony of Natal during the formative period from the 1840s to 1870s.
This fear has been described by Shula Marks as “strong, enduring and at times almost
pathological” and shows the distrust and apprehension toward a “Native uprising” within the
colony.20 Most of these tensions stemmed from diplomatic relations and conflict on the
Zululand border, such as the Mpande incident of 1855 alluded to earlier. But other conflicts
within the colony also perpetuated strong apprehension for many occupants of the colony.
The fear of the “other” from the colonists is counterbalanced by concern for the safety and
stability of the indigenous population of Natal, while also expressing concern for the sizable
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African population in the region, numbering between 80,000 and 150,000 by 1850 and over
250,000 by 1860.21

The fear of indigenous uprisings would be a constant concern for European colonists
for most of the colony’s early existence. But the colonists’ response to this concern rested in
a belief in the need for collective security. A collection of European volunteer military corps
filled some components of this need, but many colonists refused to fully acknowledge the
impact made by the indigenous military forces within the colony.22 Though present in some
of Natal’s news sources, the contributions made by African military units in the protection
and administration of the colony are typically placed as secondary or inconsequential.
Despite indigenous military presence in multiple actions carried out by the British
government, there is limited emphasis on African contributions, but instead a focus on the
white administrators who commanded them. Such historical narratives are largely the result
of sources, as will become striking evident in the Sidoyi incident of 1857 and the Matshana
incident of 1858. In others, like the Langalibalele Rebellion of 1873, it was negligence of the
African units which was blamed for the deaths of the white volunteers at Bushman’s Pass,
with little emphasis on their role in the eventual capture of Langalibalele in rebellion. These
incidents are only a small representation of not only the increased tension within military
institutions of the colony, yet they also provide striking examples of African agency in the
defensive institutions of Natal and its gradual transition into a colonial state during the
formative period of the colony, beginning as early as the formation of Natal’s colonial
government in the mid-1840s.
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Need for Troops: Fodo and the Klip River
The late 1840s were a problematic time for the colony of Natal. Not only was the
colonial government attempting to establish its authority over the indigenous population, but
also trying to maintain some semblance of continuity with the Afrikaner settlers within the
colony. This was particularly difficult considering the very nature of the Afrikaner
relationship with the British, in which the Afrikaners had fled across the continent to remove
themselves from British rule only two decades earlier. They left the Cape Colony specifically
because they believed the British legislation as a whole threatened the entire system of colour
distinction, noting the emancipation of the slaves and the unsatisfactory monetary
compensation to the slave owners, as well as other legislation.23 The Afrikaners also saw the
growing African population as an invading force onto the lands that they had laid claim to as
their new homeland. It remained continuingly difficult for the British to appease Afrikaner
interests, especially regarding the removal of the Africans from the proposed locations being
established. This tension was exacerbated around the Klip River District between 1847 and
1848.

Many Afrikaners were persuaded to stay on in the colony due to the acceptance of
Roman Dutch Law by the British government in Natal, though such acceptance would be
repealed by Lieutenant-Governor West in 1851. Nonetheless, by the end of 1847, some
members of the Afrikaner community were in open revolt against British authority, fuelled by
rumours of Africans acting as British sympathisers or spies in the Afrikaner republics to the
north.24 To make matters worse, a group of Afrikaners along the Klip River claimed to have
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achieved a treaty with Mpande, the king of the Zulu, which in essence approved the sale of a
piece of land just south of the river, clearly within the jurisdiction of the colony of Natal.
Reports eventually started coming into the government offices that the Afrikaners were
making plans to ally themselves with the Zulu to gain sufficient control of the region. Any
prospects of an alliance quickly broke down, and soon there was a clear possibility of open
conflict between the Afrikaners and Zulu. The Natal government made promises to rectify the
situation, but the problem was exacerbated by reported attacks from bushman across the
Zululand border. This only increased the tensions between the Afrikaners and Zulu, leading
to the possibility of open conflict between the two.

In response, Lieutenant-Governor West made clear to all inhabitants of the Klip River
area that such territory was under British control. A proclamation was made in January of
1848, spelling out clearly that any attack against Mpande would be unacceptable and any
colonial subject lending assistant or support to those attacking Mpande, would “render
themselves equally guilty with the chief instigators or such proceedings”.25 To give even
greater weight to the proclamation, West declared that anyone who attacked the Africans
under British rule would be “regarded and treated as Rebels.”26 West’s actions are very
telling to the changing power dynamics of the colony. Both West and Shepstone realized that
the Afrikaners could not be relied upon to keep the peace within the colony, especially
considering the near overwhelming hostility the Afrikaners expressed to the African
population. What West did next was perhaps even more important to the changing dynamics.
In his next proclamation, West warned that if such hostilities against Africans within the
British territory continued, he would be forced to provide the Africans with the means of their
own defence, going to far as to say:
25
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I shall yield to the necessity…of directing the hostility of the Natives against any
portion of the white inhabitants, I shall, notwithstanding not hesitate upon the first
certain intelligence that any actual attack has been made upon the said Natives, to put
into their hands such a supply of fire arms and ammunition as…will, I trust, enable
them to repel all such attacks.27

This statement was a direct challenge to Afrikaner authority while also illustrating the
desperation of the lieutenant-governor’s situation during Natal’s first years of existence.
Though no formal military organization was announced, the proclamation does illustrate the
willingness of the colonial government to consider using Africans as an instrumental piece of
defence, even if only for the defence of other Africans.

By February 1848, Governor Smith of the Cape had provided additional land grants to
the Afrikaners as an incentive to remain within the colony.28 The lack of European settlers
within the colony was one of the primary reasons these measured by the British government.
What the disputed of 1847 and 1848 illustrated to West and Shepstone was the necessity for a
strong ally within the colony of Natal. The European population was far too small and the
Afrikaners were uncooperative.29 Nevertheless, it seemed inconceivable to rely on Africans
as a main pillar of support for the colony as a whole. The idea, however, was now present in
the minds of the colony, and the continuing disputes along the northern region of Natal would
act as the catalyst for the first use of African troops as precursor for the formation of African
military institutions within Natal’s system of colonial defence.
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Problems with the Afrikaners were not enough for the establishment of any formal
African military corps. Indigenous troops would have to be considered a necessity and
receive the support of the both the government in Cape Town and London. Conveniently for
Natal’s colonial government, the opportunity presented itself in the case of “native feuds”
between chiefs attempting to consolidate their power under the new British regime. In
January 1847, Fodo of the Nhlangwini contested the passage of another group of Africans
crossing the Mzimkhulu River, resulting in a number of deaths, multiple individuals captured,
and several hundred cattle being seized. In response, Theophilus Shepstone, the recently
appointed Diplomatic Agent, organized a harsh response against Fodo.30 A small contingent
of 50 men under the command of Captain Blenkensopp of the 45th Regiment was called up.
This unit, however, would not be the major thrust of the force sent against Fodo. Instead, an
indigenous regiment or impi was called upon to support Shepstone in the settlement of the
“native feud”. Shepstone reported that on finding that Fodo with his cattle had sought refuge
in densely wooded ravines, sent his new contingent against the fleeing chief. Shepstone
employ an African force of about 500 men to secure Fodo and his chiefs, “with strict orders
to avoid bloodshed as much as possible.”31 With this sizable force, Shepstone and his African
troops were able to provide for the release of all captives except two, as well as the recapture
of about 200 cattle. Shepstone found it necessary to seize all of the cattle belonging to Fodo,
amounting to 7,000 head, and to retain them in his possession until Fodo’s people, with the
exception of a small number of fugitives, had signified their submission to the uncle of Fodo
whom Shepstone had appointed after Fodo’s deposal (though Fodo would be restored to his
chieftainship by Shepstone by the end of the year). This tactic, though typical in Shepstone’s

30

Guy hypothesizes that Shepstone felt that a show of force against a prominent inkosi was needed in the
isolated section of Natal occupied by Natal. See Ibid., 103.
31
BPP: Natal- Correspondence Relative to the Establishment of the Settlement of Natal, 1848, Governor West
to Governor Cape of Good Hope, February 19, 1847. Also see No. 54, Governor Sir H. Pottinger to Earl Grey
No. 25 March 24, 1848, “Measures of Lieut.-Governor of Natal for preservation of peace of the district”.

267
admiration of the colony, is one of the first major instances of his use of African troops called
upon as a kind of levies to implement imperial will and act as a legitimate force for colonial
security. Praised for his actions by Lieutenant-Governor West, Shepstone and his African
forces were presented as a key necessity for Natal’s security:

Without the most prompt and energetic measures to suppress the first symptoms of an
insurrectionary character, or of internal wars among the several tribes constituting the
immense native population of this district, this quarter would be thrown into
inextricable confusion; and I trust that the result of these measures, upon which in
order to render them effective it was necessary, as I have already pointed out, to
detach a strong body of infantry and the whole of our mounted forces, may tend, as
far as my limited means will allow, to enforce the respect of these tribes, and thus
maintain the tranquillity of the district.32

With such praise, it is somewhat surprising that by the end of the year Earl Grey, Secretary of
State for War and the Colonies, had diminished any continuing preference for the reliance on
African forces.

By the end of 1847, commissioners working on the formation of Natal’s colonial
government suggested to Earl Grey that “a large force of these [African] people, armed in the
native manner, may be readily called out for a temporary purpose, and if controlled by the
presence of a more regular force would render good service.”33 Earl Grey agreed that Natal’s
colonial government should make used of the resources and manpower available to assist in
overcoming “any refractory chief”, but still contended that a more disciplined force would
“give confidence to the native force serving under the orders of the Colonial Government,
and to secure its obedience.”34 Though such a policy was directed to the governor of the
Cape, it was the implication from Earl Grey that such a force would be critical for the newly
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established colony in Natal. Instead of the African forces, Early Grey instead insisted on the
establishment of two or three companies of pensioners along the same principles that had
been adopted in New Zealand, with “200 or 300 old soldiers so established at
Pietermaritzburg would give great support to the Colonial Government, and ought not to cost
[Britain] anything beyond the expense of removing them there.”35 Of course, as has been
previously illustrated and will continue to be emphasized throughout this chapter, such
simplistic measures were never implemented due to cost and impracticality.

The Fodo incident illustrates not only the significant necessity of African troops in the
creation of Natal’s defensive structures, but also how they remained the most consistent
element of Natal’s colonial defence. The 45th Regiment was only stationed in Natal from
1843 to 1859, the volunteer corps would be an inconsistent pillar of colonial defence until
greater formalization after the Langalibalele Rebellion, and the police, both European and
African, would be largely responsible for civil matters in the urban centres of the colony. The
Fodo incident showed that Shepstone’s use of African forces would remain a staple of
colonial control, especially as “the action took place in a region as remote as any in the
colony and demonstrated to anyone who doubted it that there was no place to hide” from
Shepstone and his African troops.36 Perhaps even more importantly, this initial use of
Shepstone’s forces would lead to a continuing relationship with many of the African leaders
in Natal, including Ngoza, one of the leaders of the Mtintandaba. (see below) Nevertheless
the consistent attempts to reinterpret, reimagine, or even diminish the African’s role in
colonial defence, as was perpetrated by Earl Grey, would also remain a constant theme for
the remainder of the formative period of the colony of Natal, and illustrate the fluid nature of
decision making in regards to this critical pillar or colonial defence.
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Perhaps most strikingly, only months later, Earl Grey’s call this dramatic shift in the
military structure of the colony was dismissed. Instead of “native cavalry” and pensioners,
the members of Natal’s executive council requested pause to see how the colony’s newly
instituted “Police” may work out, having “worked well in every respect.”37 So pleased was
the lieutenant-governor with the force that he suggested increasing their number to 500, and
have their pay taken from the local revenues instead of the military budget, making the
African pay for their own protection supplemented by “their share on general taxes on land
and cattle.”38 What caused this shift and what was this militia that were so directly praised for
their actions? This “Native Corps”, founded in conjunction with the Natal Native Police,
became illustrative of the militaristic nature of African participation on the structure of
colonial defence, especially in light of possible invasion, insurrection and rebellion within the
colony.

An African Militia
Theophilus Shepstone, Diplomatic Agent to the Natives and key colonial official in
Natal’s government, had made ample use of indigenous troops during the early period of
Natal establishment during the late 1840s. Typically described as a “native corps”,
Theophilus and his brother John would travel across the countryside with an African
contingency to enforce British authority and the removal of African squatters.39 Initial
attempts at a “Natal Native Militia” were organized in the 1848, but the parameters and
equipment of the groups were somewhat ambiguous. An initial corps of 50 troops was
organized in April 1848, equipped with “muskets without bayonets…their knapsack
comprised a blanket, folded in a length convenient for slinging obliquely from the left
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shoulder to the right hip” or simply a “light marching costume”.40 This unit typically acted as
an escort force for Shepstone or even an extension of the Native Police. With the
announcement by the Natal government of Theophilus Shepstone as “captain-in-chief of all
the Native Forces in [the] District”, a much larger force began to be mustered.41

By September, a militia of two hundred Africans was raised and began performing
drills outside of Pietermaritzburg. Unlike the initial force of fifty, these Africans were armed
and equip in a far more traditional fashion. Despite their loose knee breeches “after the
fashion of sepoys”, the troops under Shepstone’s command were equipped in a similar
manner as those in the time of Shaka, particularly the traditional headdresses: one company
“having a plume of black ostrich feathers; another preferring to add to their stature by a single
white feather or the same bird, fixed so as to stand erect from the centre of the forehead.”42
The militias were also armed with the traditional assegai and large shields of the impis. Such
units at the time were seen by some members of the Natal community, including the editors
of the Natal Witness, as both a source of apprehension, and a key necessity for the security of
“100,000 sable subjects.”43

With such a variation in titles and descriptions, it is unclear where the “Natal Native
Militia” and the “Natal Native Police” begin and end. Though these formalized units of the
Natal Native Police were created under a direct proclamation from the Cape Colony during
the creation of the Natal colonial government, these militia forces seem to have a more
transitory characteristic than their police counterparts. It is likely that the only formalized
force was created as the Natal Native Police in 1848, as was described by John Shepstone.44
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Even within Shepstone’s own account of the founding of the Native Police, there are strong
discrepancies that make it unclear what organizations are being referred to.45 Perhaps the
most striking and confusing element of these newly formed African military units was the
inclusion of the Mtintandaba.46 Described by John Shepstone as “a kind of Government
reserve force”, the Mtintandaba was formed by Theophilus Shepstone to act in response to
any kind of uprising or other occurrences in the colony. The name derived from the verb
ukuthinta, to touch, and the noun indaba, or affair. Hence, the Mtintandaba was intended to
be a force that was “in touch with affairs” or, more appropriately, a defensive response
force.47 Ngoza kaLudada, Funywayo kaMpopama, and Mqundane (also known as Jantshi)
were in command of the force acting as indunas for Shepstone and all achieved great power
within the indigenous hierarchy of Natal. Ngoza had fought against the Afrikaners at Blood
River but had moved to Natal and allied with Shepstone during the Fodo incident. He did so
well in assisting the British that he caught the attention of Shepstone, and eventually gained
the position of chief induna and was appointed to a position in the Mngeni valley near Table
Mountain to the east of Pietermaritzburg.48 Despite these details that were revealed later in
the oral tradition, incidents involving these African units were never consistently presented in
either government documents or the press. This limitation makes it considerably difficult to
differentiate between “police”, “corps”, and “levies” in the history of early Natal, forcing
historians to have a more amorphous presentation of African military organizations.
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Whatever the formal organization of these African corps, it is obvious that they
remained an important component in the early formation of Natal’s colonial security. The late
1840s, as has been previously discussed, was a period of considerable concern and
apprehension within the colony, chiefly in regards to the matter of security. Calls for some
type of force were seen in the Witness during this period, emphasizing that to protect itself,
the colony must establish some type of standing force with such organizations requiring “tact,
time and patience”, something considered lacking in the indigenous African forces being
established.49 Overall, the opinion remained that it would be better to rely upon “voluntary
bands of the colonists, uniting, not from any desire for war, but from the calm conviction that
disturbances may arise” than “the dependence to be placed on the native agency”.50 This, in
light of Shepstone raising a “native corps” which is reported to be numbering less than
16,000, predated the main thrust of the volunteer movement by half a decade, and illustrated
the disdain expressed for the forces being implemented by Shepstone, despite its successes.51

The idea of a “native corps” was not considered practicable by the editors of the
Witness, with concern that such a system implemented would diminish the necessity for the
presence of the regular troops (despite the large cost to the colony of stationing imperial
troops). Though the editors appreciated “the value of efficient defence, it is not fair to
undervalue any attempt that may be made to increase the means of protection by economic
plans…any new arrangement for the promotion of safety, and the prevention—rather than the
overthrow of hostility,—should be hailed as an improvement both in an economic and

49

The Natal Witness, September 1, 1848.

50

Ibid.

51

The Witness’ estimates of 16,000 Africans was presumably an exaggeration, as this number likely represented
the total of able African warriors under the influence of the British government at the time, not those under the
direct control of Shepstone, especially if only taken into account the forces of the Native Police Corps or even
the Mtintandaba.

273
military point of view.”52 Again, the economics of the colony remained an important
component. The company was considered an exception instead of a rule, despite their
successes in preventing Langalibalele from being “eaten up” by Mpande, though the corps
arrived long after Mpande’s troops had been sent off.53 The African unit was still seen as a
possible threat, even though the Witness was somewhat impressed by the corpss “light
marching costume, ranging three abreast and keeping step in good order, [and beginning] to
show symptoms of careful discipline.”54

The Shepstones remained committed to the idea of an African military institution in
the colony, not only for the security of Natal, but also for the perceived benefit of the African.
Decades after their initial formation, John Shepstone still believed that a “native regiment”
should exist in Natal, claiming that “one must utilize services of Natives in connection with
themselves, i.e. in regard to management of their own affairs.”55 Despite the distance of time
in the Shepstone interview, which took place in 1912, his opinions still resonated that the
Africans “like having authority” and that “Responsible Government had done so much harm
in removing responsibility from the chiefs…they [the chiefs] know their people and work in
our interest if entrusted with the management of their affairs.”56

There did appear to be some measure of respect for these new military institutions that
were being created from some within the colony. In May 1849, Shepstone, Lt. Howell, and “a
division of the Native Corps” returned from the Klip River Division with seven prisoners,
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two said to be charged with murder.57 The troop movement was reported to originally be
related to the settlement of Africans in a new location by Shepstone. Though it appeared that
the diplomatic agent was traveling with what could be inferred to be members of the Native
Police, Shepstone gave the order for another regiment to be made available if necessary.
When attempting to consolidate the forces in a valley, Shepstone deployed his corps on one
side and once:

the malcontents were descending the opposite side of the valley, the latter were
staggered at the appearance, as if by magic, of a well known clan, full armed, and
attentively awaiting [Shepstone’s] orders. In token of entire submission the over-awed
kraals drove their cattle out to be taken possession of, and tendered their willingness
to obey whatever directions might be given.58

In what was reported by the Witness with almost a passing curiousness, Shepstone thanked
the African regiment “that had come so far without having been required to do anything
worth the trouble” while the African captain of the regiment stated “his orders were to come
and receive orders.”59 The paper reported that farmers who were present expressed their
surprise at the skill and authority Shepstone possessed, as well as the organization of the
African troops and their ability to mobilize so quickly. Such a report could be dismissed as a
show of Shepstone’s authority over the indigenous population, but the reverence, or at least
respect, that the editors of the Witness show to the African chiefs illustrate the potential
benefits of the African troops within the colony. The surprise and slight admiration expressed
by the farmers also showed a lack of universal scorn for the African military systems,
especially when used to the benefit of British and European authority. Shepstone was the key
implementer in this situation, and without the man who gave the orders, farmers could just as
easily see those same forces driving them from their settlements and laying the ground to
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waste, as had been done in the days of Shaka. It is little surprise then that these reservation
would surface once again when even more Africans were called to fight for the British
Empire and march through the colony of Natal.

Call for Troops in the Xhosa War
Though Natal began to attain some autonomy during the early 1850s, it was still
unable to ignore the political tension present amongst its neighbours, especially in Kaffraria.
By 1850, there was an upturn in horse thefts, the purchase of guns, assegais being
constructed, and general desertion by workers amongst the Xhosa to the south of Natal. By
Christmas, the Xhosa launched a coordinated rebellion in British Kaffraria and beyond,
beginning the eighth Frontier War of 1850-1853 (also known as one of the many Xhosa or
“Kaffir” Wars).60 Perhaps most unnerving was news that Cape Governor Harry Smith had
been besieged at Fort White. Humiliatingly, Smith was forced to escape to King Williams
Town by blackening his face and posing as a Cape Coloured, where he reported to the
colonial office that British Kaffraria was in critical condition, due to the Xhosa who were
described as a people of “determined, reckless and savage hostility”.61

Such news would only exacerbate a fear amongst the colonists of Natal of an
indigenous uprising that would threaten the lives of European colonists. The solution, similar
to the fear that resulted from the Mpande crisis years later which spurred on the volunteer
movement, was a call for greater troops within the colony. Nevertheless, there was clearly a
stark contrast between what the colonist envisioned and what was proposed by the colonial
government. This contrast reveals a contentious division over the perceived role of colonial
troops within the colony and abroad.
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In January 1851, Sir Harry Smith requested that Lieutenant-Governor Pine raise an
indigenous force of between one and three thousand “Zulus” to act as a force against the
Xhosa fighting in the frontier war. Such a force would relieve the British being attacked in
Kaffraria with a push by forces from Natal. Ironically, Harry Smith saw this rebellion not just
as a challenge to British authority, but a betrayal to the “civilization” he had attempted to
bring to the Xhosa who rebelled, as well as the Khoikhoi and Coloured Africans who joined
the war. By the time Smith had made the request to Pine, the war had shifted to that of a race
war, in which the alliance of blacks against whites was in direct contradiction to the
preservation of British rule. With the attempt to raise such troops, Smith praised Pine who
had “acted for the great cause, White v. Black, most opportunely & judiciously.”62 Pine,
according to Guy, saw an opportunity in raising such forces, allowing him to consolidate his
control of Natal’s colonial government, and not necessarily to preserve the racial purity of the
colonial expedition. This prospect rested on Pine’s fondness for “men of action” and perhaps
even his desire to associate with the hero of Aliwal, Sir Harry Smith.63

Even with Pine’s enthusiasm, by March, no force had been successfully organized.
Though Shepstone had succeeded in initially gaining the local chiefs approval of the plan, on
January 17th the executive council expressed their misgivings about the plan, though allowed
it to continue further. In the meeting, Shepstone even went so far as to confide in the colonial
secretary that he deemed the plan “not only disastrous in its consequences for this District,
but actually ‘suicidal’ to Sir H Smith himself.”64 Shepstone, in all practicality, saw the major
problems with such an expedition. The colonial government had yet to solidify its own
control over its indigenous population. What hope would it have of maintain control of its
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people outside of the borders of the colony? To make matters worse, some of Natal’s chiefs,
including Matshana, who would later be expelled from the colony (See Below), did not
believe they were even capable of providing the manpower that was being requested,
informing Shepstone that their people (assumedly those Africans already allied with
Shepstone) “did not know how to fight, they were women, they left the Zulu country because
they feared firearms, and they would also not be where they were if they were not women.”65
Such a lack in confidence, though not decisive, caused Shepstone to review the proposal and
made his suggestions for a reconsideration of the plan.

Not to be dissuaded, Pine looked to other individuals to lead his African levies, and
eventually settle upon Henry Francis Fynn. Fynn’s role as a military presence in the colony
cannot be overstated. He was amongst the first Europeans to meet the Zulu king Shaka, and
remained one of the most famous residents in the region. Over the ensuing years, however, he
had achieved some semblance of autonomy and even made use of the Africans he influenced
in a military capacity, commanding a private military force of Africans since the 1820s. His
“African Force” which appeared in all purposes to be under his direct control, had a
measurable impact on the security and military presence of Natal, within and outside its
borders. One such incident revolved around the stealing of cattle from the across the border,
resulting in a striking challenge to the authority of the local Mpondo leader, Faku. After Fynn
had been appointed colonial resident with Faku in 1848, tensions had risen in the ensuing
period over continuing disputes and encroachments with African chiefs. Fynn, however, was
not entirely representative of the use of colonial force during this period, but instead was
principally a rogue figure that attained near autonomy in the southern reached of Natal
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following his initial settlement in the 1820s.66 To Pine, Fynn represented an alternative to
Shepstone that would allow for the raising of the levies required and retain the ability to
control such a force as it marched into Kaffraria. Ironically, Fynn would use such forces to
consolidate his own power base against Faku. The levies that were raised in 1851, though
disbanded within the year, remained an intimidating group to Faku, who assembled his own
force in response during mid-April of 1851.

Despite the attempts to retain some sense of secrecy with Pine’s arrangements with
Fynn, the plan to raise these African levies was soon revealed to the colonists of Natal.
Unsurprisingly, there was a negative reaction amongst many colonists. Thomas Phipson,
future sheriff of the colony, was one of the more outspoken critics of the rumoured policy of
raising indigenous levies for the defence of the colony. To most colonists, the majority of
African troops within Natal were placed in defence of their own individual kraals, and were
used to a limited extent in internal matters. Though the Native Police had been a presence
within the colony, few Europeans possessed an overwhelming fear of such a small group.
Greater apprehension existed with the idea of a large African levy or militia which could
overwhelm the colonists and lead to their ultimate removal from the colony. Phipson, in his
initial quarrel against the African levies being mustered by Pine, argued that the creation of
these units was not only immoral, but illegal because such actions lacked approval by the
colonial population and was being implemented solely by Lieutenant-Governor Pine without
the approval of the legislative or executive council. Phipson’s initial suggestion, which took
the form of a letter to the government, was more of a criticism of the overall system of
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defence within the colony, leading to his suggestion for reliance on white volunteers from
within the colony for defence, stating that “a volunteer is worth two pressed men.”67

A more direct outcry against the proposed levies was expressed a few weeks later in a
memorial to the Secretary of the Colonies, Earl Grey, which was published in the Natal
Witness, written by Phipson and accompanied (according to the Natal Independent) by 100
signatures. The memorial was propagated by the information that Pine had sidestepped
Shepstone’s authority on the matter and instead directly contacted Fynn about the creation of
the African levies. The information had come from James Allison, a Wesleyan missionary,
who informed Phipson that Pine had ordered Fynn: “to muster and call to arms certain native
British subjects residing within this District [Natal]; and further that the said Fynn had, while
so residing out of the boundaries of this District, sent orders or messages to certain Native
Chiefs and others within the said boundaries, to muster and assemble in arms.”68 Such actions
were reportedly done without the knowledge of Shepstone, though Pine did announce in the
Witness that letters had been exchanged between he and Shepstone, but countered that “if the
news of such disclosures as these reached Downing-street, all the Government officers here
would be instantly dismissed.”69 The memorialists emphasized once again the simple fact that
Fynn did not reside in the colony, and should therefore not be an active agent in any such
affairs. Fynn’s authority over the African population was called into question, rightly so
considering Fynn primary use of the levies against Faku as a means to maintain his own
authority in the region instead of pushing deeper into Kaffraria as requested by Harry Smith.

The “clandestine, unconstitutional, and illegal proceedings” enacted by Pine were
seen by the memorialists as an affront to the colonists “rights and liberties as British
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subjects.”70 The memorial, however, was an attack on the authority of Pine and the manner in
which he overstepped his powers in calling up the African levies. Yet Phipson and his
supporters made clear that such an armed force of Africans “destitute of any proper and
efficient control” would “endanger the peace of the District.”71 The animosity toward
indigenous troops was obvious in such accounts, and the possibility of African troops sent out
to the frontier on their own for the defence of the colony was seen as simply unsound, but
also inhumane, indicative of a mixed view of paternalism and contempt for indigenous
defensive forces. Like so many accounts of the African troops within the colony of Natal, the
African is quickly brushed aside in the debates over importance of colonial authority. The
primary concern for the memorialists, though using the African troops as a conduit, is the
abuse of power by Pine. After the initial accusations, it was merely the African’s role in the
debate which had any major importance, and not their role in the colony’s defence. Instead,
like so many debates involving Natal’s African troops, the African is cleared aside for
concerns about the Europeans role in colonial government, and the actions of their leaders
that are seen as a “great detriment of the trade, commerce, agriculture, peace security, and
well being of the white population of this District.”72

Perhaps most surprising, when the issue of the African forces was more directly
addressed by the colonial population, much of their concerns rested on mere rumour and
supposition, and not on any true awareness of the situation. C. Preller, a field cornet in Natal,
addressed a letter to the secretary of the governor of Natal in response to the news that
Shepstone would raise a “native levy” of 6,000. Preller claimed to have knowledge from a
Mr. Potgieter and others of a plan by the Africans within the proposed force to mutiny once
they had proceeded as far as the Mkhomazi River, some 40 kilometres south of Durban, kill
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Shepstone and his officers, and return to Natal to attack the settlements. Preller called
attention to the “fact that the Native Police, who were intended to be in some measure a
shield against the Bushmen, have been deliberately withdrawn from their station at the
Spioen Kop, leaving the pathway of those predators entirely open.”73 Preller neglected to
consider that if such a mutiny occurred, this pathway would be unnecessary as the mutinous
troops could simply turn back and return the way they came instead of marching to the north
and enter the colony via Spioen Kop.

With such controversy and debate, it is no surprise that the African levies never
materialized. By April, a force of 3,000 gathered along the south coast, but despite all
attempts by Shepstone and Pine to encourage the troops deeper into British Kaffraria, there
was little movement. In May, the expedition was called off by Harry Smith. The failure of the
column was multifaceted. Fynn, though famous for his dealings with the indigenous
population of the region, did not have the same personal relationship with the major African
players that Shepstone possessed. Fynn’s reputation by 1851 was also becoming over
exaggerated and led to his eventual dismissal as magistrate of Faku’s people and the abolition
of the position the following year. Even with multiple attempts by Pine and Shepstone, there
was a lack of overall organization and preparation for such a force. This was not helped by
the continual changing of minds and alterations of plans that characterized this six month
period in 1851.

Admittedly, Harry Smith did not anticipate the simple problems of ethnic and social
divisions that characterized Natal. Moreover, this incident contributed to the eventual
distancing and open hostility between Pine and Shepstone that would characterized the
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remainder of Pine’s first tenure in Natal.74 What remains most striking, however, about this
debate and the failure to raise the indigenous levies was the apprehension, paranoia, and
outright rumours that dominated the colony during this period. Despite having both African
military and police institutions within the colony for almost three years, colonists still
retained major anxiety about African troops defending their homes and livelihoods. The
white colonists’ reservations on the use of African troops to defend Natal was, in context,
nearly unfounded, as the majority of colonists did have experience with African troops within
Natal beyond those commanded by Shepstone, and were in fact indebted to such groups for
much of their safety during the early years of the colony.

The Cape Mounted Rifles
Other than the 45th Regiment of Foot stationed at Fort Napier outside
Pietermaritzburg, the largest and most continuous military presence within the colony during
its first decade of existence was the Cape Mounted Rifles (or CMR), a cavalry unit that acted
as the main protectors of the frontier region of the colony, from the border of southern Natal
to the Drakensberg Mountains. The Cape Mounted Rifles remained in existence from 1806 to
1920, but their role in this formative period is illustrative of the role of African forces within
the colony of Natal. In 1850, of the 12 troops in the CMR, eight were composed of Europeans
who were formerly members of the British Army. Four were composed of coloured men from
the Cape. These units, however, were typically referred to as “Hottentots”, though there
association with the Khoikhoi is somewhat ambiguous.75 These units also acted partially as
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the police force for the colony during its formative period, being sent out to capture criminals
who attempted to escape into the frontier. Policing, even on a small scale, was centred on the
rural areas, especially the theft of cattle while “adequate police attention was given to every
case.”76

Apprehension toward the CMR from the colonial troops probable increased following
their participation in a mutiny near the Bushman’s River during the Frontier War of 1851.
The outbreak of the Xhosa rebellion in 1851 astonished the British authority in the region, but
even more shocking was the desertion of almost half of the Cape Mounted Rifles, who took
their arms and military experience to join the Xhosa rebels.77 Ironically, one of the major
leaders of the Xhosa guerrilla forces on horseback was Willem Uithalder, a pensioner from
the Coloured ranks of the CMR.78 There is no evidence that troops stationed in Natal were
part of this group of deserters, but it would have remained part of the colonists’ collective
conscious involving African troops.79 Such actions would lead to the eventual “whitening” of
the regiment with the gradual reduction of African members in the ranks during the 1850s
and 1860s.80 The CMR would, however, continue to patrol the Natal frontier well into the
1870s but by this time the Natal government had established its own mounted police force for
the protection of the colony.81 The CMR, along with the British troops stationed at Ft. Napier,
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remained a final line of defence in the case of emergencies. In extreme cases, the CMR would
join other African troops as support, as was the case of the incident involving Sidoyi in the
late 1850s.82 The memory of the mutiny would remain in the minds of the colonists with
Natal. The Xhosa War represented the imposing threat of black unity that moved beyond
political and ethnic alliances, and represented a united Xhosa-Khoi alliance against white rule
in Southern Africa.83 Such perception of a widespread black rebellion contributed to the near
overwhelming concern for African troops turning against their officers when moving beyond
the borders of the colony. Nevertheless corruption and betrayal was not limited by race or
position in Natal, but instead individual in character. This was the case with Ringler
Thompson, Captain and Paymaster of the Natal Zulu Contingent.

Regina v. Ringler Thompson
The Shepstones were not solely responsible for the formation and organization of the
African troops within the colony of Natal during its formative period. Local resident
magistrates were also partially responsible for their own African police as well as the
organization of indigenous levies in times of need. Though this provided considerable power
and authority for the local magistrates, for much of the first decade of Natal’s existence,
many of these tasks fell to Shepstone. Pine, however, on his appointment as lieutenantgovernor, began selecting new magistrates he deemed fit and able, as he had done with
Francis Fynn in the attempt to organize an African contingent in aid of forces in the Xhosa
War. Pine established such alliances with men he saw as potential supporters to his agenda,
whether to the contrary of other members of the colonial government, including Shepstone.
John George Ringler Thompson was such a man.
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Selected as magistrate of the Mzinyathi Location, north of Greytown along the
Zululand border, Thompson appeared an ideal candidate for the position; a scholar and
linguist with published works on geology, with occasional bouts of drunkenness.84
Thompson, despite his academic credentials, was not the ideal citizen. While sailing to Natal
on the Washington, Thompson’s life was threatened by Hughbert Baker, an Irish land
surveyor also traveling to Natal. The source of the altercation was Mrs. Baker, who was
reported to have been involved with Thompson (and several other passengers) in an
unacceptable fashion. Thompson could be cast as the victim in this situation, but it has been
speculated that Thompson was paying particular attention to Mrs. Baker primarily to infuriate
her husband.85 Thompson’s attitude did not seem to improve with his appointment as
magistrate. Theophilus Shepstone reported rumours that Thompson had been drinking and
“keeping native women” during his time as magistrate, a claim with no strong evidence and
was unequivocally denied.86 Though supported strongly by Pine, a pattern of behaviour can
be traced which predicted Thompson’s problematic tenure in Natal.

During Pine’s attempt to raise an African contingent to assist the Cape Colony in
1851, Thompson had been appointed captain and paymaster of the Natal Zulu Contingent.
Though composed primarily of Africans from the Drakensberg, like most of the levies raised
in 1851, the unit never achieved the size and organization envisioned by Pine and
Shepstone.87 Thompson’s responsibilities as paymaster allowed him access to government
funds which were very limited within the colony during its early formation. The temptation
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must have been too much for Thompson, who was experiencing considerable pressure from
Pine and Shepstone to extend British authority into the Orange River Sovereignty in late
1851. It was this excursion which provided Thompson the means to move from dereliction of
duty to outright criminal behaviour.

Between September 1851 and April 1852, Thompson had collected nearly £1,400 for
the payment and provision of his troops in the Natal Zulu Contingent. It was revealed,
however, in January 1853 that these large sums of money had been unaccounted for from the
commandant’s office at Fort Napier. The commandant’s office had initial suspicions as early
as November of 1852, but by the following January, the commandant was no longer in doubt
that Thompson had “misapplied a considerable sum of Public Money”.88 More importantly,
Thompson had disappeared from the district for the past four or five month, and had failed to
report any account of this absence. Ironically, it was Langalibalele (the leader of the 1873
rebellion) who reported in June to the hut-tax collector that he and his men had not received
payment for their services to the colonial government.89 A warrant for Thompson’s arrest was
issued and by October, Thompson was charged before the resident magistrate of
Pietermaritzburg of “fraudulent appropriation and embezzlement of a large sum of money
entrusted to his charge”.90

According to the initial proceedings, Thompson had collected the funds to pay for the
members of the contingent over the last previous two years, but had never fully paid any
Africans under his command. The promised pay for the Africans under Thompson’s
command was six pence a day, but for many Africans they had only received blankets and
tobacco during the Orange River excursion in late 1851. Thompson then drew nearly £500 in
88
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January 1852 and an additional £600 the following April, none of which went to the African
troops. Oddly, around this time, Thompson disappeared from the colony, only to be found in
late 1853 beyond the Swazi kingdom. It was this time beyond the Swazi kingdom that
presumably contributed to his decline in health. Thompson was returned to Durban in
September, just in time for the beginning of the formal investigation against him. By
February 1854, preliminary interviews had been completed with the former members of the
contingent, and the trial would commence by the end of the month.91 With Thompson’s
declining health, his fitness to stand trial was called into question by his defence attorney. Dr.
Warring Cunningham examined Thompson in June the following year and provided evidence
to the district court that Thompson had gone insane and was deemed unfit for trial.92 By this
point, Thompson was no longer a viable administrator for the colony, and was shipped back
to England with the support of his friends and relatives. Though the whereabouts of the
money were unknown, it was reported by one of Thompson’s ex-lieutenants shortly before
his disappearance that Thompson was seen riding toward the Klip River Distinct to make
payments, loaded with gold and too drunk to properly load his pistols.93 A simple explanation
may have been that Thompson simply lost the money, or forgot that he had not paid his
troops their proper dues, because of a combination of his drunkenness and mental
instability.94

We can easily consider Thompson’s actions to be that of a disturbed individual who
became overwhelmed or simply incapable of dealing with his responsibilities in the colonial
setting. Yet the manner in which he abused his power is perhaps more important to
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understanding the changing role of the African in Natal’s defensive structure.95 The Natal
Zulu Contingent, as it was known, while deemed largely a failure in its initial
implementation, became a model for magisterial and eventually colonial control of the
African military institutions.

It is no coincidence that the model would become prominent in not only Shepstone’s
administration of the colony for the following decade, but also act as the precursor for the
Natal Native Contingent during the Anglo-Zulu War. Despite the failures, the money
Thompson was able to embezzle illustrates that the contingent was viewed as a viable
expense as more and more money was being drained from the colonial treasury. The simple
fact that it took nearly two years for the crime to be realized tells volumes about the belief in
the system, as well as the colony’s propensity to ignore the complaints of their African
subjects, especially regarding the issue of pay.

Removal and Shifts in Policy
Despite all these contentious problems, the Thompson case illustrates the importance
of the indigenous military organizations, especially the African troops commanded by the
Shepstones, in the formation of colonial Natal. The 1850s were a transformative period for
the colony, not only in establishing a colonial charter in 1856, the formation of the volunteer
corps, or the corporate independence of the major urban centres, but in the way in which
Africans were an intrinsic part of the security and organization of the colony. At the centre of
this shift was Shepstone, who continued to define the African military policy despite the
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intervention of detractors like Pine. One such example was Shepstone’s “Grand Removal
Scheme”.96

Shepstone’s removal scheme was a dramatic shift from his previous administration
within Natal. The plan was simple. Shepstone would lead a large body of the African
population of Natal from the locations to the vast territory to the south of the Umzimkulu
River, south of Natal. There Shepstone would establish a near independent African territory
that would be ruled, regulated, and maintained in the traditional manner. What was most
unusual about this plan was the role of Shepstone himself. Shepstone would act as supreme
Chief, or Ukumkani, of the Africans in the region and direct them in the same manner any
other chief would preside. The plan rested almost exclusively on Faku’s cooperation, which
was no difficultly considering Shepstone’s relationship with the old inkosi. Shepstone had
known this man since childhood, and had developed such a close relationship that the chief
often referred to Shepstone as “his son.”97

The new territory created by Shepstone would not only provide a home for thousands
of Africans, but would also create a “kind of safety-valve provided for the passions of the
people, in case of any discontent arising among them.”98 Bishop John Colenso, who
accompanied Shepstone on one of his preliminary trips to Faku’s territory, envisioned, like
many others, with the removal of so many Africans from the colony, those Africans left
behind and those who would continue to migrate to Natal could be placed under more
96
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“civilized” restriction, including the ending of polygamy, the use of respectable clothing, and
the ending of the sales of wives, which Colenso claimed as “absolutely necessary for their
improvement in civilization.”99 Colenso also believed this system would greatly assist in the
process of conversion by the missionaries of the colony.

Colenso’s vision for the future did not stop there. Colenso believed that if Shepstone
were to survive the migration with the Africans, his influence within South Africa would
spread considerably. Shepstone would most likely bring Faku’s people under his rule once
the old chief died, and in doing so:

[Shepstone’s] authority would be felt over the whole of Kafirland; and at length that
very rich and productive region- incomparably the finest in all South Africa- would
have rest from its many troubles, and welcome the peaceful steps of commerce,
civilization, and Christianity.100

If Shepstone did not survive the migration, though, Colenso still believed it would benefit the
region and not be a source of increased trouble in the colony. Despite such optimistic views
and the initial approval by Pine, the plan was eventually scrapped by Earl Grey, leading
Shepstone to seek other alternatives to the issue of indigenous Africans in the colony. But the
removal scheme was representative of an idealized state which Shepstone could manipulate
and even outright control. His previous use of African’s in the Fodo incident and the Klip
River increased his confidence. Though an African state manned solely by Africans was too
extreme, the more direct deployment of African troops was not.

One extreme benefit, and perhaps hindrance, to Shepstone’s relationship with Faku
was the old chief’s ability to assist Shepstone in the southern region of the colony. In one
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such case, Faku requested Shepstone’s assistance in reparations for cattle theft from
Mdushane of the Bhaca. Making use of Henry Francis Fynn, who had become magistrate of
the Mkhomazi division after his dismissal from Faku’s territory in 1852, Shepstone led a
force of indigenous troops in 1854 as tactical manoeuvre to cut off routes of escape for
Mdushane. Another group of white volunteers were also involved, and provided the main
thrust of military force from Natal, though the threat of attack from Faku was enough to have
Mdushane quickly relent to Faku’s demands for compensation.101 Whereas African troops
had a relatively minor role in the overall conflict, it anticipated a much more striking use of
indigenous forces in a series of incidents in 1857 and 1858 that, though condemned by some
colonists, was illustrative of Shepstone’s new policy in the use of African troops for the
solidification of colonial security.

Sidoyi Incident
Like the Mdushane incident, the majority of disputes between indigenous chiefs
eventually led to intervention by either the local magistrate or Shepstone. On such occasions,
Shepstone would make use of the African troops at his disposal to intimidate and in some
cases drive out “insubordinate chiefs”. One such incident occurred in 1857 with the inkosi of
the Nhlangwini, Sidoyi kaBaleni.102 Sidoyi, according to Shepstone, had been instilled as
chief only seven years before, with “special pains” taken to explain to the new inkosi that his
position was tenuous, “that neither the tribe nor the country were his, that he was but deputed
by the Government to take charge of a section of its subjects, and that should he ever lose
sight of this fact calamity would certainly fall upon both.”103 There is no indication that
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Sidoyi caused any major problems over the ensuing seven years, though a magistrate was
eventually appointed to oversee Sidoyi and his actions were presented as “a source of anxiety
amongst the old men of his tribe.”104 The source of this anxiety was Sidoyi’s associating with
an umthakathi, or one who practices witchcraft, a strong antecedent to the civilizing missions
of the British. Witchcraft and the death penalty remained controversial topics the British were
unable to property address. Many believed that the practices should be made illegal outright,
as they in no way could be affiliated with civilized society. Shepstone disagreed with this
approach, believing that these “savage” customs would eventually dissipate with in the
locations. Still, it illustrated that Sidoyi was attempting to challenge British authority or at
least expressed some resistance to colonial rule.

The catalyst for Sidoyi’s challenge to colonial rule and the implementation of African
troops against other Africans occurred in March 1857. During a wedding between a man of
Sidoyi’s people and a woman of Mshukangubo, inkosi of the Memela, only 10 miles
downstream of Sidoyi, a dispute broke out between persons from both groups, resulting in
one of Mshukangubo’s men being killed and two of Sidoyi’s being wounded. Sidoyi’s people
led an attack the next day against Mshukangubo’s people, who retreated, leaving Sidoyi’s
people to plunder the huts. The incident was immediately reported by both chiefs to the local
magistrate, Mr. A.C. Hawkins, who sent messengers to stay any further violence while an
investigation was organized. Sidoyi, however, was not present for this initial attack. He
instead organized a larger expedition against his weaker neighbour before Hawkins could
respond. Three days after the initial incident Sidoyi attacked Mshukangubo people with a
force of 500 men. Mshukangubo was only able to muster 80, but, refusing to submit or
surrender, was killed with 20 of his men. According to Shepstone, the next morning
Mshukangubo body was discovered by Sidoyi, who proceed “with great ceremony to cut off
104
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his right eyebrow and right hand and to extract his tongue and right eye.”105 Following this
incident, Sidoyi and the surviving members of Mshukangubo people were summoned by the
magistrate to answer for the crime.106

Sidoyi’s actions were part of a ceremonial custom which involved the transferring of
power, both diplomatic and militarily, from one chief to another. Yet the mutilation of
Mshukangubo was also a more concerning statement on colonial rule. These deeds by Sidoyi
were not just an act of “barbarism”, but a “proclamation of independence” causing Shepstone
to become greatly concerned by how such an exercise in power would influence the other
chiefs of the colony.107 Sidoyi’s actions were not perceived simply as an isolated incident
amongst minor chiefs within the colony, but instead a threat to the colonial system
established by the British. Sidoyi had taking part in the one exercise of power that was
strictly limited by the colonial government: the levying of war on one’s neighbours. Because
the act of mutilation was typically performed by independent and hereditary chiefs, Sidoyi
was in essence declaring “independence” from the British authority, at least in the eyes of
Shepstone. If such actions were allowed to continue, Shepstone concluded that “minor tribes
would be destroyed by the more powerful, and the struggle for supremacy between the latter
and the Government [would] soon follow.”108 This was the source of great anxiety for
Shepstone, not just for the security of the colonial government, but for the smaller indigenous
groups within Natal that had fled under similar circumstances during the mfecane.
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To make matters worse, when summoned by Hawkins, Sidoyi refused to present
himself along with his people, sending his excuses by a messenger. With this refusal,
Lieutenant-Governor John Scott (appointed November 1856), issued a proclamation for the
capture of Sidoyi in April 1857. Shepstone was instructed to summon 800 Africans to
accompany a small force of Cape Mounted Rifles into the district. The orders were to arrest
Sidoyi, if possible, “seize all the cattle belonging to the tribe of [Sidoyi]”, take measures for
the removal of Sidoyi and his family’s authority, and place another person “to take charge of
such portion of his tribe as may remain within the Colony.”109

Some 800 indigenous forces were musters and formed into two columns. Led by
Shepstone and his brother John, this force moved into Sidoyi’s territory with the intention of
removing the chief and replacing him.110 It should be noted that while there was a small
contingent of Cape Mounted Rifles and regular troops from the 45th, the overwhelming
majority of men sent against Sidoyi were Africans from the Pietermaritzburg region,
presumably including the Mtintandaba. The African troops’ orders were simple: they were to
seize all cattle, horses and guns, and take Sidoyi and all of his principle men prisoners.
Shepstone made clear that “no huts were to be burnt, nor any hard done to women and
children, and no assegai to be used except in overcoming armed resistance to the execution of
these orders.”111 This was an act of punishment, not warfare, in the minds of Shepstone and
the colonial government. Within three days, the force had arrived in the district, and quickly
seized a large number of cattle and goats, as well as a few horses and muskets. Sidoyi,
however, remained elusive.
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By April 25th, Shepstone had given notice to the Africans driven away that they could
return to their kraals and would be protected from any future incursions. Four days later,
Shepstone succeeded in making arrangements for a general meeting with the elders of the
area. At this meeting, Shepstone made clear the crimes that had been committed, and inquired
to the location of Sidoyi. He was informed that Sidoyi had fled across the Drakensberg to this
uncle’s, who resided on the Orange River. Shepstone was quick to inform the elders that
Sidoyi and his family were no longer the legitimate chiefs, and in place of Sidoyi, Shepstone
placed Zashuke, one of Shepstone’s induna lieutenants, in command of the area. But a new
leader was only the beginning of the punishment inflicted by Shepstone and his African
troops. The elders agreed to Shepstone’s appointment, and in return only asked that “the
Government would look upon them with a friendly eye, and grant them ‘a spark to kindle a
fresh fire’—a figurative expression to mean a few cattle to begin the world again with.”112
This was ostensibly because Shepstone and his troops had seized 7,000 cattle, 12 horses,
seven stands of firearms, and a large quantity of goats. Of this quantity, only 1,600 were
restored to the Africans, 1,200 left in control of the magistrate for future disputes, 3,000 sold
at public auction, and 700 cattle presented as payment to the indigenous forces that aided in
the campaign, a continuation of the traditional African practice of using cattle as currency.113
All told, only ten percent of Sidoyi peoples’ cattle escaped seizure, representing a massive
impact on the economic viability of the district. Though the casualties of this incident were
low, with only four of Sidoyi’s people and one of Shepstone’s being killed, the latter by
accident and not direct conflict, the loss of cattle would have severely hampered the region’s
economic viability for years to come. Shepstone believed this punishment to be justified, and
even touted the acceptance of such action by Sidoyi’s people. Shepstone spent the final two
weeks of the expedition without his troops in the Mkhomazi district, “surrounded by large
112
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numbers of the very people I had been engaged in punishing.” The secretary of native affairs
expressed no apprehension and experienced no resentment from the Africans, claiming “their
hope for the future was in the Government, because although a child may be punished, he still
remains a child; and because when a parent punishes he leaves the shell.”114

Because of the severity of these actions and their detrimental impact on the Africans
in the district, the activities of Shepstone and the British government were condemned by
some colonists, namely the editors of the Natal Mercury, who claimed it as an act of
barbarism and injustice (ironic considering the catalyst for the event was seen by the colonial
government as having the same characteristics). The use of African customs, such as the
“eating up” of other chiefs, was universally condemned as a heathen and barbarous custom
“abhorrent to humanity and social justice, and above all, to the genius of our Christian
faith.”115 The editors of the Mercury were shocked that the initial reports of this incident were
not a “joke,” but instead a testament to the despotic nature of the British government in its
attempts to rule. This was only fuelled by rumours that the cattle which were confiscated did
not even belong to Sidoyi and that the “theft” had left the “unoffending men, women, and
children…to perish miserably during the winter now at hand.”116 Such a response is a
testament to the divergent views of the indigenous population which existed in the colony,
and is a clear indication of the paternalist nature that existed amongst the white community.
Criticism would be even more severe following another similar incident the subsequent year.

What remains important about the Sidoyi incident, however, is the almost
overwhelming use of African troops as the primary facilitators of colonial rule. Even when
the initial threat had subsided, there were still rumours of a small group residing along the
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mountains near the Mshukangubo locality. Shepstone feared spies, or even a counterattack of
some kind by Sidoyi himself. Instead of sending any of the European forces at his disposal,
Shepstone instead despatched 250 Africans, “under a Native Commander” to make a rapid
two night march to the area, capture any remaining cattle, and if possible, locate and capture
Sidoyi. Though Sidoyi was not present, there was a small force of 150 men near the forest of
the area. Independent of any European authority, the African troops caught the group
completely by surprise and successfully drove them off and seized their cattle. As Shepstone
praised the actions of his brother and Benjamin Moodie in commanding the troops, he had
“every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the Natives employed on this service; both
the officers place over them bear testimony to their zeal and obedience, and I had seldom
cause to find fault.”117 Again, the African troops had proved their viability, and despite
criticism from the press, had continued to illustrate their key role in Natal’s defensive
structure. Though the Sidoyi incident would not have the same controversy of the Matshana
incident the following year, it was a shining example of Shepstone’s use of African troops to
fulfil imperial will while retaining distinct African agency in the parameters of colonial
control. The “eating up” of Sidoyi was an act of controlled violence, both settler and African,
which indicated the growth of colonial authority in Natal and hallmarked its solidification as
a colonial state.118

Matshana Incident
There was little time to consider the long term ramifications of Shepstone and his
African troops’ actions. Soon after the Sidoyi incident, another problem with a local chief
arose in the colony, this time in the northern section of Natal in the Klip River District. In
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December 1857, the mysterious death of a man named Ntwetwe occurred within the territory
of Matshana, chief of the Sithole in the Msinga region of the colony.119 The death was soon
associated with man by the name of Sigatiya, who was purportedly an umthakathi, or one
who practices witchcraft. In retaliation, a group of men bound and brutally beat Sigatiya so
severely he died.120 The incident was reported by Sigatiya’s wife to the local magistrate, who
immediately began an inquiry. Because of the government stance on witchcraft and its use
within the colony, Matshana was called to appear before Magistrate T. F. Kelly and in a
similar fashion to Sidoyi, he refused.

Still in the shadow of the Sidoyi incident, it was possibly Matshana’s reputation
within the colony that contributed to the harsh response to his refusal. Matshana had been
cautioned about allowing deaths associated with witchcraft to occur under his jurisdiction in
1850 and three years later was reprimanded by Lieutenant-Governor Pine for the
implementation of capital punishment on Matshana’s uncle and sons. Pine even proclaimed
that “any man who in future wilfully attempts to take the life of another will most assuredly
forfeit his own.”121 Matshana’s refusal to report to the magistrate in 1857 after the death of
Sigatiya was communicated to the lieutenant-governor, who immediately ordered the
mustering of troops to force repercussions. Initially, Duncan Moodie was ordered to request a
force of men from Langalibalele to assist the government in dealing with the “rebellious
chief”. By January, Resident Magistrate Kelly made attempts to meet with Matshana in a
final effort to avoid direct conflict. The meeting failed and a larger force was mustered in
Pietermaritzburg. In addition to 500 indigenous troops under the command of John
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Shepstone, 47 men from the Natal Carbineers and Natal Frontier Guard and 38 Afrikaners
were sent out to arrest Matshana.122 The force departed on January 11 and arrived in the Klip
River District on the 18th. Theophilus, though not in direct command of the expedition,
recommended the use of similar tactics as those used against Sidoyi the previous year. The
force would split in two, sweep up opposite sides of the Mzinyathi River, search the areas for
Matshana and his supporters, and take cattle as they proceeded.123

Matshana quickly fled the district into the Zululand, but remained in contact with his
people across the river, limiting the success of the expedition. Some 4,000 cattle, three
horses, and 2,000 goats and sheep were seized and the kraal’s population dispersed. This
effective show of force, however, had failed to successfully capture a chief who had been the
source of problems in the past for British authority in the region. The volunteer military corps
and indigenous troops performed adequately, with only two African deaths among the total
casualties of the initial expedition. In the eyes of the colonial government, the colony had, in
essence, effectively prevented a possible military crisis from within. The chief, however, who
was the target of the expedition, had escaped again, leading to a continuous fear of his return
with possible aid from the Zululand. This was only exacerbated by rumours of a force being
gathered by Cetshwayo, future king of the Zululand, coming to Matshana’s aid.124 Moodie
even went as far as to claim that Matshana “like every other traitor to the British
Government, found a ready asylum with [Cetshwayo].”125 Such aid, however, did not come,
but the criticism of the incident from the colonists fostered a debate that would continue
decades later.
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Criticism from the pages of the Natal Mercury took the form of questioning the
amount of time and the delay of the use of force that resulted, in the opinion of the editors, in
the escape of Matshana. The escape of this “petty young chief” could have been prevented,
according the editors, by the quick summoning of the Natal Frontier Guard in the region,
without the necessity to report to the lieutenant-governor and Shepstone in
Pietermaritzburg.126 According to the editors, the fault laid in the insistence of the secretary
of native affairs in summoning the indigenous military force while also placing it under the
command of his brother, who appears to be the source of much scorn from the press. The
accomplishments of the Natal Carbineers are commended, but the editors lament the lost
opportunities once again in capturing an “impudent young vagabond barbarian” who had
insulted the leader of the colony by his refusal to answer a summons.127 The memory of
Sidoyi still resonated from within the colony and the indigenous troops were an easy target
for criticism and scorn in regards to the efficiency of the colony’s defensive structures.

If such an editorial is less a criticism of the indigenous military forces and more the
administrative policy of Theophilus Shepstone, it remains interesting that the actions of the
volunteer military corps were not questioned, and in fact were praised and used as an
example of the existing potential of colonial security, despite the evidence that the mustering
of the Natal Carbineers was most likely the cause for the delay. Similar criticisms of the
efficiency of the volunteers compared to the African troops would be a common excuse
during the Langalibalele rebellion as well. Such logic is typical among the European
colonists during this period, largely due to their belief that a disciplined group of well-armed,
mounted white men could “go any where, do anything, in the territory, beneath British
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rule.”128 Ironically, such accounts were propagated by the volunteer histories, and not by any
direct fault in the African troops. In the official Natal Carbineer history, the march from
Pietermaritzburg is presented as a “fair day” event instead one of a military nature, with the
troops marching out late in the morning and only arriving in the Klip River district after over
five days march. To compare, the Carbineers came across a body of Africans who preceded
the main force, and were so ignorant of the composition of the African troops that they were
mistaken as spies.129 It come as no surprise than that the official history of the Carbineers
made no reference to the contribution of the African troops in the Matshana incident,
dismissing the vast majority of the force that was responsible for the stabilization of this
region in the colony of Natal.

This omission became even more striking when considering the African contribution
to an ill planned ambush attempt of Matshana by John Shepstone two months later. John
Shepstone and his indigenous forces remained in the Klip River district following Matshana’s
retreat, but Shepstone held out hope of capturing the exiled chief. A dialogue opened between
Matshana and Shepstone, resulting in several meetings. At each of these meetings Matshana
arrived with over 50 armed men, making any attempt at capture him considerably unsafe.
John Shepstone was eventually able to convince Matshana in April 1858 to meet under less
hostile grounds. The plan was for Matshana and his men to leave their weapons a mile away
from the meeting place to ensure a peaceful accord. Shepstone, however, had a more
nefarious plan in mind. As the meeting commenced, a group of Shepstone’s African troops
would secure Matshana’s weapons, leaving Matshana unarmed and expected to surrender.130
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To insure success, John Shepstone hid a pistol under his sitting mat, which would be the main
weapon used in the capture attempt.131

Despite all of the planning, John Shepstone was unsuccessfully in his attempt to
capture Matshana, resulting in the death of 30 of the chief’s escorts in what has been termed a
massacre.132 Matshana fled to the Zululand once again, never to make further attempts at
parley with the Shepstones. In the short term, the actions of John Shepstone were praised as
part of an attempt to capture this “impudent young vagabond barbarian”.133 This event,
however, would be called to attention later by the Bishop John Colenso following the
Langalibalele incident in 1873. Colenso was particularly critical of the manner in which Sir
Theophilus “shielded” his brother from the outrage following the incident in 1858, claiming
that both Shepstones were responsible for a great injustice.134 From what has been described
as “spin, cover-up and damage control”, the actions of John Shepstone created a rift between
the Shepstones and the Colensos and became a point of controversy in the Shepstonian policy
for decades to come.135 Though the use of indigenous military forces would not be the key
issue in the debate, the continuing use of said troops gave a clear indication of the usefulness
they provided for the administrative structure of the colony, despite the failures of their
administrators and commanders. It cannot be overstated that John Shepstone had no
European military support in his attempted ambush of Matshana. His exclusive reliance on
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the African military institutions continues to emphasize their importance to not only the
colonial policies of defence, but the overall methods of colonial control within Natal.

Both the Matshana and Sidoyi incidents also represented the major means through
which Shepstone, and in turn the colonial government, was able to maintain and expand such
forces within the colony. With the removals of these two chiefs, a power vacuum was left
open by Shepstone and his African troops. For Sidoyi, Shepstone had placed Zashuke, one of
his primary induna lieutenants, in command of the area. In turn, Matshana’s territory was
eventually awarded to Ngoza, one of the leaders of the Mtintandaba, during the 1860s, which
he ruled under the direction of Shepstone until his death in 1869.136 Shepstone awarded his
indunas in the same manner Shaka had awarded his head men during the time of the mfecane.
The Zulu military tradition which dominated the colony of Natal, whether directly or
indirectly, continued to have longstanding impact on the formation of Natal’s military
structures, even when the “martial race” ideals of Natal’s African populations were imposed
from without, instead of within.

The Zulu Militia
These multiple instances of indigenous rebellion which permeated the 1850s were
directly or indirectly related to the colonial government’s call for new forms of defence,
taking the form of volunteer corps and later mounted police. There were still, however, those
who advocated for a military presence of Africans to aid in the defence of not only Natal, but
the Empire. In October 1858, Captain J.H. Browne and Lieutenant Colonel and Commandant
J. Palmer presented two separate letters to Lord Lytton at the Office of the Secretary of State
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for the Colonies.137 Both men were members of the South Mayo Rifles, an Irish militia
stationed in the Castlebar Military Barracks and affiliated with the 88th (Connaught Rangers)
Regiment of Foot. Both schemes involved the stationing of the Mayo Rifles in Natal and the
raising of a “Zulu” militia that would be the blueprint for a militarized camp system within
the colony and allow for the preparation of African troops to be sent across the Empire,
particularly India (as an alternative or supplement to the Sepoy who had just been defeated in
June). The manner in which these two officers present their plan, and the response from the
British government, is illustrative of not only the perceptions of the Africans in Natal as a
“martial race” within the British Empire, but also telling of the perceived shortcomings of the
existing military systems in the colony of Natal.

Though Palmer and Browne made principally the same proposal to the Colonial
Office, the context in which they placed the scheme was somewhat altered. Palmer argued
that in the event of a European war, the British Army was “insufficient to defend the
extremities of the empire” with a population of 3,000,000 contained by an army of only a
100,000 (including the 75,000 in India).138 With that in mind, Palmer argued that troops that
could deal with the hot climates across the globe would be a worthy investment for the
Empire. Palmer pointed to Natal, which by his estimates contained “a population of Zooloos
[sic] & Basutos of between 200 & 300,000 among whom are estimated 48,000 warriors.”
Interestingly, Palmer argued that the answer to concerns for systems of security within the
colony of Natal would be the recruitment of these “hardy African troops” for the service of
the Empire. It is almost impossible to consider where such a scheme came from, but Palmer
believed that the officers of the South Mayo Rifles would be ideal candidates in the formation
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of an African militia that would be the cornerstone of these new African regiments (despite
none of these officers having any experience with African languages). With the confidence
Palmer had in “the strongest regiment of Irish Militia excepting one”, the British government
could place its faith in the South Mayo Rifles forming this grande armée of the Empire.139
Ideally, the South Mayo Rifles would relieve the existing British troops in Natal, while also
taking upon themselves the task of forming a second, African battalion of equal strength, with
European officers appointed amongst the colonists by the governor, selected of course “from
persons conversant with the native language”.140 As for the recruitment of Africans, Palmer
argued that the officers of the Mayo Militia had ample experience in recruiting during the
“last war” (presumably the Crimean War) in the Curragh Camp in Kildare and Dublin.
Palmer made the general assumption that recruitment techniques would be similar, as this is
the only viable experience offered for the plan. From this battalion, Palmer recommended the
formation of military farms on government land, where the African recruits could be set to
the task of cultivating cotton under the supervision of their officers.

Expectations for the growth of cotton were typical during this period. Some 30,000
acres were granted by the government to the Natal Cotton Company in 1847. High
expectations, however, resulted in lacklustre sales figures. Also, many of the labourers who
were brought into the colony to cultivate the land had little to no knowledge of cotton; their
expertise lying more in oats, rye, potatoes and beans. The company soon withdrew its request
for crown land and eventually the cotton industry itself would collapse by the 1860s.141

Palmer argued that the military code that the Africans would work under could act as
a bridge to the more “complicated civilization of the civil law” as soldiering was more
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adapted to “the ideas of a barbarian”.142 This logic led directly to Palmer’s belief that the
martial race characteristics of the “Zulu” were ideal for military life, as it had been attained
under the rule of King Shaka. More importantly, the “seeds of civilization”, which these
institutions developed, would lead to prosperity for both the Africans and the increase of
European enterprise and profitability, moving the Southern African economy away from the
traffic of slaves and into more civilized tasks of produce cultivation. For Palmer, this process
would need five years to take root, with the establishment of the Mayo Rifles in Natal and the
eventual creation of the first African Militia, numbering around 300 men. After this five year
period, the Mayo Rifles would be incorporated with the army and be responsible for an
“African Legion” numbering 2,000 men. The short term impact of the program would be the
providing African troops to all segments of the Empire, namely India, but the grander goal of
the program was the act as “pioneers in a new road to a field for recruiting” within the
Empire.143

Captain Browne’s letter was presented with almost the exact information, including
the numbers of Africans and viable warriors in Natal. Instead of beginning his
recommendation in light of the growing military concerns within the Empire, Browne instead
pointed to the growing population within Natal and how “history shows them to be capable of
military discipline”.144 More importantly, Browne emphasized the plan’s viability rested on
the key characteristics exhibited by the Africans of Natal: the “prestige of England among
South African tribes”, the Africans adaptability to “service in hot climates,” their nearly
overwhelming numbers, and their “freedom from religious animosity to Europeans”.145 Such
characteristics made the Africans of Natal ideal for replacing British troops in India and
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beyond. Browne also emphasized the impact on commerce and diminishing of the slave trade
such forces would provide for Natal.

Despite the passion exhibited in both proposals, the War Department had no interest
in such a scheme. After the proposals of Captain Brown and Lt. Col. Palmer were forwarded
to the secretary of state for war, they were informed the next month that the government was
“unable to entertain the proposal”.146 In private correspondence within the colonial office, the
proposal was described as a “wild scheme” which should not even be presented to the War
Department. The primary concerns from the Colonial Office rested in the idea of arming
Africans in a European style, which was essentially seen as “preparing a fresh Army of
Sepoys to revolt against us…but Sepoys consisting of hardy Africans instead of timid
Hindoos”.147 Even those within the Colonial Office who saw the appeal of indigenous troops
insisted that it was impractical to consider stationing the African troops in their own country,
for the simple condition of safety. A “Zulu regiment” could perhaps work, but only if they
were stationed “at Gibraltar and other posts of the same kind”.148 The plan, in simplest terms,
was too dangerous and too impractical to be even considered.

Such recommendations could be dismissed as absurd, or even laughable. Yet they are
illustrative of the perceptions that existed within the imperial mind which envisioned a use
for African troops within the colony of Natal and the Empire. Browne and Palmer both had
substantial misconceptions regarding the Africans of Natal (the generalization of “Zulu”
being just one). This was not for lack of trying. Captain Browne including in his proposal
multiple segments of information from the Colonial Blue Books regarding the “State of the
Kaffir Tribes”, underlining quotes from Livingstone and the Reverend Shooter regarding the
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“noble figures” of the Zulu and the military abilities of the people of Southern Africa.149
Perhaps more importantly, the aspirations of Palmer and Browne to become a part of the
military establishment of the colony of Natal are evident in their letters. Browne, who
includes his card as “Mr. J. Howe Browne, 39 Rutland Gate, Hyde Park”, was seemingly no
longer an active member of the Mayo Rifles, and saw this as an opportunity to improve his
lot in the Empire. Palmer, almost on the verge of pre-emptive nostalgia, declared that the
officers of the Mayo Rifles would be rewarded with their commissions in the army which
they would “devote the best years of their lives” to the execution of the scheme.150 Such
expectations reveal that the African in Natal, like so many other colonial troops in the
nineteenth century, remained an avenue for imperial careering.

It should be noted that the “Zulu scheme” was not the only attempt to make use of
forces available to the British. Obviously individuals like Palmer and Shepstone appreciated
the use of indigenous forces within the colony (despite the variations of their systems of
control). This, however, did not translate to a total advocacy for non-white troops within the
colony. As we have seen with the failed attempt to create an Indian Volunteer unit, there were
also plans to supplement both white and African troops in Natal during the 1860s. In 1867,
the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Indian Army and the Colonies made
inquiries into the viability of stationing troops from India into other parts of the Empire, a
pragmatic solution to the limitations of manpower in the ever growing imperial dominion. In
a response to a questionnaire submitted by the committee, Shepstone admitted that the use of
Indian forces within Natal would not be a very wise decision.151 Citing the African
resentment that already existed toward Indian labour in Natal, Shepstone feared that the
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presence of Indian troops would fuel anger as well as rebellion, which the Africans “might
otherwise not have attempted.”152 Shepstone attested that the most reliable troops raised for
the defence of the colony would be those from the colony itself, with the stipulation that
white officers would be expected to lead them. The apprehension felt in regards to the Indian
troops was most likely not the result of lingering fear from the Indian Mutiny ten years
before, but instead related to a deeper understanding of the indigenous population of Natal
that Shepstone was largely renowned for. Shepstone’s understanding of the Africans, even by
the 1860s, was still seen as the most informed opinion within the colony of Natal. Even the
infamous Langalibalele Rebellion would do little to diminish Shepstone’s credentials or alter
the importance of African troops to the safety and security of the colony.

Africans in the Langalibalele Incident
Perhaps one of the most haunting and telling events of the formative period of Natal,
the Langalibalele “Rebellion” of 1873 represents a primary turning point in the place of
Africans within the colony of Natal, in both the sense of its own protection and the fear of the
indigenous population from colonial settlers. The Langalibalele incident has already been
discussed in previous chapters, but it is important to understand the basic premises to better
contextualize African participation in putting down the rebellion. Though the conflict
between the Hlubi and the British administration was the primary motivator in this incident, it
was the response by the government which created its infamy in the eyes of many colonial
settlers.153 Though producing one of the most complete accounts of the motives and
outcomes of the incident to date, Jeff Guy rightly points out that though these Africans were
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crucial to the enterprise of putting down the rebellion “the details are few and it is difficult to
reconstruct.”154

From what has already been discussed, the Langalibalele incident was representative
of a clash of indigenous and colonial forces over the issue of sovereignty and more
importantly the rights of defence. John Macfarlane, Resident Magistrate at Estcourt,
demanded in 1873 that Langalibalele, a powerful chief between the Bushman’s and Little
Thukela Rivers, turn in all unregistered firearms under Natal’s Gun Laws. Much like the
Sidoyi and Matshana incidents, Langalibalele refused. As has been previously noted, what
made this incident so unique was the place Langalibalele held within Shepstone’s system of
military defence. The Hlubi had assisted Shepstone on multiple occasions, most notable the
Matshana incident of 1858 (see above). When called upon in the same manner, the chief
refused. The source of Langalibalele’s actions has been a constant debate within the
historiography, but it can be assumed that pride and ego dictated the actions of both sides
leading up to the incident. Though the racial composition of the volunteers clearly defines
their actions during the rebellion, it does little to explain the African response, or perceptions
of their response, from the majority of the population within the colony of Natal. It must be
emphasized that Langalibalele was a respected member of the indigenous community.
Though he had fled into the colony during the Mpande incursions of the late 1840s and been
forced into the Drakensberg location in 1849, Langalibalele had achieved resounding success
for both himself and the people under his charge. Sadly, it was this success verging on
prosperity that contributed to the eventual harsh repercussions against Langalibalele and his
people.
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As has been previously stated, the catalyst for the harsh repercussions against
Langalibalele and his people can be traced to the incident at Bushman’s Pass. Three
volunteers and an interpreter were killed in what amounted to an act of folly by the British
colonial officials, combined with the over confidence of the Natal Carbineers.155 Much was
made by Major Durnford’s report that orders were given “not to fire the first shot”, but it was
in all likelihood the failure of the volunteer’s discipline that contributed to the “disaster”.156
For many, it was the failure of Captain Allison’s African troops to properly arrive on time to
assist Durnford that gained the most scorn from the colonial population. Pine even went as far
as to describe “the true cause of this disaster was the fatal mistake in the plans which
prevented Mr. Allison and his large native force being on the spot to meet and support the
volunteers.”157 One contributor to the Times of Natal dismissed any fault on the part of the
volunteers, but instead cast the volunteers as a support group that was simply abused by its
connected African force. Whereas much had been said about the order “not to fire the first
shot” with reference to the disastrous occurrence at the head of Bushman’s River Pass, the
contributor to the Times argued that if examining the Durnford’s orders further, one would
realize that “the volunteers were sent to support the civil power in the arrest of a rebel; the
civil power were supposed to be an armed force of native police.”158 Since the Carbineers
were sent to the pass to support a body of Africans under Captain Allison, the orders meant
that the African troops would have to be the ones who would act fist. Since the orders never
contemplated the volunteer force being opposed alone, there was no reason for Durnford to
act as conservatively. In fact, the contributor went so far as to suggest that since a small
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contingent of Sotho was present, they should have been sent first, asking: “Would not the
employment of this small force in attack have been within the means of the order, and have
avoided any imputation of disobedience?”159 Even when critical of Durnford and the
volunteers, responsibility still fell upon the African, ostensibly because there was no voice to
defend their actions directly in the press.

Though it remained McFarlane’s primary responsibility to draw up the forces from
the local chiefs during the rebellion, it was a focus within the colonial government to bring
about a large body of indigenous levies to participate in the formal putting down of
Langalibalele and the Hlubi. This mustering was made more feasible with the declaration of
martial law by Lieutenant-Governor Pine in November. Two flying columns, composing of
largely Africans led by local magistrates, would be the primary response force that hunted
down Langalibalele. Forces were mustered from around Pietermaritzburg, Estcourt, and the
Klip River District. The appointed chiefs saw this as an opportunity to maintain their place
within the British administrative structure, but also solidify claims to their own land and the
opportunity for plunder and cattle. One group, the Mchunu of Phakade, had even taken part in
driving the Hlubi into their location twenty years before.160 Now it was their goal to drive
them out.

It would be an oversimplification to say that the response against the Hlubi was a
simple continuation of the actions by Shepstone against the likes of Sidoyi and Matshana.
The atrocities committed by the Africans and volunteers during the rebellion were ones that
had been carried out in a multitude of colonial settings, including Natal: looting, seizing of
livestock, and the forceful removal of people. Thousands of heads of cattle were seized,
kraals were burned, and women and children were captured and forcibly removed. By the end
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of December, Langalibalele was captured, and by the end of April, he and seven of his sons,
two of his indunas, and some 200 followers were sentenced to various types of imprisonment,
with Langalibalele most notably being sentenced to Robben Island in the Cape Colony.
Langalibalele’s trial would cause more turmoil in the colony, but the incident was essentially
concluded.161

Though the death of the volunteers at Bushman’s pass had been labelled “a sad
catastrophe”, this attack against the Hlubi people was seen as a fitting repercussion, in light
of Pine’s report to the Earl of Kimberly:

Our forces have, in small skirmishes with the remainder of the tribe hidden in caves
and strong fastnesses, been everywhere successful, killing a large number and taking
some men and an immense number of their women. No men, however, have been
killed unless with arms in their hands, but I regret that their number has been so
considerable.162

Ironically, where the African forces under Allison were presented as the “fatal mistake”
which led to the deaths of the volunteers at Bushman’s Pass, Pine strongly emphasized the
two flying columns of African troops which were sent out against Langalibalele, even
praising the services of Shepstone along with “the services which the native contingents
afforded me [Pine].”163 In December 1873, toward the conclusion of the rebellion, Captain
Allison also praised the contributions of the African troops, by that point numbering 1,600
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men. Though suffering hardships in the mountains due to improper clothing, there was no
open dissent, and only “one case of punishment for neglect of duty.”164

The failure of Allison to arrive on time did little to the importance of African troops to
the putting down of the Hlubi, and did not limit the number of African troops mustered in
response to the rebellion. This becomes striking when looking at the importance of African
troops to the colonial military plan during the incident. Instead of acting as a supporting
force, African troops were the primary military institution in the plans of Commandant Miles.
This included 500 Africans under Allison, Lucas, Macfarlane, and Hawkins, all resident
magistrates of their districts respectively. They would be supported by volunteer and regular
forces, and not vice versa. This was not a dramatic departure from the use of African troops
in the Sidoyi and Matshana incidents, but it shows a clear shift from the apprehensions shown
in 1851 against the colonial levies. This shift is particular telling in regards to the response of
many colonists to the destruction in the post-Langalibalele incident, including pillaging and
cattle theft.

The repercussions for Langalibalele’s flight did not end with the chief’s capture. The
defeat of the Hlubi created what amounted to socio-economic vacuum in Natal. Though white
colonists were more than happy to take over the location land and begin farming, Africans
taking part in the suppression of Hlubi forces also saw opportunities for economic gain. The
payment of cattle was the major means of compensation by magistrates and officers within
the indigenous levies, and additional plunder was seen as a means of appeasement and
continuing cooperation between the European and African military forces within the colony.
One such incident involved an African force attached to Captain Lucas’ command in late
December of 1873.
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In May 1874, Mr. Scott of Geluk Farm forwarded a complaint to lieutenant-governor
regarding a “native force” under the command of James Gregory from the Klip River County.
Scott contended that on December 20th, this group “destroyed the whole of the household
stuffs and clothing of his [Scott’s] native tenants as well as part of their live stock, ill-used the
native themselves and threatened their lives, one Native being murdered by the said party on
or on the verge of the Farm.”165 Despite the likelihood of such complaints following the
actions of many military personnel during the rebellion, HC Shepstone, Theophilus’ son and
Resident Magistrate of Ladysmith, when inquiring into the accusation, discovered some
discrepancies. According to Gregory, his troops were not near the Geluk Farm on the 20th,
though he did pass the night at Scott’s home the night of the 23rd, where Scott spoke to
Gregory about his losses, and even offered to bring the owners of the kraals that had been
robbed down the Tugela “the following morning that they might identify the offenders
and…punish them.”166 The next day Scott, however, arrived at the Tugela Punt (floating
bridge), and informed Gregory that no complainants were coming, after which Gregory left.

Why the discrepancy? It is probable that Scott himself was not at the farm when the
troops came through, and did not mention Gregory’s arrival later due to either
absentmindedness, or even the perception that it was not pertinent due to the lack of any
conclusive outcomes. The complaint, however, could be used as conduit for further problems
with the colonial government, including grievances about the manner in which African cases
were handled by the magistrate, or even the simplicity of a gun charge which H. Shepstone
simply states he could not address in the grievance. Time could also have been a relevant
factor. Though the initial complaint had been put forward in May, it was not until October
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1874 that Shepstone began addressing the issue. This was nothing extraordinary, as the
colonial government was still dealing with the repercussions of the Langalibalele incident
well over a year later, prompting some complains to be backlogged or simply forgotten. The
Geluk Farm incident is perhaps most revealing of the perceived versus actual role of the
African troops in the rebellion, as well as the inability of many colonists and Africans to
differentiate between rebel and collaborator.

According to Shepstone’s report to the Secretary of Native Affairs (his father
Theophilus), Captain Lucas during the rebellion had granted a pass to the indunas of many
kraals of the Hlubi who reported themselves as unwilling to take part in the resistance to the
colonial government. Such passes guaranteed both the safety of themselves and their property
as long as their kraals remained neutral. Amongst these kraals included the Silonda,
Sotemela, Undaba, Uklacs, and Uqitywa of Geluk Farm.167 On further examining and
interviews, Shepstone discovered that the acts of theft on the farm were committed by a small
party of Mclwyzi’s men under an induna named Umginqizane. The probable reason
Gregory’s force was implicated in the incident was their presence in the neighbourhood the
same day examining kraals and searching for rebels. Mclwyzi’s men could not be called upon
to corroborate, as they were in Pietermaritzburg and appeared to be under the protection of
another chief outside the jurisdiction of H. Shepstone’s magistracy. As for the murder, this
remained unclear, as Shepstone contented there was little evidence that proved either a party
of Gregory’s men or those under Umginqizane were responsible. The only detail know for
certain was the man’s death was violent and unjustifiable as the victim was unarmed. Though
compensation was provided for the loss of property, a total of £8 10 s. for the five men, there
was no conclusive evidence or prosecution for the death of the African. Despite the fact that
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the African forces were ostensibly cleared of wrongdoings, the cloud of possible violence still
resonated in the area almost a year after the Langalibalele rebellion.

All of these incidents, combined with the activities by the African units during the
rebellion itself, showed the heavy reliance the colonial government had on these African
defensive institutions. It would not be an exaggeration to state that without the involvement
of Africans in the capture and dispersing of Langalibalele’s forces, Shepstone and the
colonial government would lack the resource necessary to impose their colonial will. It
remains telling, however, that the African units, despite their assistance, remained the source
of blame and apprehension from large segments of the colonial society. Perhaps this was
simply deflection on the part of the colonial population, or the product of a racialized world
view. Perhaps, more likely, it was the revelation that Langalibalele, a long-time ally to
Shepstone, would just as quickly become a threat the emerging colonial state. It was no
surprise than, that the continued use of African troops created such apprehension and debate
throughout the formative period.

“A Pretorian Guard of Savages”
The debates which raged in Natal over the use of African troops remained a heated
issue throughout the formative period of the colony. The Sidoyi, Matshana, and Langalibalele
incident all illustrated the need and practicality of the indigenous defensive institutions. Much
like the African police, however, African troops were seen as a danger to the peace and
security of the colony. The criticisms that had boiled over regarding the African levies in the
1850s had not subsided decades later in the shadow of the Langalibalele incident. Though the
far-fetched schemes of the Zulu Sepoy style regiments were dismissed before any proper
implementation, the continuing reliance on African troops posed an even greater problem for
white settlers. As the volunteers and burgher forces were seen as a counterbalance to the
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necessity for a standing army, the African troops were seen as a dangerous crutch for the
colony.

Oddly, the colony and its government remained on a precarious position of
equilibrium by the conclusion of the 1860s and moving into 1870. The report of a
commission appointed by the lieutenant-governor to inquire into the state of the colonial
forces and defences in 1868 found major faults in the volunteer systems and regular colonial
forces, calling upon the construction of more laagers in all counties and stating the present
volunteer system was “very defective in respect to organization, efficiency, [and] disciple.”168
Ironically, laagers were seen as the best means of protection as the settlers were “scattered
among the native tribes of Natal” which at this point had reached 250,000 Africans compared
to 15,000 Europeans and 6,000 Indians.169 Even with this impending threat, the commission
reported that “native tribes have an organisation of their own sufficient for present purposes,
and that it would be unwise to disturb their natural arrangements.”170 Despite all the criticism,
nothing was officially changed in the indigenous military systems. Whether this was the
result of neglect or ignorance remains unclear. Theophilus Shepstone served on this
committee, which submitted its report in March 1869, though it is unlikely he had any
problems with his own system of indigenous troop management as he remained the de facto
leader of any such organization.

It is important to note that the questionnaires sent out to resident magistrates
regarding to topic of colonial defence included information relevant to the African military
forces within the colony. The lists of question for the commission included descriptions of
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the colonial force in their country or division as militia, burgher, volunteer, African, or a
combination, whether military forces should be raised from the African population, and if so,
on what principle, either armed, mounted or unmounted.171 Ironically, many of the later
questions not pertaining to the volunteer forces focused almost exclusively on the “native
forces”, including preventative measures insuring minimal panic amongst the African
population in the case of invasion, or whether “a paid infantry force, officered by
Europeans…could thorough dependence be place upon their fidelity, if property selected.”172
In spite of these questions, the committee made little comment on the importance of
indigenous troops the following year.

Even in the Report of the Select Committee upon the Financial State of the Colony in
July 1869 no mention is made of the indigenous contribution to colonial defence. The
committee recommended limiting Shepstone’s powers as Secretary of Native Affairs, though
this was nothing new in the continuing conflict with Shepstone and his detractors. The
greatest concern regarding colonial defence was the possibility of the small body of imperial
troops being withdrawn from the colony, throwing “the burden of preserving the peace of the
country upon a small number of white inhabitants, surrounded on all sides by uncivilized
native tribes.”173 This ignorance or dismissal of the indigenous forces, as has been shown,
was nothing new. Nonetheless, this period was chiefly characterized by the call for reform
and changes within the colonial system, as has been shown for both the volunteer and police
institutions. The following year, two bills related to defence were introduced, one for the
better regulation of the volunteers, and the other “For the better defence of the colony.” The
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second bill principally attempted to create a system in which all able bodied white men would
be capable of joining a military detachment in times of need, or simple be “armed and liable
to be called out for active service when required.”174 The bill was never ratified (unlike its
volunteer counterpart), but the complete dismissal of African troops is again glaring.

Within the public debate, however, Africans were not ignored, but instead cast as the
worse possible solution to the problems of defence within the colony. When discussing the
new military tactics used during the Franco-Prussian War of 1871, the editors of the Witness
lamented the new technology, tactics, and science of the war which was not being
implemented within the colonies. Though England had a strong military tradition:

at present, in Natal, the Executive seems to be undecided whether the defence of the
colony, against internal enemies, should be undertaken by the Home or the Colonial
Government; and, if the local authorities were left to themselves (which, of course,
they could not be) they would probably begin to inaugurate a plan of defence after the
Governor had been either scotched or killed by the enemy, and not before.175

Perhaps most threatening to the European population was not the possibility of an
armed African force, but instead the lack of a proper implementation of discipline and fear to
insure the submission of the local African population. The colonial government, in the
opinion of the editors, had done nothing “to place the defence of the colony on a satisfactory
footing, by preparing the colony for attack, or by weakening the powers of the Kafirs.”176
Africans no long “feared” the “white man” because their defeat by the Afrikaners decades
before had diminished in the collective memory.177 Instead, the Africans had forgotten, and in
turn become “to a great extend armed with European weapons…[and remained] under their
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hereditary chiefs.”178 Of course, the editors of the Witness did not venture to claim whether
such conditions made them less or more defiant, but left the answer to their readers’
imagination.

Criticism rested on the current government policy that had done nothing to remove
the ongoing, imperceptible threat of the African but instead had only addressed emergency
threats, such as the Sidoyi, Matshana, and Langalibalele incidents. Questions continued to be
raised, which still resonated from the previous decade: “Have all or any of the natural
fastness, in which the native are located been penetrated by good roads? Are our volunteers
as well organised and armed as is possible? Have any efforts been made to facilitate the
construction of railways?”179 All answers were in the negative, but for many of these
infrastructure concerns, the colonial government was not entirely to blame before 1867
(largely due to the financial problems of the colony). Recommendations from the editors
remained focused on the reliance on Europeans, with the encouragement of the burgher
forces being organised by the Afrikaners (which have already been revealed to be ineffective
for much of their existence in the colony) and the involvement of English and German
colonists in “every possible effort should be made to get up an efficient volunteer corps, that
should comprise of all classes.”180 As was typically the case, suggestion were made for
monetary grants which focused on the protection of prospective neighbourhoods, citing that
cost savings would be better than the current system.

Of course, as has been previously discussed, such initial monetary investment was
highly unlikely for most of the formative period of the colony. The level of anxiety expressed
by the editor, however, ultimately extends to the belief that the colony should be less
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dependent on “native police” and African troops, described as being fuelled by “tribal
antipathies” which allowed for the alliance with other African leaders and the “eating up” of
other chiefdoms. If the African troops were allowed to continue this system of influence,
without being properly balanced against a European police force, the editors of the Witness
believed the colony was “training a Pretorian guard of savages, who, no doubt will, if the
system continued, do as such forces have ever done.”181 What the editors of the Witness
continually ignored was with such an analysis; Shepstone was the “emperor” of the colony,
not the Lieutenant-Governor, a fitting, if somewhat exaggerated metaphor to Natal’s colonial
power structure.

Just as the white population of the colony was concerned with an African arresting a
European, the colonists of Natal were fearful of being usurped by the established military
systems which predated their arrival in the colony. Though such systems had only slightly
evolved since European arrival, the consistency of African military tradition remained an
intimidating, if not outright threatening, prospect to the legitimacy of British rule. The
combination of a fear of an invasion from the outside and within was only exacerbated by the
inherent problems that existed within the European institutions of control. The Langalibalele
rebellion provided fodder for greater criticism of indigenous troops, but did little to relieve
the colony’s own concerns for their own military traditions, despite all claims to the contrary
from the parts of the media and many colonial administrators. Though the catalyst for
military reform, including the greater formalization of the volunteer system and the
implementation of a more professional mounted police, the Langalibalele incident did not
change primary military structures of the colony. African troops of the colony of Natal would
remain the most significant component of the colony’s defensive institutions, and would be
crucial in the British invasion of the Zululand in 1879.
181
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Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that the use of African troops and their contribution to
the colonial order had a significant impact of the forging of Natal as a colonial state. It would
be remiss, however, to ignore the African contribution to the most iconic incident of this
formative period of the colony: the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. The largest effort to mobilize
the Africans into a semi-formal military organisation was the Natal Native Contingent (or
NNC). Though largely forgotten in the collective memory of the war, over half of the 17,000
troops commanded by Lord Chelmsford that marched into the Zululand in January 1879 were
Africans.182 Considered “black auxiliaries”, the NNC was placed under the command of
Colonel Anthony Durnford and headed by European officers and NCOs. The main trust of
the contingent included three “lines” which contributed to the three major invasion columns,
numbering about 2,000 men each. A major divergence from previous deployments was the
organization of over 1,300 “mounted natives”, consisting of eight companies, though 800 of
these men were part of the “transport service” and “pioneer corps” that was associated with
the Royal Engineers. All told, the NNC consisted of 8,187 men, including 14 white
officers.183

Despite the size and organization of this contingent, these African troops were given
no uniforms, save a red headband to distinguish them from the Zulu, and only one in ten were
given rifles. The remaining men were forced to fight with traditional throwing spears and
shields, resulting in cases of the members of the NNC being mistaken for Zulu troops in the
heat of battle. The limited success of the NNC appeared largely the result of the inability of
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the British command to fully implement them into the traditional British military
organization.184 Though they were expected to make major contributions to the war effort, the
overall impression of their use has rightly been described as rife with “authoritarian stupidity
and racist exploitation.”185 The NNC was also never able to be effectively used as a scouting
force during the campaign, instead being used as manual labour instead of soldiers,
particularly the pioneer and transport units. This was a consistent theme of African troops
throughout the military history of the British Empire and not just Natal.186 Over 3,000
Africans were also used for “various Army Services”, including an additional 2,291 used for
transport and hospital services, and 724 men for the “Special Pioneer Service, on the Roads
used by the Military within the Colony.”187

If the NNC could be perceived as a failure, it did not diminish their overall
importance to the war. Despite part of the troops being nearly wiped out in Chelmsford’s
second column at Isandlwana, they remained an active part of the continued invasion for the
remainder of the year. Discipline, of course, was also a factor, as was the case with any levied
troops, African or otherwise.188 The fleeing of African troops from the Zululand into Natal
after the disaster at Isandlwana contributed to the panic which subsidized the fear of Zulu
invasion with Natal’s white population. But they were no less dramatic than the desertions of
British members of the invasion force, including the white volunteers. Lieutenant-Governor
Bulwer even praised the “Native Auxiliaries” for their “good service” and assured all
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participants that “the memories of those who fell, and the circumstance of those whom the
war has bereaved, claim our warmest recognition.”189 Though the Natal Native Contingent
was an important component of Natal’s defence in the war, it does not even include the over
10,000 Africans called up for the “Native Levies”. These included forces under the command
of local magistrates in each of the military districts established at the time of the war. It
included 8,206 Africans on foot, 800 mounted, and 2,500 in reserve. These forces, less of an
invasion force, represent the most consistent element of African contribution to colonial rule.
They were “available for the Defence of the colony” according the government report, as
they had been available for the vast majority of the formative period of the colony of Natal.190

Indigenous military forces were always a key component to the establishment of
colonial authority within the British Empire. The colony of Natal was no different in that
respect. This chapter has only analysed a select number of incidences from within the colony
of Natal. Yet there is clear evidence of a continuing debate which took place within the
colony over the use and importance of indigenous forces. This debate largely focused on the
divides between Shepstone, the Natal government, and the local European population, which
included the Afrikaner sympathizer “One of the People”. As has been shown in previous
chapters, this was nothing new.

The period of Natal’s state formation was a time of great debate and fluidity within
the colony. Pressures from all groups within Natal would result in compromises and
consolidation from all sides, eventually achieving the outline of a fully functional colonial
state. The use of African troops in the defence of the colony, though a practical and largely
successful structure in Natal’s developing ideas of colonial defence, was an easy target for
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dissenters, reformers, and exceptionalists who were eager and sometimes overzealous in their
suggestions for alterations. They can be seen in Stainbank, “One of the People”, and Robson
for the volunteers, Dartnell, Currey, and Miles for the mounted police, or even Constable
Budaza, alias “Witboy”. All of these individuals challenged the established systems and
attempted to incorporate their own concepts of security within Natal. For African troops,
despite plans from the likes of Pine and Palmer, it was Theophilus Shepstone who defined
their use within the colony of Natal.

What does this tell us about the role of Africans in the defensive evolution of the
colony of Natal? It reveals that there was clear indigenous involvement in the security of the
colony. Such participation not only advances the theory of a type of militarization of society
that took place in Natal during this period but also provides a viable platform for
incorporating African agency into the administration and creation of Natal as a colonial state.
The indigenous African forces of the colony of Natal remained largely associated with British
administration and its treatment of other Africans. Nonetheless, these African military units
continued to prove again and again their presence, numbers, and capabilities were a key
component in the defence of the colony and the colonial structures that were established
during the formative years of the colony of Natal.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion
Shepstone’s 1892 vision of a peaceful Natal over its “forty six years of existence”
could, on the surface, be seen as a legitimate claim. Even the Anglo-Zulu War, despite fears
of a Zulu invasion after the disaster at Isandlwana, did not bring a major offensive or open
conflict into the hills of Natal. Peace, however, is not always the measurement of success, or
righteousness, when examining the history of the British Empire.1 The trope of “Pax
Britannica” and its use as a foundation for law and order within the British Empire is
evidence enough of such contradictions. As historians, we use such events as wars and
rebellions as a marker to indicate how a society evolves during its formation. This is why few
historians have attempted to look exclusively at this formative period in Natal, and instead
focus on the aftermath of the Anglo-Zulu War and the conflicts which permeated South
Africa as a whole during the build-up to the South African Wars. Although Natal was hardly
unique in the context of the emerging British Empire, its history did allow it to have a diverse
perspective on the development of colonial rule in Southern Africa during the nineteenth
century. The situation on the ground provide major case studies that illustrate a colonial state
coming to grips with multiple social, political, racial, and economic problems. The
relationships between white and black, European and African, whether beneficial,
destructive, or benign, remained intrinsic to Natal’s formation as a colonial state.

To claim that the making of Natal was defined solely by the military and police
organization which precipitated the formative period of the colony would be overly
simplistic. The impact of these institutions, however, cannot be dismissed. The relationships
which developed between European, Afrikaner, and African military and police institutions
1
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were indicative of a developing state attempting to come to grips with the problems of
security, stability, and safety within the colonial period. Whether autonomous from the
colonial government, or with its support, these institutions filled a void which was seen as
necessary for the safety and security of the colony. Though the volunteer systems were either
impractical or unnecessary, they provided a sense of security and community for the colonists
who took part in them. Though the police institutions, both white and black, were either
avenues for advancement within colonial society, or simply a means to maintain agency in
the expanding scope of British rule, they continued to represent an important pillar in colonial
order for the entirety of this formative period. And though the African military units used by
Shepstone and the magistracy were rooted in a combination of a shortage of manpower and
the perceived “martial race” characteristics of Natal’s indigenous inhabitants, their
participation in the major events of the colony illustrates the key role of the African in Natal’s
rise as a colonial entity. Such participation also advances the theory of a type of militarization
of society that took place in Natal during this period and provides a viable platform for
incorporating African agency into the administration and creation of Natal as a colonial state.
Moreover, the multifaceted approach to colonial rule utilized in this dissertation highlights
the hybridized makeup of Natal’s defensive institutions.

The foundations for future military and police actions were forged during this seminal
period. The volunteers would continue to hold on to their military tradition which stemmed
from the Langalibalele incident and Anglo-Zulu War. Their regimental histories clearly show
that the volunteers would endure (or possibly linger) into the twentieth century, taking part in
the First and Second World War, and created veterans’ associations which continue to this
day. The Royal Carbineer Association still has an active, if diminished, presence in Natal,
where they continue to hold meetings and organized events. The memory of their actions
during the Anglo-Zulu War have reached an almost mythical level, though this remains a
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common trend in the popular history of the Anglo- Zulu War, as has been commented on by
Jeff Guy.2 Little reference in these regimental histories was made to the Natal Carbineer’s
part in the brutal suppression of the Bambatha Rebellion in 1906, with a regimental history
written in 1945 simply stating the regiment was “in the thick of things taking their full share
of the hard work and fighting till the suppression of the trouble.”3 No reference is made to the
killings at Mome Gorge where 600 of Bambatha’s followers, given no chance to surrender,
were massacred by the segments of the volunteers.4 Nonetheless, there remains a strong
memory of the Carbineers and volunteers within the colony, and a Carbineer Street still cuts
through central Pietermaritzburg, though somewhat off the main road.5

The Natal Mounted Police did not fare as well as their volunteer counterparts. Though
they received some acclaim in their escorting of the Prince Imperial’s mother to the site of
her son’s death following the Anglo-Zulu War, their effectiveness as a police force declined
over the ensuing years. By 1892, the force was declared a failure by a magistrate’s
commission though it would retain a small force until its amalgamation with the rest of
Natal’s police branches in 1894. The unit would act as part of said police force well into the
next decade, and along with the volunteers would take part in the Bambatha Rebellion. Like
the rest of Southern Africa’s police forces, they were absorbed into the South African
Constabulary under the Union Government in 1910. Major Dartnell would eventually become

2
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Major General Dartnell, commanding Natal’s police forces for thirty years until becoming the
Honourable Colonel in Chief of the Colonial Forces of Natal.6

The African police would continue to act within the administrative system of the
British colonial government of Natal. Africans continued to be the majority of police in the
rural regions for the remainder of the nineteenth century. The Natal Native Police would also
act as the principle inspiration for the Zululand Police. Formed in 1883, the Zululand Police
oversaw the implementation of law and order for decades following the Anglo-Zulu War.
They also took part in the Bambatha Rebellion, and like their predecessors under Shepstone,
were instrumental in the putting down of their fellow Africans. Unlike many African police
during the early colonial period, however, there seemed to be a greater system of regulation
which was not a hallmark of the formative period of the colony. The Zululand Police
continued the tradition of the British government using Africans as a cheaper alternative to
white manpower. It also cultivated the advancement of these police as part of the “civilizing
mission” directed toward the colony’s African population. African troops and levies would
also be called upon in this same manner for the ensuing decades of the nineteenth and early
twentieth century, and even form a Natal Native Horse regiment during the Bambatha
Rebellion, continuing the tradition of African troops being used to put down other Africans in
rebellion.7

Though some work continues to be done on these aspects of Natal’s defensive
institutions, there is a gap in the historiography regarding the nature of these systems within
6
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Though easily dismissed as a typical British military official during the colonial period, there is space for a more
nuanced examination of his contribution to Natal’s colonial defensive institutions within the literature.
7
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Natal’s history. This dissertation has contributed to an understanding of Natal’s defensive
institutions, but more work is needed to better understand the role of these institutions in the
overall history of Natal, South Africa, and the British Empire. Larger questions of race,
colonial policy, resistance, and collaboration continue to be widely debated within the
historiography. Even with decolonization, the architects of African independence, to an
extent, are still attempting to define the greater nuances of these questions, especially
collaboration and resistance. Many African leaders, freedom fighters, or everyday peoples
were not exclusively part of secondary resistance institutions, collaboration, or simply
“stooges” working within the existing colonial systems. All were part of these African states
and systems’ rise to power and eventual independence. Resistors were not less enlightened
than their collaborator counterparts, but the idea of the “romantic reactionaries” to colonial
rule discussed by Robinson and Gallagher in many ways proved the foundation for future
nationalist narratives. Because of the positive and negative associations given by nationalist
narratives to resistance and collaboration, it has only been recently that historians have begun
to truly examine the growing complexities between these two identifiers.8 The very fact that
Africa was not conquered and colonial rule was not enforced by Europeans alone gives a
clear indication of the greater complexities that go with defining collaboration and resistance.
This dissertation is part of a growing body of work that no longer asks the question of “who
were collaborators and who were resistors” but instead asks the more evocative question of
“what were the roles of Africans in colonialism”.

This dissertation is also part of an emerging segment of the field attempting to define
the colony of Natal and Shepstone’s influence within a greater Southern African context.

8
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Recent scholarship by Jeff Guy and Thomas McClendon cast new light on Shepstone and
Natal during the formative period. There has been somewhat a backlash growing against the
work of Jeff Guy, particularly an upcoming review by Norman Etherington in the Journal of
New Zealand History which challenges several key components of Guys argument, particular
the importance of factors beyond Natal.9 Another is the upcoming article on “decentering
Shepstone” by Jeremy Martens, who has described Guy’s work as “a revisionist
piece…designed to provoke debate and disagreement”. Some will take issue with it in their
own work and incite debate on the topic of Shepstone and his place in Natal history.10 Such
debate is good for the field, as it forces those who support each side to delve deeper into the
archives and re-examine assumed premises of Natal’s history.11 Hlonipha Mokoena’s
unpublished work on African police in Natal in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century also illustrates the growing importance of looking at Natal from a new perspective.
Perhaps most encouraging, a new crop of recent PhDs and students have taken up the topic of
Shepstone, Natal, and the people of these regions in new and exciting ways.12 Such new
research, along with this dissertation, contributes to this growing component of African and
British imperial history. Natal, after being long overlooked, is finally beginning to gain the
attention it deserves.

It is perhaps most fitting that Natal was one of the only states which did not receive
the honour of hosting one of South Africa’s three capitals after the Act of Union in 1910.

9
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Practically, Natal was simply a victim of mathematics, claiming the smallest population
between the Cape Colony, Orange Free State, and South African Republic. Its omission,
however, is a telling example of Natal’s place in the consciousness and history of South
Africa. As has been shown, despite being close neighbours to three nations the British Empire
waged war with during the nineteenth century (the Afrikaner Republics and the Zulu
Kingdom), Natal forged itself into a viable colonial state with its own systems of
administration and defence that ensured its survival. These defensive institutions contribute a
small, but nevertheless important part of the underlying question of this topic: Natal’s rise as
a colonial state. Previous scholarship has tended to view the history of Natal as part of the
backdrop to the larger story of South Africa. This placement in South African history was far
from a foregone conclusion. At its core, the response and development of these defensive
institutions within the colony shows the fluid and contentious nature of state formation within
colonial Natal, and the British Empire as a whole. In essence, the fate of the colony of Natal,
with its incorporation into the Union of South Africa in 1910, should not be regarded as
inevitable or preordained. Instead, Natal built itself up as a colonial state to illustrate its place
as a viable colony within the British Empire. The defensive institutions it created were but
one layer of a foundation of colonial authority which precipitated the colonial period in
Southern Africa. The making of Natal, in the scope of South African history, was a
continuing process.

More importantly, these defensive institutions reveal a vital component in
understanding the nature of colonial rule in Natal. The debates over these systems of defence
and their continued evolution during the formative period highlights a massive disconnect
that existed between many segments of the colonial population. In many cases, settlers,
police, volunteers, and even African troops were unsure of their role within colonial society.
Despite all measures and assurances of “peace”, anxiety was the true state of existence in
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nineteenth century Natal. These defensive institutions were established for the sake of
protection against dangers, whether internal or external. With such concerns, it is no surprise
that the colonial state and its population were constantly attempting to improve or change
these systems for the perceived benefit of the colony as a whole, whether necessary or not.
When the editor of the Natal Witness feared the creation of “a Pretorian guard of savages”, he
ignored the success of those like Budaza. When blame was cast for the Langalibalele
Incident, the volunteers were raised up as martyrs and the Africans were singles out for
tardiness, despite the Africans being the primary force that put down the rebellion. These
attacks and condemnations of the defensive institutions were not only the product of racism
from the settler community, but were the product of fear, anxiety, and misunderstanding.
When colonists were attempting to “Make Natal”, they first and foremost wanted a safe
Natal. And despite all of their apprehension, it remained somewhat safe and peaceful, thanks
to the combined efforts of European and African, military and police, rich and poor, and
finally, wanted and unwanted. Combined, these defensive institutions were critical in the
making of colonial Natal.
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Appendix:
Map 1: Natal and Neighbouring States c. 1875 (CO 879/3)
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Map 2: Natal, c. 1860
Source: Franco Frescura Collection (Accessed from:
http://www.sahistory.org.za/content/colony-natal-and-part-colony-cape-1860 )
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